KEA v. MATHEWS (1998)

OPINION

¶ 1 Laura Kea, the daughter of Kathleen Kea and Kenneth Kea, was killed in a one-car rollover accident.   The Keas sued Adrianne Regrutto, the driver of the vehicle, and Stefanie Mathews, the front-seat passenger, alleging that their negligence caused the accident.   The jury found in favor of the Keas, and the trial court entered judgments in accordance with the verdict.   Now on appeal, liability is no longer in question;  only issues about damages remain, including those relating to the donation of Laura's organs.   For the reasons which follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Laura, Adrianne and Stefanie were traveling from Tucson to Phoenix in a car driven by Adrianne.   Stefanie was in the front passenger seat and Laura was in a rear passenger seat.   Near Casa Grande, Adrianne and Stefanie decided to switch places so that Stefanie could drive.   Adrianne did not stop the car.   Instead, with the car operating on cruise control at 65 m.p.h., Stefanie undid her seat belt and prepared to slide across into the driver's seat.   There were conflicting statements whether Stefanie grabbed the steering wheel and turned it to the right, but, in any event, the car drifted to the right.   Adrianne then over-corrected, turning the wheel sharply to the left, and the car swerved across two lanes of traffic and turned over several times, causing Laura to be thrown from the vehicle.

¶ 3 Laura was taken to a hospital, and her parents were notified of the accident.   When they arrived at the medical center, they were advised that their daughter's brain was no longer functioning.   Kathleen and Kenneth eventually consented to the removal of Laura's organs and corneas for transplantation.   Laura was taken off the life-support system, and she died shortly thereafter.

¶ 4 Kenneth and Kathleen, who are divorced, filed separate suits against Adrianne and Stefanie, which cases were consolidated.   Adrianne settled;  the case against Stefanie continued to trial.   The jury awarded each of Laura's parents $3.75 million in damages, a total of $7.5 million.   Adrianne was found to be 60% responsible ($4.5 million had she not settled) and Stefanie 40% responsible ($3 million).   A motion for new trial or, in the alternative, remittitur, was denied.   The trial court accordingly entered separate judgments for Kenneth and Kathleen and against Stefanie in the amount of $1.5 million to each parent.

¶ 5 On appeal, Stefanie argues that the trial court erred:

1.  In admitting evidence of the organ donations;

2.  In not limiting the photographs and other “emotional evidence;”

3.  In not granting a new trial because the verdict was excessive;

4.  In not granting a remittitur as to Kenneth.

DISCUSSION

I. Evidence of Organ Donations

¶ 6 Delores Ramirez, a friend of the Keas, testified without objection that the Keas were asked to donate Laura's organs after tests showed that Laura's brain was no longer functioning:

Q What did the doctor say?

A [H]e basically said that Laura was brain dead.

Q Did he say anything about organ failure?

 * * *

A Yes, he said that through the night some of her vital organs had already started breaking down, and, you know, that she was still a viable person to be a donor, if that's what they wanted to do.

 * * *

Q I want to go back to when the papers were signed for the organ donation, was that an emotional time?

A Yes, it was.

Q What did Kathy say about what they could harvest and what they could not?

A Kathy said that they could take her beautiful blue eyes.   They could have her heart and her lungs and, you know, and the internal-other organs that they could use.   And then I believe they asked if they could take bone or ligaments, and they said, no, they didn't want them to do that, just the internal organs.

 * * *

Q When it came to actually sign [sic] the papers saying that we will allow the donor-the organs to be taken, how did Ken react?

A He was-he was in favor of it, but he was adamant that they not take any bone or ligaments.

Q Why do you think that was?

 * * *

THE WITNESS:  He said because they were her legs, she played soccer with them.

¶ 7 Kathleen's grief counselor, Linda Sampliner, testified, also without objection, that the organ donations were still a significant part of Kathleen's grief.   Kathleen suffers recurring nightmares about them, and she is very troubled that Laura was “robbed of her basic functioning organs.”

¶ 8 Just before the closing arguments, the trial court admitted in evidence, over Stefanie's objection, three exhibits pertaining to the organ donation:  Exhibit 95, a copy of the organ donation consent form signed by the Keas;  Exhibit 96, a certificate of appreciation for the organ donation from Joycelyn Elders, Surgeon General of the United States;  and Exhibit 97, a letter to the Keas from the Organ Recovery Coordinator of the Donor Network of Arizona informing them of how Laura's organs were used.   Exhibit 97 was read to the jury in virtually its entirety by Kathleen's counsel during closing argument.¹  Later, during his discussion of damages, Kathleen's counsel further referred to the organ donation:

[T]hey agreed to the donor organs-not her legs, because those are her soccer legs.   But Mom says, “They can have my daughter's beautiful blue eyes.”   And they gave the gift of light․

¶ 9 Stefanie argues that none of this evidence about the organ-donation decision should have been admitted at trial.   She contends that any probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.  Ariz. R. Evid. 403.²  Additionally, she asserts that the organ-donor evidence was inadmissible as irrelevant.  Ariz. R. Evid. 401, 402.

¶ 10 Stefanie failed to object to the testimony of Sampliner and Ramirez.   This precludes review absent fundamental error, which is applied “sparingly” in civil cases.  Williams v. Thude, 188 Ariz. 257, 260, 934 P.2d 1349, 1352 (1997);  Johnson v. Elliott, 112 Ariz. 57, 61, 537 P.2d 927, 931 (1975).   We will not overturn a trial court's ruling on an evidentiary objection absent an abuse of its discretion.  Walter v. Simmons, 169 Ariz. 229, 241, 818 P.2d 214, 226 (App.1991).

¶ 11 The decision whether to donate organs for transplantation may confront the families of victims who have suffered mortal injury.   See generally David M. English, Gift of Life:  The Lawyer's Role in Organ and Tissue Donation, Prob. & Prop., Mar.-Apr.1994, at 10, 11-12.   In a wrongful-death case, in addition to pecuniary losses, a plaintiff may recover damages for anguish, sorrow, stress, mental suffering, pain and shock, as well as the loss of companionship and comfort.  City of Tucson v. Wondergem, 105 Ariz. 429, 433, 466 P.2d 383, 387 (1970).   Certainly the trauma experienced in making this decision by the parents of a child so injured qualifies as compensable mental suffering and anguish.

¶ 12 The testimony from Kathleen's grief counselor and the Keas' family friend about the emotional pain and suffering endured by the Keas during the process of making their decision to donate Laura's organs and corneas was undoubtedly admissible.   Given the nature of the pain suffered by the parents and the decision they were asked to make, the substantiating evidence is necessarily heart-rending, but the testimony reflecting that distress was not disproportionate nor unfairly prejudicial.   See State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 52, 859 P.2d 156, 162 (holding that evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis such as emotion, sympathy or horror), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1026, 114 S.Ct. 640, 126 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993).   We identify no error in the trial court's admission of the testimony given by Ramirez and Sampliner describing the Keas' words and actions following the accident.   This evidence bore directly on the emotional damages suffered by the Keas in making the organ-donation decision.

¶ 13 Similarly admissible was Exhibit 95.   The permission form signed by Kenneth and Kathleen only evinced their acquiescence in the donation about which Ramirez and Sampliner already had testified.

¶ 14 The relevance of the certificate of appreciation from Dr. Elders and of the letter from the Donor Network describing the improved lives of the organ recipients is less clear, however.   When Kathleen's counsel offered Exhibits 96 and 97 to be admitted, he explained his intended use of the letter as follows:

And I was going to, and prepared to cover the [organ] recipients and the information that [Kathleen] has back and what her state of mind is with regard to the recipients, but I would rather offer the letter instead of going through it with her testimony.

¶ 15 Then, before reading the letter in his closing argument, Kathleen's counsel said:  “[T]here was one thing Kathy wanted to share with you, but emotionally she couldn't read it to you or tell you about it.   It's in evidence, and I am going to take a moment right here to tell you.”

¶ 16 Stefanie argues that these two exhibits were irrelevant to the Keas' pain and suffering and highly inflammatory, elevating the Keas to “hero status.”   We conclude instead that the exhibits should not have been admitted for the purpose for which they were introduced.

