REFUGIO JUNIOR JIMENEZ v. STATE OF ARIZONA (2025)

OPINION

¶1 Refugio Jimenez seeks special action review of a protective order, entered at the State's request, that prevents him from seeing crime scene photographs that have been made available to his attorney. We accept special action jurisdiction and grant relief, holding that the superior court erred by granting the protective order without first requiring the State to identify any protected victim identifying or locating information and to show why any such information cannot be redacted.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 According to police records, Jimenez was staying in a house across the street from the victims’ residence when he and one of the victims were involved in a confrontation that escalated to an exchange of gunfire in front of and then inside the murder victim's apartment. During a police interview, Jimenez claimed that he had acted in self-defense. According to defense counsel, police officers showed Jimenez multiple crime scene photographs and asked him about them during the interview.

¶3 The State charged Jimenez with first degree murder, two counts of aggravated assault, burglary, and other offenses. The indictment lists the victims’ names as well as the address of the murder victim's apartment.

¶4 During discovery, the State moved for a protective order to permit disclosure of all crime scene photographs to defense counsel, while restricting Jimenez's access to any photographs that included victim identifying or locating information. See A.R.S. § 13-4434(B), (D). The State acknowledged that disclosure of the crime scene photographs was required by rule and because they might include Brady ² material. The State asserted, however, that the collection of photographs contained “the victim's identifying and/or locating information” and that it was unable to redact that information “[d]ue to the nature of the media format and/or the quantity of the media data,” which the State characterized as “hundreds/thousands of pages/GB of data” overall. The State did not specify what type of victim identifying or locating information was involved, identify any specific photographs or categories of photographs that included such information, or further detail barriers to redacting the information.

¶5 Jimenez opposed the motion, noting that the State had not explained what kind of protected information appeared in the crime scene photographs or why it was unable to provide redacted copies (especially given that the victims’ names and general location of the crime are exempt from redaction, see A.R.S. § 13-4434(C)). The State did not file a reply.

¶6 The superior court granted the State's motion and entered a protective order directing defense counsel to restrict access to the evidence and limit dissemination of protected information appearing in the photographs, including prohibiting Jimenez access to protected information in the photographs: “Under no circumstances is the Defendant to be given access to any of the personal identifying or locating information of the victim(s) contained within.”

¶7 This special action followed. As Jimenez lacks an adequate remedy by appeal, see RPSA 12(a), we accept special action jurisdiction.

DISCUSSION

¶8 Our Legislature has effectuated a crime victim's right to privacy, in part, by limiting disclosure of a victim's basic “identifying” and “locating” information. See A.R.S. § 13-4434(B).³ Victim identifying information “includes a victim's date of birth, social security number and official state or government issued driver license or identification number.” A.R.S. § 13-4434(E)(1). Victim locating information “includes the victim's address, telephone number, email address and place of employment.” A.R.S. § 13-4434(E)(2).

¶9 When a law enforcement or prosecution agency “obtain[s], compile[s] or report[s]” victim identifying or locating information, the information “shall be redacted by the originating agency and prosecution agencies from records pertaining to the criminal case involving the victim, including [from] discovery disclosed to the defendant, the defendant's attorney or any of the attorney's staff.” A.R.S. § 13-4434(B); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.5(e), 39(a)(2), (b)(11). Certain categories—the victim's name, the general location of the crime, and any information the victim agrees to release—are exempt from the redaction requirement. A.R.S. § 13-4434(C)(1), (3)–(4).

¶10 Recognizing that a victim's rights must give way if in direct conflict with a defendant's constitutional rights, see, e.g., State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court (Roper), 172 Ariz. 232, 236 (App. 1992), the statute permits the court to order disclosure of evidence containing victim identifying or locating information “[1] if it is necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional rights or [2] when the information is not reasonably able to be redacted because of undue burden or expense.” A.R.S. § 13-4434(D); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(b)(8), (v)(1), 39(b)(11). The victim has a right to notice and an opportunity to be heard before the court orders such disclosure, and disclosure under these circumstances is limited to the defense team and not the defendant individually unless specifically authorized by the court. A.R.S. § 13-4434(D); see also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(v)(1), 15.5(c).

¶11 The State failed to meet its obligations under this statutory scheme. The State's motion asserted generally that some form of victim identifying or locating information appeared at some point within the sizeable collection of crime scene photographs. But the State did not indicate what type of protected information might be involved—even when Jimenez flagged the omission and even though most of the defined types of protected information seem unlikely to appear in crime scene photographs. See A.R.S. § 13-4434(E). The State admitted that disclosure of the crime scene photographs was constitutionally and procedurally required—and offered no legal basis for placing the protective order's restriction on any of the photographs that do not show victim identifying or locating information.

¶12 The State similarly failed to specify which photographs (or categories of photographs) contained protected information, or give even an estimate of how many photographs might be implicated. Without some indication of the scale of the issue, the State failed to show why complying with its statutory redaction mandate would be unduly burdensome. Even assuming, as the State asserted, that the media format affects the feasibility of redaction, the number of photographs in need of redaction remains relevant to whether an alternative format or disclosure method would permit redaction and thus allow unrestricted disclosure of the redacted materials.

¶13 In short, by failing to identify any protected victim identifying or locating information or to adequately explain why any such information cannot be redacted from the crime scene photographs, the State sought a protective order that covers both too much (photographs that did not include protected information) and too little (permitting disclosure of protected information without victim authorization and without a showing that redaction was unworkable).

¶14 In opposing Jimenez's special action petition, the State now contends that defense counsel can simply “(i) Examine each photograph within the collection; and (ii) For all photographs that do not, or arguably do not, contain personal identifying or locating information of the victim, file them under seal with a motion that explains as much and asks for permission to allow Jimenez to look at them.” But § 13-4434(B) places that burden on the prosecution, not the defense: “[A] victim's identifying and locating information ․ shall be redacted by the originating agency and prosecution agencies,” before any such records are disclosed to the defense. (Emphasis added); see also 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 151, § 11 (51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess.) (amending § 13-4434(B) to require prosecution agencies to redact victim identifying and locating information from materials disclosed to the defendant after State ex rel. Montgomery v. Chavez, 234 Ariz. 255 (2014), required a court order for such redaction). And although § 13-4434(D) permits disclosure of protected information to defense counsel under certain circumstances, it first requires (1) a showing that disclosure of the protected information itself is constitutionally required or that the information cannot reasonably be redacted from materials subject to disclosure and (2) notice to the victim, who has a right to be heard. See also Ariz. R. Crim. P. 15.1(v)(1), 39(b)(11), (c)(4). The statute thus necessarily requires the prosecution to identify protected information before disclosure is made to the defense.⁴

¶15 Given this statutory framework, the superior court erred by effectively placing the burden on defense counsel to determine whether the disclosed material includes victim identifying or locating information that should not be disclosed to the defendant or should be disclosed in a redacted format. Accordingly, we vacate the protective order and direct the superior court to require the State to specify which photographs contain victim identifying or locating information as defined in § 13-4434 (and not subject to an exception under § 13-4434(C)). If there is such information, the State must then redact the materials as required by § 13-4434(B) or explain as required by § 13-4434(D) why redaction is not an appropriate option. This decision is effective immediately, see RPSA 18(c), but we stay its effect (leaving the protective order in place) for 30 days after issuance to permit the State to comply.

CONCLUSION

¶16 For the foregoing reasons, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief.

FOOTNOTES

2.   Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

3.   The Legislature amended this statute in 2025 to permit, under certain circumstances, redaction of the victim's name from records released in response to a public records request, but this amendment is not implicated here. See 2025 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 87, § 2 (57th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.).

4.   Although collateral to the issues raised, we note that the limited record provided does not reveal whether the victims were notified of the disclosure and advised of their right to be heard.

CATTANI, Judge: