IN RE: K.P. (2010)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

O P I N I O N

A.P. (father) appealed from an order terminating parental rights (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 366.26) to his daughter K.¹ After reviewing the entire record, father's court-appointed appellate counsel informed this court that he could find no arguable issues to raise in this appeal.   Counsel in turn requested and this court granted leave for father to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error does exist.  (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835.)

Father has since filed a letter.   In it, he characterizes himself, his wife, and his parents as victims of discrimination by law enforcement and child protective services agencies.   He also asks that his family receive custody of K. On review, we conclude the letter does not amount to a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

At the time of K.'s birth in the summer of 2009, father was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee charged with the December 2008 murder of his son, 17-month-old A. K.'s mother was free on bail on pending related charges.   According to a coroner's report, A. died of blunt force injuries to his abdomen and head.   Chronic child abuse contributed to the child's death.   It was under these circumstances that respondent Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) detained newborn K. and initiated the underlying dependency proceedings.

Following a two-day evidentiary hearing in October 2009, the Stanislaus County Superior Court exercised its dependency jurisdiction (§ 300, subds.(a), (b) & (g)) over K. and removed her from parental custody.   The court specifically found K. was at substantial risk of danger because:  A. was nonaccidentally injured to the point of death;  it was father's conduct that caused the injuries that killed A.;   and it was the mother's inability or refusal to protect A., despite her awareness of father's abusive conduct, that resulted in A.'s death.   The mother did not accept the fact that A. died at the hands of father.   Indeed, she “very much wishe[d]” to continue her marital relationship with father.

The court also found clear and convincing evidence to deny each parent reunification services on multiple grounds (§ 361.5, subds.(b)(4), (b)(6) & (e)(1)).   Further, the court could not find clear and convincing evidence that reunification would be in K.'s best interest (§ 361.5, subd. (c)).

Consequently, the court set a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan for K. Despite receiving notice of his right to challenge the court's findings by way of writ, father did not pursue writ relief in this court.

In January 2010, the court conducted its section 366.26 hearing.   It received into evidence the agency's report in which it assessed K. as likely to be adopted.   Due to the likelihood that K. would be adopted, the agency recommended the court terminate parental rights.   At the January 2010 hearing, there was no dispute over K.'s adoptability.   Rather, the mother urged the court to find termination would be detrimental to K. because the mother regularly visited and wished to have a continuing relationship with K. Father opposed termination but had no evidence to offer.

The court found K. was likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights.   The court observed there was no evidence before it that K. would be significantly harmed if parental rights were terminated.

DISCUSSION

An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct.  (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)   It is up to an appellant to raise claims of reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made.   If an appellant does not do so, the appeal should be dismissed.  (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)   Father does not raise any arguable claim of error or other defect against the termination order from which he appeals.   Thus, we have no reason to reverse or even modify the termination order.  (Ibid.)

In large part, father's letter is a complaint against the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional findings that he and the mother were responsible for A.'s death and, thus, posed a significant risk of harm to K. The time to challenge those findings, however, has passed.   They were reviewable by way of writ petition to this court after the juvenile court set the section 366.26 hearing. (§ 366.26, subd. (l ).)  Because father did not seek such writ review of the jurisdictional and dispositional findings, he has forfeited the right to complain about them in this appeal.  (Ibid.)

To the extent father asks that the court give custody of K. to father's family, father misunderstands this court's authority as a reviewing court.   We review claims of reversible legal error, that is, the trial court erred by making or failing to make a particular finding or order.  (In re Sade C., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 994.)

At the termination hearing, the court's proper focus was on the child to determine whether it was likely she would be adopted and if so, order termination of parental rights.   The court at this stage of dependency proceedings must address the child's need for permanency and stability.  (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.)   If, as in this case, the child is likely to be adopted, adoption is the norm.   Indeed, the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.  (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)   Here, there was no compelling reason to select a permanent plan other than adoption.

The child's placement, that is, where or with whom the child will live is not ordinarily at issue at a termination hearing.  (See § 366.26.) Furthermore, in this case, no one raised an issue regarding K.'s placement at the termination hearing.   Consequently, we will not now allow father, who sat by silently, to argue that the juvenile court erred in not being psychic.  (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.)

DISPOSITION

The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

FOOTNOTE.  

FN1. All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated..  FN1. All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.