CATHEDRAL CITY PUBLIC SAFETY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION v. CITY OF CATHEDRAL CITY (1999)

O P I N I O N

Appellant Cathedral City Public Safety Management Association (herein the “Association”) appeals from the judgment denying its petition for writ of mandate (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085) challenging the actions of the City of Cathedral City, its city manager, George Trupelli, its mayor, David Berry, and the members of the city council, Gary Amy, Greg Pettis, Joe Valasquez, and Sarah Di Grandi (herein collectively referred to as the “City”) during the course of the parties' employment negotiations.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND AND FACTS

The Association is an employee organization whose membership consists of all full-time sworn employees of the Cathedral City Police Department of the rank of sergeant, and above, with the exception of the chief of police, and all full-time sworn employees of the Cathedral City Fire Department of the rank of fire captain, and above, with the exception of the fire chief.   The Association had a memorandum of understanding (herein “MOU”) with the City effective January 1, 1994, through December 31, 1995, which governed compensation, attendance, and other terms and conditions of employment.

Relations between local public employers and their employees are governed generally by the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (herein the “Act”).  (Gov.Code, § 3500 et seq.¹ )  The Act addresses such matters as representation by employee organizations like the Association, negotiations, MOU, and mediation.   It also provides for a public agency's adoption of reasonable rules and regulations for administration of employee relations under the Act. The City adopted such rules and regulations many years ago by Resolution 82-84.

Pursuant to the Act, in December 1995, the Association and the City began negotiating a new MOU. Between January and August, 1996, representatives of the Association and the City met 11 times, approximately twice a month, to discuss various employment issues.   However, no agreement was reached.

Resolution 82-84, section 13, provides procedures for the resolution of impasses.   One of those procedures is mediation.   Thus, pursuant to section 13 of Resolution 82-84, a mediation session was conducted on August 26, 1996, by a mediator from the California State Mediation and Conciliation Bureau.   However, no agreement was reached.   From August 1996, through May 1997, the parties communicated sporadically about the employment issues and about procedures for resolving the impasse.   On May 19, 1997, the City made another offer which the Association rejected on May 21.

An alternative impasse resolution procedure specified by Resolution 82-84, section 13, is a determination by the city council following a hearing on the merits of the dispute.   Pursuant to that provision, on June 30, 1997, the City informed the Association that the city council would hold an impasse hearing on August 13, 1997, to resolve the impasse.

On July 16, 1997, before the impasse hearing, the Association filed its first petition for writ of mandate seeking to compel the City to meet and confer in good faith and/or submit to arbitration.   The hearing on that petition was originally set for August 21, 1997, after the City's planned impasse hearing.

On August 13, 1997, the city council held the impasse hearing.   After the hearing, the city council recessed into closed session and discussed the matter further with the City's labor negotiator.   The city council voted 5-0 to impose the City's May 19, 1997, last and best final offer pursuant to section 13(B) of Resolution 82-84.   Those employment terms were then documented in a new MOU effective July 1, 1997, through December 31, 1999.

On August 29, 1997, the City filed an opposition to the Association's first petition which then had been set for hearing on September 19, 1997, addressing the issues raised.   The Association replied, raising new arguments concerning the conduct of the impasse hearing, which had been held since the filing of its original petition, and concerning the imposition of a new MOU with a term extending to December 31, 1999.   Following the hearing on the first petition, the trial court ruled:  “NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Mandate is DENIED with prejudice except that the Petition is denied without prejudice as to the claims made in Petitioner's Reply Brief that the conduct of the City Council Impasse Hearing and the imposition of a contract with a term extending to December 31, 1999 constituted unfair labor practices.”

On November 12, 1997, the Association filed its second petition for writ of mandate alleging the City had failed to meet and confer in good faith as required by law and seeking mandamus to compel rescission of the new MOU and to compel the City to resume bargaining with the Association to a mutual resolution.   The Association argued the unilateral imposition of a “contract” with a term of two years and six months was an unfair practice.   On March 3, 1998, the trial court denied the second petition, stating:  “The court found that [the City] met and conferred in good faith and fully complied with Government Code Section 3505, and that the subject Memorandum of Understanding is valid, appropriate and is not an unfair or arbitrary labor practice.”

The Association appealed.

ISSUES

The Association raises two issues on appeal.   First, it contends that the trial court erred in finding that the City had met and conferred in good faith prior to the imposition of the unilateral MOU. Second, it faults the trial court for ruling that the two-year, six-month, MOU is valid, appropriate and not an unfair labor practice.

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE SUPPORTS A FINDING THAT THE CITY HAD MET AND CONFERRED IN GOOD FAITH WITH THE ASSOCIATION

“The [Act] was adopted in 1968, after several more modest attempts to regulate labor relations for local government employees.   Its stated purpose is to provide ‘a reasonable method of resolving disputes regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment․’  [Citation.]   Its principal means for doing so is by imposing on public agencies the obligation to ‘meet and confer in good faith regarding wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment with representatives of recognized employee organizations․'  [Citation.]   The duty to meet and confer in good faith has been construed as a duty to bargain with the objective of reaching binding agreements between agencies and employee organizations over the relevant terms and conditions of employment.  [Citation.]   The duty to bargain requires the public agency to refrain from making unilateral changes in employees' wages and working conditions until the employer and employee association have bargained to impasse;  this duty continues in effect after the expiration of any employer-employee agreement.  [Citation.]”  (Santa Clara County Counsel Attys. Assn. v. Woodside (1994) 7 Cal.4th 525, 536-537, 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 617, 869 P.2d 1142, emphasis added.)

 “The question of good or bad faith on the part of the ․ employer is primarily a factual one.  [Citation.]   Resolution of the question of good faith necessarily involves consideration of all the facts of a particular case.  [Citation.]   In the instant case the court found that respondent at all times met and conferred in good faith.   Where there is substantial evidence to support a finding of the trial court, the appellate court will uphold the trial court's finding.  [Citation.]

 “ ‘Whether a party is chargeable with an overall failure to bargain in good faith “involves a finding of motive or state of mind,” which must be inferred from the evidence viewed as a whole.’  [Citation.]   The duty to confer in good faith does not compel either side to make concessions or to yield any positions fairly maintained, but it does require the parties to bargain with an open mind and sincere intention to reach an agreement.  [Citation.]”  (Lipow v. Regents of University of California (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 215, 227, 126 Cal.Rptr. 515;  see also, Placentia Fire Fighters v. City of Placentia (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 9, 25, 129 Cal.Rptr. 126;  Public Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 797, 805, 213 Cal.Rptr. 491.)

 Without citing to specific instances, the Association generally argues that the imposition of the unilateral MOU which covers a time period of two years and six months shows the City's failure to meet and confer in good faith.   We disagree.   The record before us shows that, in December 1995, the City began negotiating a new MOU. Between January and August 1996, representatives of the City and the Association met eleven times, approximately twice a month, to discuss various employment issues.   Nonetheless, they were unable to reach an agreement.   Finding themselves at an impasse, a mediation session was conducted on August 26, 1996, pursuant to Resolution 82-84, section 13.   However, once again no agreement was reached.

From August 1996, through May 1997, the parties communicated sporadically about the employment issues and about procedures for resolving the impasse.   Finally, on May 19, 1997, the City made another offer which the Association rejected on May 21.   On June 30, 1997, the City once again turned to Resolution 82-84, section 13, looking for a means to end the impasse.   On that day, the City informed the Association that the city council would hold an impasse hearing on August 13, 1997, to resolve the impasse.   As a result of the hearing, the city council voted 5-0 to impose the City's May 19, 1997, last and best final offer which was documented in the new MOU effective July 1, 1997, through December 31, 1999.

