IN RE: EUGENE Z. (2010)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Mayra Z., the mother of Eugene Z., appeals from the juvenile court orders denying her petition for modification pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 ¹ and terminating her parental rights (§ 366.26).   Mayra contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her section 388 petition because she demonstrated she had made sufficient progress with her case plan to be a proper parent for Eugene, who had developed a strong bond with her, and erred in failing to apply the parent-child-relationship exception to termination of parental rights set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).   We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Mayra's History with the Department Before Eugene's Birth

In April 2005, about 28 months before Eugene was born, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) filed a section 300 petition on behalf of Mayra's first child, Lorena Z., alleging Mayra had a history of mental and emotional problems, had failed to take her prescribed psychotropic medication resulting in involuntary hospitalization in March 2005 and had a history of substance abuse.   The petition also alleged Mayra and Lorena's father had engaged in violent altercations.   Lorena was declared a dependent child of the juvenile court and suitably placed;  reunification services were ordered for Mayra and the father.   In February 2006 the court released Lorena to her father, and in August 2006 jurisdiction was terminated.

In April 2006 the Department filed a section 300 petition on behalf of Mayra's second child, Briana Z., alleging Mayra's history of mental and emotional problems and substance abuse placed Briana at risk of harm.   In May 2006 the court ordered Briana suitably placed and Mayra to be provided with family reunification services.   On March 6, 2007 the court terminated Mayra's family reunification services.

2. Eugene's Detention ;  the Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing

In mid-August 2007, several days after Eugene's birth, the Department received a referral from the child protection hotline alleging Eugene was at substantial risk of harm.   In connection with the Department's investigation, a social worker spoke to Mayra's therapist, Dr. Sharon Siegel, who stated her ²

On August 17, 2007 the social worker interviewed Mayra, who stated she had stopped taking her prescribed medication about two months earlier but was not feeling suicidal, homicidal or depressed and had been sober since May 2006.   The social worker reported she found Mayra “to be very withdrawn, it appeared that mother had very little interest in talking to this [social worker] and she had a flat affect, there was very little interaction, and mother had a difficult time in processing information.”   Later that day the Department took Eugene into protective custody.

On August 22, 2007 the Department filed a petition under section 300, subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling) on behalf of Eugene.   The petition alleged Eugene was at risk because Mayra had mental and emotional problems, including a diagnosis of major depression, was failing to take her prescribed medication and had a history of alcohol abuse.   The petition also alleged Eugene's half-sister Briana was a current dependent of the juvenile court for the same reasons and Mayra had failed to reunify with her.   At a detention hearing that day the juvenile court ordered Eugene detained in shelter care and family reunification services provided to Mayra with monitored visitation.³  The court also ordered Mayra attend all psychiatric sessions and take her prescribed medication.

On October 2, 2007, at the continued pretrial conference, Mayra submitted on an amended petition dismissing the alcohol abuse allegations and sibling count.   Although the court questioned why Mayra should be provided family reunification services with respect to Eugene-observing, “I don't see that anything has changed since the first detention of Briana”-the court nevertheless ordered reunification services be provided.

3. The Termination of Reunification Services After 20 Months

For the continued six-month review hearing on May 6, 2008 (§ 366.21, subd. (e)), the Department's report stated Mayra had completed parenting and individual counseling, was taking her medication and seeing her psychiatrist and had submitted to three drug tests that had negative results.   The Department nevertheless recommended reunification services be terminated because Mayra had been receiving individual counseling from a drug counselor rather than a licensed therapist, had not visited with Eugene since November 2007 and had failed to contact the Department in response to the social worker's several attempts to contact her by telephone, letter and in person.   The matter was continued for a contested hearing.

By June 10, 2008, the date of the contested hearing, the Department had changed its recommendation to continuing reunification services on the condition that Mayra comply with the case plan and enroll in counseling with a licensed therapist.   The court exercised its discretion to extend reunification services for only three months, rather than the usual six, telling Mayra, “[I]f you come back in three months and show me that you're going to comply with the case plan and you're going to visit when you're supposed to visit, that you're going to do all the programs that the Department is asking you to do, I will extend your reunification services for the full six months.”

A report for the September 30, 2008 review hearing stated Mayra appeared to be in compliance with court orders and had “made significant progress in visiting her child weekly,” but the Department had not received documentation from Mayra's therapist to assess her progress in therapy or verification from her psychiatrist that she was taking her medication.   The report also stated Eugene's caregiver had expressed concerns about Mayra's mental health because, for example, during a visit with Eugene it was “as if [Mayra] was zoned out or didn't appear to be in the present moment.”   The court extended reunification services for three months and terminated jurisdiction as to Briana, who had been adopted.

In the report prepared for the 12-month review hearing (§ 366.21, subd. (f)), the Department recommended Mayra receive an additional six months of reunification services because she had made substantial progress with her case plan:  She had been seeing her therapist and case manager biweekly, a psychiatrist who examined her in October 2008 did not prescribe medication because he did not believe she was depressed, she had seven consecutive clean drug tests and had been visiting Eugene more consistently.   The report noted, however, Mayra's therapist believed, although her mood was improving, Mayra had “an anxiety problem which impair[ed her] judgment.”   The Department stated it would seek additional information about this and help Mayra schedule visits with Eugene where they could more freely and naturally interact than they had been able to.  (Mayra had complained she was only permitted to visit with Eugene during church services, which required them to be quiet.)

At the 12-month review hearing on December 9, 2008 Mayra's counsel requested a contest on the issue of unmonitored visitation, and the court continued the matter to January 27, 2009 for a contested hearing.

By the time of the Department's January 2009 report for the contested 12-month review hearing, Mayra's compliance with her case plan had deteriorated, not unlike the pattern Mayra had previously demonstrated:  Mayra's therapist reported he had not seen her since December 4, 2008, which Mayra confirmed;  and she had not visited Eugene since the end of October 2008.  (Although Mayra had scheduled one visit, it was canceled because of rain.)   Nevertheless, the Department continued to recommend Mayra be provided with six additional months of reunification services.

After Mayra testified at the continued 12-month review hearing on January 27, 2009, the court expressed its concerns:  “I have concerns because although she is complying or attempting to comply at least partially with the case plan, she does not seem to be making much progress in terms of her compliance with the case plan and ability to be able to care for a one-year-old child.   She appears to the court to have not the best grasp on the-oriented as to time and space.   She can't recall visiting her child specific dates, can't recall specifically when she did or didn't see her therapist.   Her therapist indicated that he hasn't seen her since December 4. She gave some sort of explanation that somehow retroactively it was changed to once a week, but she didn't even go once a week.”   Nevertheless, the court gave Mayra “the benefit of the doubt,” notwithstanding its “serious doubts” and lack of optimism, and followed the Department's recommendation to provide Mayra with additional reunification services.   The court continued the matter to March 3, 2009 for the 18-month review hearing (§ 366.22).

The Department's report prepared for the 18-month review hearing described Eugene's strong bond with his foster parents with whom he had been living since he was five weeks old, and stated “the foster parents have expressed endlessly that they want to adopt Eugene.”   With respect to Mayra, the report stated she had not been complying with her case plan.   According to Mayra's therapist, Dr. Sterling Harris, Mayra had attended therapy twice since the January 27, 2009 hearing, but rescheduled the third session.   Dr. Harris described Mayra as “lazy” and did not believe she was ready to have her child back.   The report also stated Mayra, who was supposed to visit with Eugene on Wednesday mornings and Sundays, was often late to the Wednesday visits or would miss them without informing the Department in advance she could not attend.⁴  The monitor for the February 4, 2009 visit described Mayra as non-responsive:  “Monitor informed [social worker Mayra] appears to have a blank face when you talk to her and does not know if mother understands or hears what the monitor is saying.”   On March 3, 2009 the court set the matter for a contested hearing scheduled for April 7, 2009 based on the Department's recommendation the court terminate reunification services and set a permanent planning hearing under section 366.26.

The Department's report for the contested 18-month review hearing stated Mayra, according to Dr. Harris, had been attending her twice weekly sessions and making progress.   Dr. Harris described Mayra as “ ‘a lot ․ more animated about her visits with her son.   Mother is starting to enjoy the contact and visit with her son.’ ”   Mayra only missed one session, which she had called to cancel, “something mother has never done.”   The report also stated Mayra had been visiting Eugene more regularly, although still arriving late on Wednesdays, and, “[d]uring visits, [Mayra] plays with [Eugene] and appropriately corrects [Eugene] when [Eugene] misbehaves․”  Eugene's foster mother reported Eugene had “ ‘a wonderful time with [Mayra]” at a monitored visit to Disneyland in March 2008.   Notwithstanding Mayra's progress, the Department recommended reunification services be terminated given her inconsistent compliance and the lengthy period for which reunification services had already been provided.

The contested 18-month review hearing was continued until May 12, 2009 at which time the court terminated reunification services.   Although the court was “impressed with the fact ․ there appears to have been some progress made by [Mayra],” the court found it was “not enough when the therapist has indicated ․ that [Mayra] is lazy and needs to be pushed when it comes to doing things.”   Additionally, Mayra had received more than three or four years of reunification services from the time her first child had been detained and, with respect to Eugene, there was “no legal basis or factual basis to extend reunification services past the'22 date.”   The court continued the matter to September 8, 2009 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan pursuant to section 366.26 and encouraged Mayra to continue making progress if she intended to file a section 388 petition.

4. The Denial of Mayra's Section 388 Petition ;  Termination of Her Parental Rights

For the September 8, 2009 section 366.26 hearing the Department reported it was highly likely Eugene would be adopted by his foster parents, whose home study had been approved.   The Department recommended Mayra's parental rights be terminated and that Eugene be placed for adoption.   The court continued the matter to October 27, 2009 for a contested hearing.

Mayra filed a section 388 petition on October 27, 2009 seeking the return of Eugene to her (a home-of-mother order) or, alternatively, additional family reunification services and unmonitored visitation.   In her declaration in support of the petition, Mayra contended she was consistently attending therapy and visiting well with Eugene, who looked forward to seeing her.   She asserted any missed visits were due to problems the Department had transporting Eugene.   With her petition Mayra submitted a June 5, 2009 letter from Dr. Harris stating she had been attending therapy on time, twice a week, and “[h]er mood during therapy sessions is improved, especially when discussing visits with her son.”   The court continued the contested section 366.26 hearing to December 18, 2009 and scheduled Mayra's section 388 petition for hearing the same day.

In its report for the December 18, 2009 hearing, the Department recommended denial of the section 388 petition.   In addition to disputing several points asserted by Mayra in her petition and declaration, the Department described Mayra's inability to properly supervise Eugene during monitored visits:  “[Mayra] has been observed by more than one monitor to be engaged in what she is doing and neglecting to properly supervise Eugene at the visits.  [Mayra] attempts to engage Eugene in different activities, but Eugene is an active child and does not commit to an activity for a long period of time.   Frequently, [Mayra] would continue the activity even after child engages in something else and neglect to properly supervise Eugene․  It is a great concern to the Department regarding whether [Mayra] is able to properly supervise Eugene without a monitor present.”

After hearing argument, the juvenile court denied Mayra's petition, finding, “[W]hen looking at what circumstances have changed from 2005 to May of 2009 and from May of 2009 to today, I don't see any change.   She's still in the program.   She's still, quote unquote, making progress, which has been sort of more or less consistently what's been reported.   But it doesn't appear to the court that anything has changed significantly from then to now․  [E]ven if the court were to accept the argument that there's been changed circumstances, there's been absolutely a failure to establish that the requested modification would be in the child's best interest.”

Turning to the issues presented by the contested section 366.26 hearing, the court found Eugene adoptable and terminated Mayra's parental rights, notwithstanding Mayra's efforts through her testimony to establish she satisfied the parent-child-relationship exception to termination.   The court found, “There's no doubt that [Mayra] loves her son deeply.   But she's not shown today that her visits have been consistent or that she's played a parental role in Eugene's life.   She testified that at visits, which have always been monitored, that she plays games and she reads books and she brings him snacks.   And these are all very wonderful things to do with a child, but those in themselves do not constitute parenting.   She's never acted as a mother.   She's never taken him to a doctor's visit.   She couldn't even give the name of his pediatrician.   And it appears the only thing she knows about Eugene is what she's read in the social worker's reports.”

DISCUSSION

1. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Section 388 Petition

Section 388 provides for modification of prior juvenile court orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change of circumstances and demonstrates modification of the previous order is in the child's best interest.  (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317;  In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415;  In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 446;  see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(e).) ⁵

“A petition which alleges merely changing circumstances and would mean delaying the selection of a permanent home for a child to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote stability for the child or the child's best interests.”  (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.)   Moreover, even if a parent is able to demonstrate a genuine change of circumstances, the parent must also “show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child.”  (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529.)  “After the termination of reunification services, the parents' interest in the care, custody and companionship of the child are no longer paramount.   Rather, at this point ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability’ [citation], and in fact, there is a rebuttable presumption that continued foster care is in the best interest of the child.   [Citation.]  A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interest of the child.”  (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317;  see In re Casey D., at p. 47 [“ ‘ “[c]hildhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate” ’ ”].)

Ordinarily, the juvenile court's decision concerning a section 388 petition is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.  (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.)   We may disturb the juvenile court's exercise of that discretion only in the rare case when the court has made an arbitrary, capricious or “patently absurd” determination.  (Id. at p. 318.)   We do not inquire whether substantial evidence would have supported a different order, nor do we reweigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court.  (Id. at pp. 318-319.)

Since May 2009 Mayra appears to have been consistently attending therapy with improvement in her mood.⁶  Additionally, the consistency and frequency of her visits with Eugene had also improved although she was still late to some visits and others were canceled, whether through her fault or the Department's.   Nevertheless, we need not decide whether Mayra demonstrated she had genuinely changed her circumstances, rather than merely repeating a pattern of improvement followed by deterioration, because there is no question the court's determination a change of placement at this stage was not in Eugene's best interest was well founded.

Eugene had a very strong bond with his prospective adoptive parents, with whom he had been placed since he was five weeks old-almost two and one-half years by the December 18, 2009 hearing.   In contrast, although Mayra contended she and Eugene had also bonded, the evidence does not support a connection of such strength that it outweighs Eugene's interest in permanence and stability.   (See In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531 [“the strength of a child's bond to his or her present caretakers, and the length of time a child has been in the dependency system in relationship to the parental bond” is an important factor to be considered in evaluating best interest of child].)   Indeed, Mayra admitted to a Department social worker on October 7, 2009, “ ‘With regards to the visits I know when the foster mother drops off my son he tends to cry a lot.   But after awhile Eugene stops crying and warms up to me very well and our visits proceed well.   I believe my child is getting more used to the fact of seeing and interacting with me.’ ”   Mayra also expressed concern to Dr. Harris, as reflected in his December 18, 2009 letter, that her connection and bonding with Eugene had “decreased” because her visits had been reduced to once a week.

Although we are mindful that bonding between a foster caregiver and a very young child will invariably be greater than between the child and a parent permitted only limited visitation (see In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 531 [“the bond to the caretaker cannot be dispositive”] ), nothing in the record suggests a sufficient bond between Eugene and Mayra, or any other factor, that would justify a finding it would be in Eugene's best interest to return him to Mayra or otherwise delay the permanency and stability offered by his prospective adoptive parents.   In short, the trial court's denial of Mayra's section 388 petition was not an abuse of discretion.

2. Substantial Evidence Supports the Court's Finding Mayra Did Not Establish the Parent-child Exception to Termination of Her Parental Rights

Section 366.26 directs the juvenile court in selecting and implementing a permanent placement plan for a dependent child.   The express purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is “to provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).)  If the court has decided to end parent-child reunification services, the legislative preference is for adoption.  (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53 [“if the child is adoptable ․ adoption is the norm”];  see In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 [once reunification efforts have been found unsuccessful, the state has a “compelling” interest in “providing stable, permanent homes for children who have been removed from parental custody” and the court then must “concentrate its efforts ․ on the child's placement and well-being, rather than on a parent's challenge to a custody order”].)   When the court finds by clear and convincing evidence the child is likely to be adopted, the statute mandates judicial termination of parental rights unless the parent opposing termination can demonstrate one of six enumerated exceptions applies. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B);  see In re Celine, at p. 53 [“court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child”];  In re Matthew C. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 386, 392 [when child adoptable and declining to apply one of the statutory exceptions would not cause detriment to the child, the decision to terminate parental rights is relatively automatic].)

To satisfy the parent-child exception to termination of parental rights in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), a parent must prove he or she has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i);  see In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826 [“parent has the burden to show that the statutory exception applies”].)   The “benefit” prong of the exception requires the parent to prove his or her relationship with the child “promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.”   (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 [“the court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer”].)   No matter how loving and frequent the contact, and notwithstanding the existence of an “emotional bond” with the child, “the parents must show that they occupy ‘a parental role’ in the child's life.”  (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108;  In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418.)   The relationship that gives rise to this exception to the statutory preference for adoption “characteristically aris[es] from day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences.   Day-to-day contact is not necessarily required, although it is typical in a parent-child relationship.”   (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51.)   Moreover, “[b]ecause a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement.”  (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)

We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court's findings the parent-child relationship exception is inapplicable.  (See In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 424-425 [in an “[a]dmittedly ․ very close case,” trial court's conclusion was supported by substantial evidence and would not be disturbed].)   As we have discussed with respect to her section 388 petition, Mayra has failed to demonstrate even a minimal bond supporting the delay of a permanent plan for Eugene.   For these same reasons, Mayra has failed to demonstrate, among other things, she occupies a parental role in Eugene's life warranting application of the parent-child relationship exception to termination of her parental rights.  (See In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 51 [showing of strong and beneficial parent-child relationship will be difficult to make when parent has never had custody or “advanced beyond supervised visitation”;  “difficulty is due to the factual circumstances of the parents in failing to reunify and establish a parental, rather than caretaker or friendly visitor relationship with the child”].)

