PEOPLE v. JOYCE (1998)

Defendant John Anthony Joyce pled guilty to one count of possession of methamphetamine.  (Health & Saf.Code, § 11377, subd. (a).)  In this consolidated appeal and petition for writ of habeas corpus he contends the trial court should have granted his suppression motion and that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to tender an alternative ground for the motion.   Neither contention has any merit.   In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we affirm the judgment.   In the published portion, we deny the petition for writ of habeas corpus.

Facts and Procedural History1

At about 8:30 in the morning of September 28, 1996, defendant rode his bicycle through an intersection in Kern County.   Deputy Sheriff Robert Stevenson noticed defendant after he was into the intersection;  Stevenson also noticed the relevant traffic control signal was red.   Stevenson detained defendant and told him he had been stopped for running a red light.   Stevenson obtained identification from defendant and then went back to his patrol car to “call [ ] the Communications Center for a warrant check.”   The communications center advised Stevenson there was an active bench warrant for defendant's arrest.

Stevenson returned to defendant and arrested him on the warrant.   He asked defendant if he had “anything on him I needed to know about.”   Defendant said there was a baggie in his wallet.   Stevenson retrieved the baggie and found it contained methamphetamine.

After the court denied defendant's suppression motion, defendant pled no contest, on January 10, 1997, to one count of possession of methamphetamine.   Pursuant to a plea bargain, the court sentenced defendant to the lower term of 16 months in prison on February 5, 1997.   Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.  (Pen.Code, § 1538.5, subd. (m);  Cal. Rules of Court, rule 31(d).)

Discussion

I. The Appeal***

II. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

Defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus contends his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to argue an alternative basis for the suppression motion.   He says Stevenson prolonged the detention unreasonably while awaiting the results of the warrant check, rendering the detention illegal (see People v. McGaughran (1979) 25 Cal.3d 577, 584-587, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207) and tainting the subsequent discovery of methamphetamine (see Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 486, 83 S.Ct. 407, 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441).   Pursuant to our invitation to respond to the petition, trial counsel submitted a declaration in which he says he considered the McGaughran issue and decided the detention was not unduly prolonged, based on his own previous experience as a police officer writing traffic tickets.   Defendant rejoins that counsel never even asked him how long the detention lasted before the existence of the warrant was reported to Stevenson.

The standards for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel are well established.  “In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant must first show counsel's performance was deficient because the representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.  (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688 [104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064-2065, 80 L.Ed.2d 674].) Second, he must show prejudice flowing from counsel's performance or lack thereof.   Prejudice is shown when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.   A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”  (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 215, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.)

 In the present case, we need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient.  “[A] court need not determine whether counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies.   The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel's performance.   If it is easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect will often be so, that course should be followed.”   (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.)   We therefore turn to the prejudice issue.

 The Supreme Court in People v. McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d at page 584, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207, stated:

 “[T]he law contemplates that the officer may temporarily detain the offender at the scene for the period of time necessary to discharge the duties that he incurs by virtue of the traffic stop.   If a warrant check can be completed within that same period, no reason appears to hold it improper:  because it would not add to the delay already lawfully experienced by the offender as a result of his violation, it would not represent any further intrusion on his rights.”

As defendant contends, the McGaughran court also held that an “additional period of detention for the purpose of seeking out unrelated arrest warrants in the name of defendant or his passenger ․ ‘exceed[s] constitutional limitations' under the foregoing rule.”  (25 Cal.3d at p. 587, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207.)  McGaughran has never been expressly overruled by the Supreme Court.  (See, e.g., People v. Bell (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 754, 765, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 115;  People v. Castaneda (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1222, 1228, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 18.)