Although the Association insinuates that the October 23, 1997, memorandum from the city manager to the president of the Association illustrates the City's intent to unilaterally impose conditions on the Association, we find otherwise.   According to the memorandum, section 8.3.a of the MOU incorrectly contained the word “fire officer.”   As the memorandum explained, “The word ‘fire officer’ is being deleted from this section, as it was incorrectly included back on January 1, 1993 and has remained in error up to, and including, the current MOU. This language does not affect anyone currently working under the [Association] MOU.” The Association fails to point to any evidence which contradicts the language of the memorandum which explains a mere clerical correction to the MOU.

Based on the above, we conclude that the trial court's finding that the City acted in good faith is supported by substantial evidence, and cannot be disturbed.

THE TWO-YEAR, SIX-MONTH MOU IS VALID, APPROPRIATE, AND NOT AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE

 Quoting the language of section 3505, the Association faults the trial court for finding that the two-year, six-month MOU is valid.   Section 3505, in relevant part, provides:  “ ‘Meet and confer in good faith’ means that a public agency ․ and representatives of recognized employee organizations, shall have the mutual obligation personally to meet and confer promptly upon request by either party and continue for a reasonable period of time in order ․ to endeavor to reach agreement on matters within the scope of representation prior to the adoption by the public agency of its final budget for the ensuing year.”  (Emphasis added.)   Relying on the words “prior to the adoption by the public agency of its final budget for the ensuing year,” the Association argues that the language of section 3505 implies a time limit on the term of a MOU imposed after an impasse, and that “the customary bargaining regarding local agency public employees is confined to the usual budgetary year.”   We disagree.

 The language in the statute is clear.   The reference to the “ensuing year” simply specifies the point of time during which the parties should meet and confer, not duration that any resulting MOU should be effective.   If we were to accept the Association's interpretation of the statute, then it would follow that no MOU, agreed upon by both parties or unilaterally imposed, could have a term of more than one year.   We find such interpretation of section 3505 too constricting on the parties' freedom to bargain,² lacking in common sense, and not supported by case law.  (Placentia Fire Fighters v. City of Placentia, supra, 57 Cal.App.3d 9, 13, 129 Cal.Rptr. 126, [parties executed an MOU pursuant to the Act with a term of two years, nine months];  San Joaquin County Employees Assn. v. City of Stockton (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 813, 817, 207 Cal.Rptr. 876, [MOU at issue was executed in November 1981, and expired on June 30, 1983].)  Furthermore, as the City points out, it negotiated with the Association for over one and one-half years before the City finally resolved the matter.   If the MOU were limited by law to a term of one year, the parties would remain in a state of almost continuous negotiations.   Nothing in the Act suggests such a useless and wasteful requirement.

Turning to the record, we find evidence which shows that the City had a valid reason for selecting a term of two years, six months for the MOU. The MOU provides that the salary increase for the employees will be based on an increase in general fund revenues of June 30, 1996, compared to June 30, 1998.   The City did not anticipate that there would be any increase in general fund revenues until at least June 30, 1998.   Selecting an earlier date would likely show no increase in the general fund revenues, resulting in no salary increase.   As the audited financial statements for June 30, 1998, will not be received by the City until January 1, 1999, a date earlier than January 1, 1999, could not have been selected.   The date of December 31, 1999, was also selected because two other MOU's with City employees (the Fire Fighters Association and the Police Officers Association) terminate on December 31, 1999.   These other MOU's together with the MOU at issue in this case cover all personnel of the Police and Fire Departments except for the chiefs of each department.   Selecting the same date for expiration of all MOU's enables the City to plan its budget effectively.

Based on the above, we find the MOU imposed by the City was valid and did not constitute an unfair labor practice.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.

2.   We note that the prior MOU between the Association and the City had a term of two years, from January 1, 1994, through December 31, 1995.

HOLLENHORST, Acting P.J.

RICHLI, J., and WARD, J., concur.