¶ 17 Kathleen's state of mind about the recipients of Laura's organs might have been relevant to the jury's determination of Kathleen's emotional damages suffered as a result of Laura's death.   However, neither the certificate nor the letter speaks to her state of mind.   While the certificate is no more than a form acknowledgement of the donation and arguably harmless, the letter describes, in touching terms, the recovered lives of the organ recipients and thanks the Keas for their decision to donate.   Apart from counsel's reference to the impact of the letter on Kathleen's state of mind-which, of course, is not evidence, Walker v. County of Coconino, 12 Ariz.App. 547, 551, 473 P.2d 472, 476 (1970)-the record reveals nothing of the impact the receipt of these two documents may have had on either Kathleen or Kenneth.

¶ 18 The Keas suggested at oral argument that the laudatory evidence is relevant to mitigate the Keas' damages in that “some good” came of Laura's death and that this fact “matter[ed] a great deal” to them.   At trial, however, no testimony served to link the two exhibits to the issue of damages.   The record thus still reveals nothing as to the impact the receipt of these two documents had on the Keas. Further, the Keas, in all likelihood, did not intend to offer the evidence in mitigation of their own damages.   To the contrary, Kathleen's evidence spoke of her continuing nightmares that Laura was “robbed” of her vital organs.

¶ 19 Even though it was error to admit the exhibits, we will not reverse the verdict if there is no prejudice.  Cotterhill v. Bafile, 177 Ariz. 76, 81, 865 P.2d 120, 125 (App.1993)(declining to reverse on improper admission of evidence absent clear abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice).   See also Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 27 (“No cause shall be reversed for technical error in ․ proceedings when upon the whole case it shall appear that substantial justice has been done.”);  Ariz. R. Civ. P. 61 (stating that judgment will not be disturbed based on an error in the admission of evidence “unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice”).   Further, we will not presume prejudice;  it must be apparent from the record.  Cotterhill, 177 Ariz. at 81, 865 P.2d at 125;  Employment Sec. Comm'n v. Doughty, 13 Ariz.App. 494, 496, 478 P.2d 109, 111 (1970).

¶ 20 Stefanie argues that prejudice resulted from Kathleen's counsel's specific request during closing argument for $1.5 million in damages for the organ donations.   First, evidence of the Keas' mental suffering associated with the decision to donate Laura's organs was relevant and admissible on the issue of damages.   Therefore, it was not improper argument to refer to admissible evidence of those damages in closing argument.

¶ 21 Second, the $1.5 million figure requested referred to all of Kathleen's general damages suffered during the first year following Laura's death, including the issue of the organ donation.   Stefanie's argument to the contrary takes the pertinent portion of the closing argument out of context.   Kathleen's counsel, after a detailed discussion of her special damages, addressed the issue of general damages by relating the monetary requests to specific post-accident time frames.

Let me bring it to a conclusion by talking about what we call-these are called general damages․  I have broken it down into some categories:  The death in the first year;  Kathy's breakdown and the hospitalizations, and the ongoing problems with [the Keas' son] Casey's well-being and mental health or guilt feelings about not being important to Casey;  and all the things that you heard that I am not going to repeat from the people on the stand.

And then I put it into the future.   You talk about this one first (indicating), you heard the description, the horrificness [sic] that they went through.  [Kathleen] gets a call at work and she is told there has been an accident, and they think it's not that serious.   And they get there, and there are tubes.  [Kathleen] does her own check, because she is a nurse, and the pupils are fixated.

And then later, after they try several different things, and are told there is little blood flow to the brain, [the Keas] agreed to the donor organs-not her legs, because those are her soccer legs.   But Mom says, “They can have my daughter's beautiful blue eyes.”   And they gave the gift of light.   And I submit 1.5 million for that, if that was all that was fair and reasonable.

From that first year into the second year, you have heard the description of what Kathy has gone through:  In February, the hospitalization for a nervous breakdown;  in August, going in after seeing Kathy in the kitchen and having to deal with Casey, and the daily reminders of Saturday, every anniversary. 2-1/2 million for that night, ladies and gentlemen.

 * * *

Then the future life expectancy.

 * * *

200,000 a year for 10 years;  100,000 a year for 30 years, and that totals 7.5 million for the total damages for Kathy, plus the out-of-pocket․

Were we to accept Stefanie's assertion that Kathleen's counsel asked for $1.5 million for the organ donation alone, not only would the numbers not total $7.5 million, but we would also have to conclude that the Keas requested no damages for any of the other events from the first year-results which the record plainly does not support.

