Learn About the Law
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. C. H., Defendant and Appellant.
Received for posting 6/30/10
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
The juvenile court decided to commit appellant to the DJJ so that he could participate in its sex offender program: “I think the best chance for [appellant] is at the
․ [DJJ], Sexual Offender Program․ [¶] I just think that's the place where he can receive the appropriate level of treatment and supervision․ [¶] I think the longer we wait, the longer we run the risk of not helping this young man.” “It's not like we're putting him in a cell, locking it up and walking away. We're not doing that. [¶] I don't know of any better program, quite frankly.” The court noted that “he's had three opportunities in three very fine programs. Rancho San Antonio is top notch, and he hasn't made it. And he doesn't make it because he hasn't wanted to.” The court was “fully satisfied that the mental and physical condition and qualifications of [appellant] are such as to render it probable that [he] will be benefited by the reformatory, educational discipline, and other treatment provided by the [DJJ].” The court also concluded that appellant “poses a significant risk to the safety of children in our community” and needs to be “in a place where he cannot have access to other potential victims. And that comes down to the [DJJ].”
The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion by Committing Appellant to the DJJ
“The decision of the juvenile court to commit a juvenile offender to [the DJJ] may be reversed on appeal only by a showing that the court abused its discretion. [Citation.] ‘[D]iscretion is abused whenever the court exceeds the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.’ [Citation.]” (In re Carl N. (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 423, 431-432.) “A decision by the juvenile court to commit a minor to the [DJJ] will not be deemed to constitute an abuse of discretion where the evidence ‘demonstrate[s] probable benefit to the minor from commitment to the [DJJ] and that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556.)
Appellant contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion because “1. There was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding of probable benefit from the commitment to DJJ; and [¶] 2. Alternative placements were not sufficiently considered and it was improper to reject the ones offered [by appellant].”
We disagree. The juvenile court's finding of probable benefit is amply supported by the probation officer's description of the DJJ sex offender treatment program. In the supplemental report filed on February 18, 2009, the probation officer explained that the program, which usually requires 24 months to complete, “is divided into four phases as follows: The Orientation Phase is approximately 28 weeks long. In this stage, youth gain an understanding of treatment concepts, rules of group therapy, psychological testing, and overall rules/expectations, including the expectation of full disclosure. The Core Program Phase[ ] is approximately 40 weeks. In this phase, youth go through an intense exploration of their sexual offender behavior patterns, identifying triggers, antecedents, perceptions, cognitions and emotions. They learn their assault cycle and how to interrupt it. The Relapse Phase is approximately 20 weeks. This [involves] the development of a detailed plan on how to interrupt the sexual offending cycle and prevent or eliminate criminal behaviors. [Appellant] will also participate in the following groups: victim awareness, anger management, and family dynamics counseling.”
The record demonstrates that the juvenile court considered less restrictive placements and did not abuse its discretion in rejecting them as ineffective or inappropriate. Appellant had dismally failed at three prior less restrictive placements. In view of these failures, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that appellant's best chance at rehabilitation was the DJJ sex offender treatment program. That program would provide him with extensive, long-term sex offender counseling in a highly structured, disciplined, and closely supervised environment. Such a restrictive environment was necessary to ensure appellant's participation in the treatment program.
Moreover, since appellant had been assessed as posing a high risk of reoffending, his commitment to the DJJ would ensure the safety of the community. “The purposes of juvenile wardship proceedings are twofold: to treat and rehabilitate the delinquent minor, and to protect the public from criminal conduct. [Citations.] The preservation of the safety and welfare of a state's citizenry is foremost among its government's interests․” (In re Jose C. (2009) 45 Cal.4th 534, 555.)
Because the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by committing appellant to the DJJ, we reject appellant's contention that the commitment violated his constitutional right to due process.
Appellant's Offense Renders Him Eligible for Commitment to the DJJ
Appellant contends that the commitment offense-lewd act upon a child under the age of 14 (Pen.Code, § 288, subd. (a))-does not qualify as an offense for which a ward may be committed to the DJJ because it is not listed in section 707, subdivision (b). Section 731, subdivision (a)(4), provides that the juvenile court may commit a ward to the DJJ “if the ward has committed an offense described in subdivision (b) of Section 707․”
In determining whether a violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), qualifies as an offense for which a ward may be committed to the DJJ, “[o]ur task is to ascertain legislative intent so we can ‘effectuate the purpose of the law.’ [Citations.] We begin with the statutory language, which is usually the most reliable indicator of legislative intent. [Citations.] Ordinarily, if that language is susceptible of only one meaning, ‘ “we presume the Legislature meant what it said, and the plain meaning of the statute controls.” ‘ [Citations.]” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1045-1046.)
The relevant statutory language clearly manifests the Legislature's intent that a violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), shall qualify as an offense for which a ward may be committed to the DJJ. Section 733, subdivision (c), provides that a ward shall not be committed to the DJJ if “the most recent offense alleged in any petition and admitted or found to be true by the court is not described in subdivision (b) of Section 707, unless the offense is a sex offense set forth in subdivision (c) of Section 290.008 of the Penal Code.” (Italics added.) A violation of Penal Code section 288 is one of the sex offenses set forth in Penal Code section 290.008, subdivision (c)(2).
Section 733 was added to the Welfare and Institutions Code in 2007 and became operative on September 1, 2007. (Stats.2007, c. 175, §§ 22, 37.) Section 731.1, also added in 2007, (Stats.2007, c. 175, § 20) provides that “the court committing a ward to the [DJJ], upon the recommendation of the chief probation officer of the county, may recall that commitment in the case of any ward whose commitment offense was not an offense listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707, unless the offense was a sex offense set forth in subdivision (c) of Section 290.008 of the Penal Code, and who remains confined in an institution operated by the [DJJ] on or after September 1, 2007.” (Italics added.) Thus, a court that committed a ward to the DJJ for a violation of Penal Code section 288, subdivision (a), cannot recall the commitment even though that offense is not listed in subdivision (b) of section 707. If the legislature had intended that only offenses listed in subdivision (b) of section 707 shall qualify for commitment to the DJJ, it would have permitted recall for an unlisted commitment offense irrespective of whether that offense was set forth in subdivision (c) of Penal Code section 290.008.
Disposition
The dispositional order of the juvenile court committing appellant to the DJJ is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
We concur:
Donald D. Coleman, Judge
Superior Court County of Ventura
Susan B. Gans-Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez, Michael J.Wise, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Thank you for your feedback!
As the largest network of trusted legal brands, we help firms build authority across the platforms consumers and AI systems rely on most. Our network helps attorneys strengthen visibility, credibility, and preference where legal decisions begin.
Docket No: No. B214707
Decided: May 18, 2010
Court: Court of Appeal, Second District, California.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)
Harness the power of our directory with your own profile. Select the button below to sign up.
Learn more about FindLaw’s newsletters, including our terms of use and privacy policy.
Get help with your legal needs
FindLaw’s Learn About the Law features thousands of informational articles to help you understand your options. And if you’re ready to hire an attorney, find one in your area who can help.
Search our directory by legal issue
Enter information in one or both fields (Required)