GRANT v. CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY (2026)

OPINION

Plaintiffs Findlay Grant and Christian Walsh challenge the grant of summary judgment for defendant Chapman University on their claims related to Chapman's suspension of in-person education during the COVID-19 pandemic. They assert Chapman breached an implied contract to provide in-person education.

Six years after the pandemic started, courts nationwide still grapple with these kinds of claims. California case law already provides that an implied promise by a university is enforceable only if it is “specific” and does not merely represent a “general expectation.” We contribute to the debate by holding that even the extensive statements here, which listed class locations and touted on-campus facilities and “face-to-face contact” with faculty, are not sufficiently “specific” to constitute enforceable implied promises. As the trial court correctly granted summary judgment, we affirm.

FACTS

Plaintiffs were enrolled students at Chapman in early 2020, as COVID-19 was spreading in California. Like many universities nationwide, Chapman closed its campus and transitioned to online instruction in March 2020, following lockdown orders issued by local authorities.

Ahead of the Fall 2020 semester, Chapman communicated with students about the possibility of returning to campus. It stated in June that its “goal” was to reopen and described plans for a mix of in-person, online, and hybrid classes. The following month, Chapman said it “remain[ed] optimistic” about resuming on-campus instruction but explained this depended on the authorities' “support and approval.” Come August, Chapman informed students it was unlikely to receive this approval and thus would proceed with remote instruction. Plaintiffs remained enrolled and later graduated.

Plaintiffs sued Chapman, asserting breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and unfair business practices. Though they did not fault Chapman for closing its campus during the COVID-19 emergency, they claimed this was a breach of contract and sought a partial tuition refund. Alternatively, they claimed that even if the emergency excused Chapman's obligation to deliver in-person education, the university was unjustly enriched by retaining their full tuition. They also alleged Chapman had unfairly or unlawfully represented it would provide in-person education.

Chapman moved for summary judgment, contending there was no evidence it had promised to provide in-person education. In opposition, plaintiffs identified various university publications and practices they contended reflected an enforceable promise. These included (1) Chapman's course registration portal listing class times and locations; (2) a credit-hour policy requiring a weekly hour of “face-to-face contact” per credit-hour for traditional classes but not for online classes; (3) statements in a faculty handbook about on-campus teaching and availability; (4) descriptions of high-end campus facilities in Chapman's undergraduate and graduate catalogs, which noted they were “for informational purposes and should not be considered as the basis of a contract between students and the University”; and (5) Chapman's historical practice of offering primarily in-person instruction.

The trial court granted summary judgment for Chapman, concluding that Berlanga v. University of San Francisco (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 75, 318 Cal.Rptr.3d 782 (Berlanga) foreclosed plaintiffs' claims. And it found no triable issue that Chapman had misrepresented its educational program.

DISCUSSION

We conclude the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Chapman because in-person education was not part of the parties' bargain. “Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no triable issues of material fact such that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all causes of action.” (Choi v. Sagemark Consulting (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 308, 318, 226 Cal.Rptr.3d 267.) We review the trial court's ruling de novo, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” (Ibid.)

Courts have recognized that the student-university relationship is unique; universities must have leeway to modify their programs in exercising their educational responsibility. (Kashmiri v. Regents of University of California (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 809, 824, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 635 (Kashmiri).) Courts therefore apply contract law only to “specific promise[s]” the universities undertake. (Id. at p. 826, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 635.) General promises or expectations are unenforceable. (Ibid.)

Absent a formal agreement between the student and the university, the terms of their contract are implied based on the parties' reasonable expectations, in light of all the circumstances. (Kashmiri, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 828, 831–832, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 635.) In evaluating those expectations, courts may consider representations in university publications. (Id. at pp. 828–829, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 635.) “The reasonableness of the student's expectation is measured by the definiteness, specificity, or explicit nature of the representation at issue.” (Id. at p. 832, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 635.) In Kashmiri, for example, the court found an enforceable promise where the university expressly assured students a certain fee “ ‘will remain the same for each student for the duration of his or her enrollment’ ” and that increases will “ ‘apply to new students only.’ ” (Id. at pp. 816, 833, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 635.)

Courts across the country have reached different conclusions on whether campus shutdowns during the pandemic violated enforceable promises for in-person education. (Compare, e.g., Jones v. Administrators of the Tulane Educational Fund (5th Cir. 2022) 51 F.4th 101, 114 [plausible inference that university agreed to provide in-person instruction], with, e.g., Polley v. Northwestern University (N.D. Ill. 2021) 560 F.Supp.3d 1197, 1208–1209 [students failed to plead “specific promise” of in-person education].)

The only published California Court of Appeal decision on-point, Berlanga, concluded the parties' “general expectations” for in-person classes did not “amount to an enforceable term of the parties' contract.” (Berlanga, supra, 100 Cal.App.5th at p. 86, 318 Cal.Rptr.3d 782 [affirming summary judgment for university].) It declined to follow contrary federal cases relying on “generalized statements regarding campus experiences or facilities” that “fail[ed] to delineate the specific terms under which the universities were offering in-person instruction or campus access as required by California law.” (Id. at pp. 85–86, 318 Cal.Rptr.3d 782.) We find Berlanga persuasive and apply it here.

The evidence that plaintiffs highlight shows only the parties' general expectations that classes would be largely in-person. But none of this evidence reflects a specific, binding promise. The credit-hour policy generally required a weekly hour of “face-to-face contact” per credit hour for traditional classes but not for online classes. The undergraduate and graduate catalogs boasting about Chapman's facilities expressly disclaimed any binding promise in them. The registration portal merely noted expected class locations. The faculty handbook was not addressed to students and there is no evidence it was even available to them. So it could not have shown an implied promise to students. (Polley v. Northwestern University, supra, 560 F.Supp.3d at p. 1209 [faculty handbook cannot be part of implied contract with students].) And Chapman's prior practice of providing in-person instruction does not support a binding promise to do it in perpetuity. (Cf. Charpentier v. Los Angeles Rams Football Co. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 301, 308, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 115 [relocation did not breach contract with season ticket holders; “[j]ust because a team has played for years in a particular location ․ does not mean that it must always do so”].)

Chapman's communications ahead of the Fall 2020 semester do not change the picture. They described reopening as a “goal,” expressed only “optimis[m],” and conditioned in-person instruction on “support” from authorities. These aspirational, contingent statements were the opposite of specific promises and entirely unlike the unequivocal assurances in Kashmiri that the relevant fee “ ‘will remain the same’ ” for existing students and any increase would “ ‘apply to new students only.’ ” (Kashmiri, supra, 156 Cal.App.4th at p. 816, 67 Cal.Rptr.3d 635.)

Nor is this a case where the university's pricing structure implied a promise of in-person instruction. There is no evidence Chapman ever offered a cheaper, online program, unlike institutions in some other cases.¹ (E.g., Shaffer v. George Washington University (D.C. Cir. 2022) 27 F.4th 754, 764 [pricing of online program supported inference that universities promised in-person education in exchange for plaintiffs' in-person track tuition].)

An older California decision plaintiffs cite is unhelpful. The court there accepted as true, for demurrer purposes, conclusory allegations that the university made specific promises about a course's duration and its final exam. (Zumbrun v. University of Southern California (1972) 25 Cal.App.3d 1, 6, 10–11, 101 Cal.Rptr. 499.)

Here, in contrast, the summary judgment record confirms the parties' essential bargain. As Chapman's counsel put it at oral argument, “Plaintiffs got the benefit of the bargain here. They received an education. They received degrees, which they can now leverage for the entirety of their careers.” Plaintiffs do not contend they were deprived the benefit of that bargain—to the contrary, they attended classes and graduated with degrees. Their contractual claims therefore cannot succeed. And there is no basis to conclude the university was unjustly enriched by retaining their tuition. (Peterson v. Cellco Partnership (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1593, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316 [no unjust enrichment where plaintiff gets expected exchange].)

Plaintiffs' unfair business practices claims fare no better. Their unfairness theory is derivative of their contract claim. And their unlawfulness theory rests on an inapplicable statute—Education Code section 94897. As Chapman notes, it is accredited by the Western Association of Schools and Colleges and thus exempted from that provision's operation.² (Ed. Code, § 94874, subd. (i) [exempting schools accredited by this association].) The trial court correctly granted summary judgment for Chapman.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Chapman is awarded costs on appeal.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Plaintiffs provided no evidence to support the complaint's allegations that Chapman charged lower tuition for any online classes, including the specific allegation that Chapman charged about half as much for the online version of its “Wellness and Complementary Medicine” course than for the in-person version of the same course. Moreover, plaintiffs do not allege they enrolled in any of the in-person classes for which a cheaper online alternative purportedly existed.

2.   Plaintiffs mistakenly assert that Chapman is accredited by the Western College Association, rather than the Western Association of School, perhaps because the record page attesting to Chapman's accreditation in the latter also lists its membership in the former.

SCOTT, J.

WE CONCUR: DELANEY, ACTING P. J. GOODING, J.