Despite the continued general viability of McGaughran, however, in the particular circumstances of the present case, more recent precedent requires that McGaughran be distinguished.   In this case, there was a facially valid arrest warrant outstanding for defendant.   As a result, he no longer had a reasonable expectation of privacy and Stevenson's actions in detaining and arresting him did not violate the Fourth Amendment. (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 88-89, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.) ²

 Under current Fourth Amendment analysis, a wholly objective standard is applicable.  (People v. Lloyd (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 724, 733, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 105.)   If the law permits an officer to engage in the objective acts in question, there is no Fourth Amendment violation, regardless of the subjective motivations of the officer.  (Scott v. United States (1978) 436 U.S. 128, 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168;  see Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89.)   Further, it is the “collective knowledge” of “law enforcement” that establishes the facts that may justify the arrest or detention.  (Remers v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659, 666-667, 87 Cal.Rptr. 202, 470 P.2d 11;  see People v. Ramirez (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1558, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 341.)

In Tyrell J., the police officer detained and searched the suspect with no knowledge whatsoever that he was on probation with a search condition.  (8 Cal.4th at pp. 74-75, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.)   The Supreme Court discussed at length and rejected a contention that the officer had to know about the grounds for a search before he could conduct the search:

“Because [the officer] did not know whether the minor was subject to a search condition, the officer took the chance that the search would be deemed improper.   If it had turned out that the minor was not subject to a search condition, any contraband found in the search of the minor would have been inadmissible in court.   Thus, under our interpretation, law enforcement officers still have a sufficient incentive to try to avoid improperly invading a person's privacy.   Contrary to the minor's arguments, our reluctance to adopt a strict ‘knowledge-first’ rule for juvenile probation search conditions will not encourage police to engage in warrantless searches.

“In arguing for a different result, the minor relies heavily on his perception that [the officer] acted improperly by detaining and then searching him.   We need not reach that issue because the premise of the argument is flawed.   The detention and pat-search of the minor did not intrude on a reasonable expectation of privacy, that is, an expectation that society is willing to recognize as legitimate.   Accordingly, [the officer] did not act in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”  (8 Cal.4th at p. 89, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519;  see also id. at p. 90, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519, dis. opn. of Kennard, J.)

Similarly, if Stevenson had engaged in an unreasonably prolonged detention of defendant and there had been no outstanding arrest warrant, contraband recovered from defendant may well have been subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule.   As it was, however, Stevenson was entitled to seize-arrest-defendant from the very outset of the encounter.   Thus, continuation of the traffic stop beyond a time reasonably necessary to investigate and cite for the offense did not violate defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.  (In re Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 89, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 876 P.2d 519.)   A person subject to a facially valid arrest warrant, just as a juvenile probationer, has a radically diminished legitimate expectation of privacy:  he is subject to arrest, essentially, at any time by any law enforcement officer.   He is also subject to search incident to any such arrest.   Accordingly, Stevenson did not violate defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy even if the detention would have been unduly prolonged for a person not the subject of an arrest warrant.

If trial counsel had based his suppression motion on the theory the detention was unduly prolonged, the motion properly would have been denied on the foregoing basis even if, factually, the detention extended beyond the limits permitted in McGaughran, supra, 25 Cal.3d 577, 159 Cal.Rptr. 191, 601 P.2d 207.   As a result, defendant was not prejudiced by the failure to bring the meritless motion.

Disposition

The judgment is affirmed.   The petition for writ of habeas corpus is denied.

FOOTNOTES

1.   For purposes of this statement of facts, we have incorporated facts alleged in defendant's declaration in support of his petition for writ of habeas corpus.   For clarity, we have also included postarrest facts contained in the deputy's incident report, contained in our record but not admitted in evidence at the suppression hearing.   At the suppression hearing, there was no testimony concerning the details of the detention or its aftermath.

FOOTNOTE.   See footnote *, ante.

2.   Although respondent did not articulate this argument in its response to the petition for writ of habeas corpus, we invited additional briefing on the issue.  (Gov.Code, § 68081.)

VARTABEDIAN, Acting Presiding Justice.

BUCKLEY and WISEMAN, JJ., concur.