¶ 22 In light of the evidence that was properly admitted of the Keas' pain and suffering during the year immediately following Laura's death, we cannot say that reversible error resulting from the erroneous admission of the certificate and thank-you letter either appears from the record, e.g. Cotterhill, 177 Ariz. at 81, 865 P.2d at 125, or has been demonstrated by Stefanie.   Southern Pac. Co. v. Richey, 13 Ariz. 67, 69, 108 P. 225, 226 (1910);  Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, 20 Ariz.App. 388, 389, 513 P.2d 677, 678 (App.1973).

II. Photographs and Other “Emotional Evidence”

¶ 23 The trial court admitted in evidence more than two hundred photographs of and about Laura, most of which were in a scrapbook, as well as several poems, essays, letters and holiday cards.   Stefanie acknowledges that such items are generally relevant to establish the relationship between Laura and her parents.   She contends that the volume of such evidence admitted in this case offended Ariz. R. Evid. 403 because the probative value of these exhibits was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect and by considerations of the needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

¶ 24 We will reverse a trial court's evidentiary rulings only for an abuse of discretion and resulting prejudice apparent from the record.   Cotterhill, 177 Ariz. at 81, 865 P.2d at 125.   The court evaluated the evidence and duly considered Stefanie's objections.   Her argument that the court abdicated its responsibilities and “lost control” of the trial is unconvincing, supported as it is chiefly by reference to the sheer number of exhibits admitted and to the contention that the court consistently overruled her objections.   Such analysis does not reveal an abuse of discretion.   Having presided over the trial, that court is in a better position than we to determine the effect of the evidence and whether its volume had an unfairly prejudicial effect on the jury.  Taylor v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 130 Ariz. 516, 521, 637 P.2d 726, 731 (1981).

¶ 25 Further, Stefanie fails to demonstrate prejudice, rendering harmless any error.  Gutierrez, 20 Ariz.App. at 389, 513 P.2d at 678.   Conceding that some of the photographs and other exhibits illustrating Laura's life were properly admitted, Stefanie fails to demonstrate how the arguably cumulative exhibits led the jury to a conclusion exaggerated by undue sympathy.   Schurz, 176 Ariz. at 52, 859 P.2d at 162.   For example, Stefanie identifies no particular photographs or exhibits as particularly inflammatory.   See State v. McCall, 139 Ariz. 147, 158, 677 P.2d 920, 931 (1983)(holding that autopsy photographs of victims were cumulative but not inflammatory, concluding that “their admission into evidence, if error at all, was harmless”), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220, 104 S.Ct. 2670, 81 L.Ed.2d 375 (1984).

III. Excessive Verdict

¶ 26 Stefanie argues that the verdict is excessive and asks for a new trial.   Notwithstanding her comparison of this award to others in wrongful-death actions and her assertion that the award is “unprecedented” in its size, it is axiomatic that each case is different;  each jury is different, and each relationship between a parent and a child is different.   See Wry v. Dial, 18 Ariz.App. 503, 514-15, 503 P.2d 979, 990-91 (1972).   Having heard and reviewed the evidence adduced by the Keas of the loving relationship that they enjoyed with Laura, the jury saw fit to award $7.5 million for her wrongful death.

For damages to be found excessive they must strike mankind, at first blush, as being beyond all measure, unreasonable, and outrageous, and such as manifestly show the jury to have been actuated by passion, partiality, prejudice, or corruption.   In short, the damages must be flagrantly outrageous and extravagant, or the court cannot undertake to draw the line, for they have no standard by which to ascertain the excess.

Flieger v. Reeb, 120 Ariz. 31, 35, 583 P.2d 1351, 1355 (App.1978) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

¶ 27 The size of the award alone is inconclusive as to whether it is the result of passion or prejudice.  Carter-Glogau Labs. v. Construction, Prod. & Maintenance Laborers' Local 383, 153 Ariz. 351, 358, 736 P.2d 1163, 1170 (App.1986).   In fixing Kenneth and Kathleen's total general damages at $7.5 million, the jury effectively cut in half the $7.5 million award requested during closing arguments for each parent.   While it is not necessarily an excessive award when the jury grants the plaintiff(s) the exact amount requested, see Barzelis v. Kulikowski, 418 F.2d 869, 869-70 (9th Cir.1969), the jury's substantial downward departure from the award requested by the Keas supports our conclusion that the verdict was not the result of passion or prejudice.   We do not find this award to be excessive.

IV. Remittitur for Kenneth Kea

¶ 28 Stefanie complains that the trial court should have ordered a remittitur with particular regard to Kenneth.   She argues that the evidence shows that his loss was less than Kathleen's and that he did not suffer as much as she.   We find this argument meritless.

¶ 29 It is for the jury to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, Pugh v. Cook, 153 Ariz. 246, 247, 735 P.2d 856, 857 (App.1987), and it is for the trial court to exercise its discretion to decide the propriety of a remittitur.  Spur Feeding Co. v. Fernandez, 106 Ariz. 143, 149, 472 P.2d 12, 18 (1970).  “A parent's loss of a child can be both devastating and difficult to measure.   Valuation of that loss can be heavily influenced by witness demeanor and credibility.”   Hutcherson v. City of Phoenix, 188 Ariz. 183, 194, 933 P.2d 1251, 1262 (App.1996)(upholding the jury's award when evidence supported “close” relationships between parents and children, one plaintiff's depression and anxiety due to her daughter's death and another plaintiff's “devastat [ion from] the loss of her son”), review of unrelated issues granted in part and denied in part, CV-96-0615-PR (March 25, 1997).   We find no abuse of discretion in the court's refusal to order a remittitur.

CONCLUSION

¶ 30 The judgment is affirmed.

GERBER, Judge, concurring in part, dissenting in part.

¶ 31 I respectfully dissent from the majority only on the narrow issue of admissibility of the certificate of appreciation from Dr. Elders and the letter from the Donor Network, both of which, in my view, are admissible for their bearing on the extent of the parents' pain and suffering.   Other than this matter, I agree in all other respects with the majority opinion.

¶ 32 I do not agree that the error in admitting the Organ Recovery Coordinator's thank-you letter into evidence was harmless.   Plaintiffs' lead counsel began final argument by reading most of this letter to the jury.   Skilled counsel does not begin final argument in a heart-breaking wrongful death case-or in any case-by reading the jury a lengthy letter he considers harmless to the other side.   As used by counsel, this tear-jerking letter was probably an effective, and was certainly an improper, suggestion that the jury reward Plaintiffs for their generosity to others.   Defendant should not have to pay for whatever Plaintiffs gained by getting that letter into evidence and reading it to the jury.

¶ 33 Getting right to the point here, I think we should remand with directions that the trial court decide whether this error can be cured with a remittitur pursuant to Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(i).

¶ 34 The error affected the damages verdict only, and its maximum effect seems ascertainable because of the way counsel compartmentalized his argument.   When discussing damages, counsel began with Laura's death and the first year;  he reminded the jury of Plaintiffs' “gift of light” (referring to the thank-you letter), and he then said, “And I submit 1.5 million for that, if that was all that was fair and reasonable.”   He then went on to ask for separate sums of money for other periods of time, with no later mention of the thank-you letter.  (Although only lead counsel made this argument, it was the main argument for both Plaintiffs and it provided the calculations and the chart the jury used in awarding the same amount of damages to each Plaintiff.)

¶ 35 Fairly construed, the record indicates that each Plaintiff asked for $1.5 million for Laura's death and the first year, and that this amount included the “reward” request.   From this context, it appears that any damage from the thank-you letter would not exceed $1.5 million per Plaintiff and would certainly be much less, for no one disputes that each Plaintiff suffered tremendous loss because of Laura's death and during the first year after her death.  (We have not said much about Laura here, but the record contains much objective evidence that she was an exceptional young woman-a star on and off the athletic field, and a wonderful person whose future was unlimited and whose death devastated her parents.)

¶ 36 Although remittitur is ordinarily ordered to correct excessive or insufficient damages, it can sometimes be ordered to correct errors in the admission of evidence.

Remittitur is also used ․ when there has been reversible error committed at the trial, such as erroneous admission of evidence or erroneous instructions, and the maximum effect upon the amount of the verdict due to the error can with reasonable accuracy be determined.   The use of remittitur enables the court and the parties to avoid the delay and expense of a new trial, and when wisely used furthers the legitimate objective of bringing litigation to as speedy and expeditious end as is reasonable.

6A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 59.08[7] (2d ed.1996)(footnote omitted).   See, e.g., Hooks v. Washington Sheraton Corp., 578 F.2d 313, 318 (D.C.Cir.1977)(Remittitur ordered in trial court adequately compensated for trial court's error in excluding evidence.);   Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Eastman, 356 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir.1966)(Any error in plaintiff's argument on the calculation of damages was cured by the trial court's order of remittitur.);  Carlstrom v. United States, 275 F.2d 802, 808 (9th Cir.1960)(Error by jury in calculating value of one of a number of parcels of property was adequately remedied by trial court's remittitur.);  Jacuzzi Bros., Inc. v. Todd, 316 Ark. 785, 875 S.W.2d 67, 70 (1994) (Admission of expert testimony that plaintiff might require future surgery was error, but remittitur of the amount awarded for future surgical expenses would cure the error.);  Forte v. Schiebe, 145 Cal.App.2d 296, 302 P.2d 336, 340 (1956)(Trial court's comments regarding parties' malice in an assault and battery case were prejudicial, but error could be remedied by modification of judgment to exclude exemplary damages.).

¶ 37 Given the context provided by the evidence, arguments, and verdicts, the trial court might be able to ascertain the maximum effect of the error and to then give Plaintiffs the opportunity of curing that error while preserving the untainted portions of the verdicts.   If the trial court ordered a remittitur, any Plaintiff who rejected it would have a new trial on damages.   If the trial court decided that it could not order a remittitur, both Plaintiffs would have a new trial on damages.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Exhibit 97 states:On behalf of the Donor Network of Arizona, please accept our condolences on the death of your daughter, Laura.   Your willingness to reach out and help others during this painful time is a tribute to you and to Laura's memory.   Your generosity is greatly appreciated.   I realize that words bring little consolation, but it is my hope that knowing the results of your generous gift will bring you a sense of comfort.After evaluation, we successfully located recipients for Laura's heart and lungs, liver, kidneys, pancreas, and corneas.Laura's heart and lungs were received by a 21-year-old woman from Arizona.   She required a heart-lung transplant as a result of suffering from a chronic state of hypertension specifically within the arteries of the lungs.   This condition causes the arteries to narrow and inhibits normal blood flow through the lungs.   Because the heart must work harder to pump the blood through these narrow vessels, the heart muscle abnormally enlarges and becomes increasingly inefficient.   Ultimately the heart, as well as the lungs fail, and a transplant becomes the only option for survival.   This young woman is married, has a 2-year-old daughter, and was employed as an administrative assistant until becoming medically disabled.   She viewed transplant “as a must to achieve a better quality of life.”   She is recovering steadily and is eager to return home to her family.Laura's liver was transplanted into a 35-year-old woman who lives in California.   She suffered from a disease known as sclerosing cholangitis.   This disease is manifested by anobstruction of the duct which drains bile from the liver.   The chronic obstruction causes the bile to accumulate within the liver cells.   The bile destroys the cells and over time the liver is rendered nonfunctional.   This woman is married and has two children and looks forward to resuming her daily activities with increased energy and vigor.Laura's right kidney and pancreas were transplanted into [a] 35-year-old woman also from California.   She suffered from diabetes, a disease characterized by the pancreas's inability to secrete insulin in order to maintain normal levels of sugar within the bloodstream.   The high level of sugar within the bloodstream causes many devastating side effects, kidney failure being one of the most common.   As a result of receiving both a kidney and a pancreas, she has been given the opportunity to rid herself of the need for dialysis, as well as, the need for multiple daily insulin injections.   Both treatments were necessary for her survival.   She is married and has been employed as a legal secretary.   She also continues to recover steadily.Laura's left kidney was received by a woman who relocated temporarily to the Tucson area in order to receive her kidney transplant.   The disease which caused her kidneys to fail had not been determined.   I am happy to report that she experienced a rapid recovery and has since returned to her home town.Laura's corneas were transplanted into two individuals from Phoenix.   As a result, both have regained sight.As a result of Laura's “gift of life,” all of these recipients can anticipate returning home to their families [with a renewed sense of health and well-being, as well as the hope for a more normal lifestyle.Once again, please accept our sympathies.]Counsel read all but that portion of the letter which we have put in brackets.

2.   Relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice ․ or by considerations of ․ needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”   Ariz. R. Evid. 403.

EHRLICH, Judge.