ZACHARIAH BRANDON EZELL v. STATE OF ARIZONA RACHEL MITCHELL (2025)

OPINION

¶1 Zachariah Ezell seeks special action relief from the superior court's denial of his motion to remand to the grand jury for a redetermination of probable cause.

¶2 Over three decades ago, the Arizona Supreme Court provided that “[d]ue process requires only that the prosecutor read all relevant statutes to the grand jury, provide them with a copy of those statutes to refer to during deliberations, and ask if they want any statutes reread or clarified.” O'Meara v. Gottsfield, 174 Ariz. 576, 578 (1993). More recently, the supreme court clarified that where justification evidence exists, the State's responsibility also includes instructing the grand jury on A.R.S. § 13-205(A), which defines justification defenses. Willis v. Bernini, 253 Ariz. 453, 464 ¶ 41 (2022). Ezell reads Willis to imply that the superior court is no longer bound by O'Meara in cases involving justification evidence. We now resolve that Willis does not overrule O'Meara but rather adds requirements that the State must comply with when presenting a case involving justification evidence to a grand jury. We accept jurisdiction but deny relief.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶3 In the summer of 2023, Ezell was at a house party when a fight broke out. Jesse (a pseudonym) allegedly pointed a handgun at Ezell. Ezell fired his own gun at Jesse, who was struck and killed. Upon police questioning, Ezell claimed that he fired in self-defense.

¶4 The State first presented its investigation to a grand jury first on June 26, 2023. The jurors were read and provided copies of all relevant statutes when the grand jury was empaneled. At the start of its presentation against Ezell, the State indicated that certain statutes might help the grand jury in determining probable cause, including “A.R.S. section ․ 13-401 through 13-412” and the “definition of premeditation.” The State then reread the definition of premeditation but did not reread or clarify the statutes. The grand jury indicted Ezell on five counts, including first-degree murder.

¶5 Ezell moved to dismiss or order a new probable cause finding, arguing that the State “failed to instruct the grand jury on the application of the justification statutes”—in particular, A.R.S. § 13-205(A)—as Willis requires. The court granted Ezell's motion and remanded the case to the grand jury, holding that the State failed to reference A.R.S. § 13-205 to the grand jury as Willis requires and that “failure to do so here was fatal.”

¶6 The State presented the case to a grand jury a second time on February 14, 2024. Before that presentation, defense counsel provided the State with a letter requesting that the State read to the grand jury several statutes addressing justification defenses including A.R.S. §§ 13-205, -404, -405, -406, and -411. See Trebus v. Davis, 189 Ariz. 621, 625 (1997) (“[T]he county attorney must inform the grand jury that the defendant has requested to appear or has submitted exculpatory evidence.”). The jurors were read and provided copies of all relevant statutes when they were empaneled. This time, at the start of its presentation to the grand jury against Ezell, the State both referenced various statutes by number and explained that

you may also wish to consider the justification statutes ․ A.R.S. 13-401 through 13-421. And in conjunction with those you should consider 13-205, which does state in relevant parts justification defenses under Chapter 4 of this title are not affirmative defenses. Justification defenses describe conduct that, if not justified, would constitute an offense but, if justified, does not constitute criminal or wrongful conduct.

The State further explained that, if the case proceeded to trial and “if there were any evidence of justification presented, then the State would be required to prove that the defendant ․ did not act with justification.” The grand jury again indicted Ezell on five counts, including first-degree murder.

¶7 Ezell again moved to dismiss or order a new probable cause finding, arguing that the State failed to properly instruct the grand jury about the justification defenses and “misle[d] the grand jury to believe that the issue of justification is an issue for trial.” He also argued that “[t]he State failed to provide the definition of ‘premeditation’ as required by State v. Thompson, 204 Ariz. 471 (2003).” The State agreed that the court should grant Ezell's motion to remand due to its failure to provide the definition of premeditation under Thompson but maintained that it met its requirement to instruct on justification defenses. After oral argument, the court granted the motion based on the party's agreement about the missing premeditation definition but also attempted to give guidance on the other issues. The court pointed out that the State quoted the holding of Willis directly to the grand jury, noted that “as far as I'm concerned, the Willis issue is put to bed,” and instructed the State that it could present that issue as it did at the second grand jury and that presentation would be compliant.

¶8 The State presented the case to a grand jury a third time on June 11, 2024. Before it did so, defense counsel again provided the State with a letter requesting that it read the grand jury several statutes addressing justification defenses including A.R.S. §§ 13-205, -404, -405, -406, and -411. See Trebus, 189 Ariz. at 625. The jurors were read and provided copies of all relevant statutes when the grand jury was empaneled. In its third presentation to the grand jury, the State noted that several statutes might be helpful to determine probable cause including “A.R.S. 13-401 through 13-412” and the “definition of premeditation.” It also reread both the definition of premeditation, and, as at the second presentation, A.R.S. § 13-205 addressing justification defenses. At the end of its presentation the State again reminded the jurors that “they may want to consider ․ the Thompson definition of premeditation ․ 13-401 through 13-412” and, upon questions from the jurors, reread the definition of premeditation. The grand jury again indicted Ezell on five counts, including first-degree murder.

¶9 Ezell moved to dismiss or order a new probable cause finding for a third time, arguing that the State did not adequately instruct the grand jury on the relevant justification statutes and their “possible application.” The court held oral argument, at which defense counsel argued that the State should have done more to highlight the relevant justification statutes “for example they should have said 13-406 may be applicable here in light of the evidence presented that this was in—done to protect a third party.” The court denied Ezell's motion, finding that the State complied with the previous remand order, because

the State read the statues to the [g]rand [j]ury [at the empanelment] and gave them copies of the statutes. At the grand jury proceeding on June 11, 2024, the State read the statute numbers and asked if they wanted any of the statutes reread or clarified. It also read A.R.S. 13-205(A) in its entirety. The grand jury panel did not request clarification of the justification statutes nor did it ask any questions regarding the application of those statutes to the justification evidence that was presented to them.

In doing so, the court found itself “bound by the opinion in O'Meara stating that, ‘[d]ue process requires only that the prosecutor read all relevant statutes to the grand jury, provide them with a copy of those statutes to refer to during deliberations, and ask if they want any statutes reread or clarified.’ ” After the court denied Ezell's motion for reconsideration, he petitioned this Court for special action review.

DISCUSSION

¶10 Ezell now argues that the superior court erred in relying on O'Meara and that the “mere recitation of statutory numbers to a grand jury is insufficient to satisfy due process, especially in justification cases.” Denial of a motion to remand is generally not reviewable on direct appeal, leaving challenge by special action as the appropriate avenue for relief. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 439–40 ¶ 31 (2004); Francis v. Sanders, 222 Ariz. 423, 426 ¶ 9 (App. 2009). Accordingly, we accept special action jurisdiction. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 12(a)–(b). We review denial of a motion to remand for an abuse of discretion but review de novo issues of law and constitutional claims. Willis, 253 Ariz. at 458 ¶ 14.

¶11 Generally, in grand jury proceedings “[d]ue process requires only that the prosecutor read all relevant statutes to the grand jury, provide them with a copy of those statutes to refer to during deliberations, and ask if they want any statutes reread or clarified.” O'Meara, 174 Ariz. at 578. The Arizona Supreme Court recently clarified this standard as it pertains to justification defenses. See Willis, 253 Ariz. 453, 464–65 ¶ 41; Cespedes v. Lee, 243 Ariz. 46, 49 ¶ 9 (2017). The State has a duty to provide “instructions on justification defenses that, based on the evidence presented to the grand jury, are relevant to the jurors determining whether probable cause exists to indict the defendant.” Cespedes, 243 Ariz. at 49 ¶ 9. Where justification evidence exists, “the State must [ ] instruct the grand jury that a ‘[j]ustification defense[ ] describe[s] conduct that, if not justified, would constitute an offense but, if justified, does not constitute criminal or wrongful conduct.’ ” Willis, 253 Ariz. at 464 ¶ 41 (quoting A.R.S. § 13 -205(A)). These cases did not overrule O'Meara but rather clarified the broad rule that it set out and added specific requirements for justification defense issues.

¶12 Thus, currently, the State must adhere to both O'Meara and Willis by—at minimum—reminding the grand jury of the relevant statutes, asking if they want any statutes reread or clarified, see O'Meara, 174 Ariz. at 578, and reading A.R.S. § 13-205(A) explaining that “[j]ustification defenses describe conduct that, if not justified, would constitute an offense but, if justified, does not constitute criminal or wrongful conduct,” see Willis, 253 Ariz. at 458 ¶ 14. The clarification in Willis requires only that, where justification evidence exists, the State read the A.R.S. § 13-205 language in addition to its existing responsibilities under O'Meara. The superior court was correct that it was bound by O'Meara, as it is bound by both O'Meara and Willis. See State v. Smyers, 207 Ariz. 314, 318 ¶ 15 n.4 (2004) (“The courts of this state are bound by the decisions of [the supreme court] and do not have the authority to modify or disregard [the supreme court's] rulings.”).

¶13 Here, the State met this burden. In its third recitation of the case to a grand jury, the State twice indicated that several statutes might be helpful to determine probable cause including “A.R.S. 13-401 through 13 -412,” which encompass the justification defenses included in Ezell's Trebus letter. The State also read the required A.R.S. § 13-205 language and asked if any jurors needed statutes reread or clarified. Further, following questions from the grand jury, the State reread the definition of premeditation, showing that it was open to rereading the law when the jurors had questions. This presentation meets the requirements of O'Meara and Willis.

¶14 The superior court praised the State for its compliance with Willis at the second presentation. The only substantive difference between the State's presentation of the justification statutes in its second and third presentations to the grand jury is that, at the second presentation, when directing the jurors to the relevant statutes, the State said “you may also wish to consider the justification statutes, those are going to be found at A.R.S. 13-401 through 13-421.” One sentence noting that the mentioned statutes are specifically “the justification statutes” cannot be the difference between complying with or violating Willis. Thus, the State's third presentation to the grand jury did not violate Ezell's due process rights. The court did not err in relying on both O'Meara and Willis in finding such.

CONCLUSION

¶15 We accept jurisdiction but deny relief.

HOWE, Judge: