IN RE: R.R. et al. (2010)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, Byron G. Shibata, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Father, F.R., appeals from an order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights with his children R.R., Re.R., and C.R. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Because this is an unreported opinion and the parties are familiar with the facts, we will dispense with their recitation here.   To the extent they are relevant, we discuss the facts in our resolution of the single issue on appeal, whether the court erred in failing to find that termination of father's parental rights would be detrimental to the children because he had “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child[ren] and the child[ren] would benefit from continuing the relationship.”  (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) ¹

In brief, the three children were detained by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in December 2007 due to domestic violence between their father and mother and father's use of drugs and alcohol.   At the time, R.R. was three years old, Re.R. was nearly two and C.R. was nine months of age.   R.R. was subsequently assessed as having a speech delay, mild retardation and autistic tendencies.   Re.R. displayed some negative emotional and behavioral issues.   The children were eventually placed together in the home of their paternal uncle and aunt who have expressed the desire to adopt all three children.

Father visited the children fairly often during the nearly two years that the children were under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.   His unmonitored visits sometimes lasted as long as six hours.   He brought the children clothes and toys, played with them, read to them, changed C.R.'s diapers and helped R.R. with his homework.   The children always seemed happy to see father and were disappointed on the few occasions that he missed a visit.

At the hearing on termination of parental rights the court heard testimony and considered documentary evidence on whether terminating father's parental rights would be detrimental to the children.   The court concluded that “[w]hile there may have been regular visitation between [father] and his children, there's no evidence before me that [the children] would benefit from continuing that relationship.”

The court terminated father's parental rights and father filed a timely appeal.²

DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is undisputed that under the facts of this case the court was required to terminate parental rights and order the children placed for adoption unless it found “a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child[ren] ․“ (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B), italics added.)   A court may forego terminating parental rights if the parent has “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child[ren] and the child [ren] would benefit from continuing the [parent-child] relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)   Father bore the burden of proving that the “parental relationship” exception applied in this case.  (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527.)

Father maintains that the court erred in terminating his parental rights because he produced substantial evidence to support the “parental relationship” exception and there was no substantial evidence to the contrary.   For the reasons discussed below, we disagree.

II. EVIDENCE RELEVANT TO THE “PARENTAL RELATIONSHIP”

EXCEPTION

There are two prongs to the “parental relationship” exception to termination of parental rights.   First the parent must show that he or she “maintained regular visitation and contact with the child.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)   Second, the parent must show that “the child would benefit from continuing the [parent-child] relationship.”  (Ibid.) The trial court did not make a specific finding as to the first prong, although it acknowledged “there may have been regular visitation between [father] and his children.”   The court did make a finding, however, that there was “no evidence” that the children would benefit from continuing their parental relationship with father.

“To meet the burden of proving the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) exception the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits-the parent must show that he or she occupies a parental role in the life of the child.”  (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1527.)   Moreover, the Legislature's requirement that the parent show a “compelling reason” not to terminate parental rights (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)) means the parent must prove a relationship that promotes the well-being of the child “to such a degree that it outweigh[s] the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.”  (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.)

Father has not played a parental role in the lives of his three children.

At the time the children were detained, R.R. was three years old, Re.R. was nearly two and C.R. was nine months of age.   By the time of the permanent plan hearing the children had lived out of father's custody nearly as long or longer than they had lived under his custody.   Furthermore, the time the children did live with father was marked by domestic violence and drug and alcohol abuse.

During the time the children were in foster care, father demonstrated no interest or understanding of R.R.'s and Re.R.'s special needs.   The record shows that after the children were detained they were referred for a health assessment by a medical doctor.   The doctor reported that R.R. was “developmentally delayed with severe language delays” and that Re. R. was also found to be “developmentally delayed in personal, social, fine motor and gross motor” skills.   Father initially refused to consent to the children's referral to the San Gabriel/Pomona Regional Center for further evaluation.³  He later claimed that “nothing is wrong with his children” and that the regional center made “false statements” about the children's need for its services.   He told the DCFS worker that “he will no longer participate in any services for the children.”   Despite the court's warning that father needed “to start participating in the children's services [and] to know what to do for them if I'm going to release them in his care at some point” father “demonstrated [no] interest in being trained in the area of [his children's] special needs[.]”  At the permanency planning hearing father continued to deny that any of his children had any special needs with respect to their education or mental health.

Father's obstinate refusal to even acknowledge R.R's and Re.R.'s special needs much less cooperate in addressing them was sufficient to support the court's finding that no parental relationship existed sufficient to compel an exception to the rule requiring termination of parental rights.

DISPOSITION

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. All undesignated references below are to the Welfare and Institutions Code..  FN1. All undesignated references below are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

FN2. The court also terminated the mother's parental rights.   Mother is not a party to this appeal..  FN2. The court also terminated the mother's parental rights.   Mother is not a party to this appeal.

FN3. Regional centers are private, nonprofit corporations that contract with the DCFS to help the state carry out its responsibilities to developmentally disabled persons and their families.  (In re Social Services Payment Cases (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1257.).  FN3. Regional centers are private, nonprofit corporations that contract with the DCFS to help the state carry out its responsibilities to developmentally disabled persons and their families.  (In re Social Services Payment Cases (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1257.)

MALLANO, P.J. JOHNSON, J.