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code..  FN1. Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

FN2. The December 2006 report stated in part, “[Mayra] is not motivated to participate in psychotherapy, and despite repeated efforts to have her come in for treatment she is not therapeutically engaged.   She does not demonstrate an ability to keep appointments or show up for walk-in sessions, nor to address issues of significance when present although early in treatment she appeared interested in doing so.  [¶] [Mayra] does not address issues of depression or attend meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous unless they are mandated and occur on site at her residence.   She has been reticent about attending anger management groups, parenting classes, and domestic violence groups.  [¶] Clinical depression, apathy perhaps due to mental health issues, poor decision-making, and lack of communication skills adversely affect [Mayra's] functioning.   She has temporary spurts of interest in meeting the mandates of the court [regarding custody of Brianna] only when threatened with immediate loss of her child.  [¶] I recommend continued monitored visitation with the child, for the child's sake as well as for [Mayra's].”.  FN2. The December 2006 report stated in part, “[Mayra] is not motivated to participate in psychotherapy, and despite repeated efforts to have her come in for treatment she is not therapeutically engaged.   She does not demonstrate an ability to keep appointments or show up for walk-in sessions, nor to address issues of significance when present although early in treatment she appeared interested in doing so.  [¶] [Mayra] does not address issues of depression or attend meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous unless they are mandated and occur on site at her residence.   She has been reticent about attending anger management groups, parenting classes, and domestic violence groups.  [¶] Clinical depression, apathy perhaps due to mental health issues, poor decision-making, and lack of communication skills adversely affect [Mayra's] functioning.   She has temporary spurts of interest in meeting the mandates of the court [regarding custody of Brianna] only when threatened with immediate loss of her child.  [¶] I recommend continued monitored visitation with the child, for the child's sake as well as for [Mayra's].”

FN3. The identity of Eugene's father is unknown..  FN3. The identity of Eugene's father is unknown.

FN4. In response to Mayra's complaints that Eugene's foster mother had canceled many visits and the quality of the visits was suffering because they occurred during church services, the Department agreed to monitor visits on Wednesday mornings at a Department office.   Mayra arrived 20 minutes late for her first Wednesday visit on January 14, 2009.   On January 21, 2009 the Department called Mayra 20 minutes after she had failed to show up;  Mayra returned the call 20 minutes later and said she would not be able to visit because she was ill.   On January 28, 2009 the social worker called Mayra at 8:00 a.m. to remind her of the 9:30 a.m. visit;  Mayra responded she would not be able to get there until 30 to 45 minutes after the scheduled start time.   After the social worker told Mayra there was only a 15 minute grace period for being late, Mayra said she would visit Eugene the following week and did not request a make-up visit..  FN4. In response to Mayra's complaints that Eugene's foster mother had canceled many visits and the quality of the visits was suffering because they occurred during church services, the Department agreed to monitor visits on Wednesday mornings at a Department office.   Mayra arrived 20 minutes late for her first Wednesday visit on January 14, 2009.   On January 21, 2009 the Department called Mayra 20 minutes after she had failed to show up;  Mayra returned the call 20 minutes later and said she would not be able to visit because she was ill.   On January 28, 2009 the social worker called Mayra at 8:00 a.m. to remind her of the 9:30 a.m. visit;  Mayra responded she would not be able to get there until 30 to 45 minutes after the scheduled start time.   After the social worker told Mayra there was only a 15 minute grace period for being late, Mayra said she would visit Eugene the following week and did not request a make-up visit.

FN5. Section 388 provides a parent or other interested party “may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court ․ for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made․  [¶] ․ [¶] ․ If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, ․ the court shall order that a hearing be held․”.  FN5. Section 388 provides a parent or other interested party “may, upon grounds of change of circumstance or new evidence, petition the court ․ for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made․  [¶] ․ [¶] ․ If it appears that the best interests of the child may be promoted by the proposed change of order, ․ the court shall order that a hearing be held․”

FN6. A December 18, 2009 letter from Dr. Harris stated, “[Mayra] has continued weekly contacts for therapy she comes weekly [sic ].  [Mayra] continues to be on time for her therapy session.   Her mood during therapy sessions continues to improve[ ], especially when discussing visits with her son.  [Mayra] would need to remain involved with therapy if she were to reunite with her son consistently.”.  FN6. A December 18, 2009 letter from Dr. Harris stated, “[Mayra] has continued weekly contacts for therapy she comes weekly [sic ].  [Mayra] continues to be on time for her therapy session.   Her mood during therapy sessions continues to improve[ ], especially when discussing visits with her son.  [Mayra] would need to remain involved with therapy if she were to reunite with her son consistently.”

WOODS, J. JACKSON, J.