Victor Sanchez-Ravuelta and Janette Dodge, a married couple, on behalf of their minor children, Elijah Sanchez and Amelia Sanchez, Cross-Appellees, v. Town of Dewey-humboldt, Cross-Appellant. (2025)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

¶1 This matter is on remand from our supreme court. See Sanchez-Ravuelta v. Yavapai County, No. CV-24-0093-PR, 2025 WL 1427953 (Ariz. May 19, 2025). We must determine the issue raised by the Town of Dewey-Humboldt's (“Town”) cross-appeal, specifically, whether the superior court erred by granting, in part, a motion for a new trial in Minor Plaintiffs’ favor, resulting in the dismissal, without prejudice, of their claims against the Town. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶2 The factual and procedural history of this case is set forth in our supreme court's opinion, which we adopt and repeat only as necessary to determine the limited issue before us. As relevant here, the plaintiffs—two parents (“Adult Plaintiffs”) and two minor children (“Minor Plaintiffs”)—were injured in a car accident involving an allegedly intoxicated driver. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. The four plaintiffs collectively filed a complaint alleging various claims against the State of Arizona (“State”), Yavapai County (“County”), and the Town. Id. ¶¶ 4-5. The State and the County filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, but the Town filed an answer and a motion for judgment on the pleadings, later also joining the County's motion to dismiss. Id. ¶ 7. The superior court heard oral argument on these motions and took the matter under advisement. Before the court entered its rulings on the pending motions, the Minor Plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary dismissal, without prejudice, of their claims against the State and the County, as provided by Rule 41(a)(1), Ariz. R. Civ. P. Because the Town had filed an answer to the complaint, the Minor Plaintiffs moved to dismiss their claims against the Town without prejudice, as allowed by Rule 41(a)(2). Sanchez-Ravuelta, 2025 WL 1427953, ¶ 8.

¶3 Without ruling on the Minor Plaintiffs’ outstanding motion for voluntary dismissal, the superior court granted the motions to dismiss filed by the State and the County. Id. ¶ 9. In so doing, the court concluded that the collective plaintiffs’ notice of claim to both the County and the Town contained insufficient facts to comply with Arizona's notice-of-claim statute, A.R.S. § 12-821.01(A). See Sanchez-Ravuelta, 2025 WL 1427953, ¶ 9. It granted the Town's motion for judgment on the pleadings for the same reason, concluding the notice lacked adequate facts to permit the Town to understand the claimed basis for liability and could no longer be amended. Id.

¶4 The Minor Plaintiffs objected to the proposed form of judgment, arguing in relevant part that they had already given notice of their voluntary dismissal as to the State and the County and that their motion for voluntary dismissal as to the Town remained pending. The superior court then dismissed the Minor Plaintiffs as plaintiffs in the case, without prejudice, pursuant to their notice of voluntary dismissal as to the State and the County. Id. ¶ 10. But it denied as moot the Minor Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss their claims against the Town without prejudice, citing the earlier grant of the Town's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Id. Then, in October 2022, the court entered a judgment dismissing, with prejudice, all claims by all four plaintiffs against all three defendants, despite its prior rulings dismissing Minor Plaintiffs from the case, without prejudice, as to their claims against the State and the County. Id. ¶ 11.

¶5 Afterward, the collective plaintiffs moved for a new trial, arguing among other things that the superior court should have granted the Minor Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss their claims against the Town without prejudice rather than entering judgment against them on the pleadings and then dismissing their claims against the Town with prejudice. Id. ¶ 12. In November 2022, the court entered a second judgment dismissing the Minor Plaintiffs’ claims against the State and the County without prejudice and dismissing all the other claims in the case—including the Minor Plaintiffs’ claims against the Town—with prejudice. Id. ¶ 12. The court did not address the pending motion for a new trial. Id.

¶6 After the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, the superior court vacated its November 2022 judgment, held oral argument on the motion for a new trial, and, in two separate judgments, granted that motion in part, dismissing the Minor Plaintiffs’ claims against the Town without prejudice, like its claims against the State and the County. Id. ¶¶ 15-16, 18. In so doing, the court noted that it had erred by denying as moot the Minor Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss without prejudice, both because the Town had not identified “any ‘substantive right’ that would be violated” if the dismissal of the Minor Plaintiffs’ claims were entered without prejudice and because the case did “not present the kind of ‘extraordinary circumstance’ ” that would merit refusal of the Minor Plaintiffs’ request to dismiss without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). As to both new judgments, the collective plaintiffs filed an amended notice of appeal, and the Town filed a cross-appeal. Sanchez-Ravuelta, 2025 WL 1427953, ¶¶ 17, 19. Ultimately, our supreme court determined, in relevant part, that the Town's notice of appeal had been timely and that the superior court retained jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial. Id. ¶¶ 39, 46. It therefore remanded the case for this court to consider the Town's cross-appeal. Id. ¶¶ 2, 63.

¶7 On cross-appeal, the Town argues that the extraordinary circumstances presented by the procedural posture of the case—specifically, that the Town had obtained a dispositive judgment on the pleadings before the superior court ruled on the Minor Plaintiffs’ Rule 41(a)(2) motion—expose it to sufficient prejudice to compel denial of that motion. We review a superior court's decision whether to grant a motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Mill Alley Partners v. Wallace, 236 Ariz. 420, ¶ 7 (App. 2014). We similarly review for an abuse of discretion a superior court's decision whether to dismiss a claim without prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2). See Schoolhouse Educ. Aids, Inc. v. Haag, 145 Ariz. 87, 90 (App. 1985).

¶8 “The right to dismiss after an answer has been filed ․ is discretionary with the trial court, and must be made by motion with notice to the defendants, a hearing and a court order.” Cheney v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 446, 448 (1985). It is well settled that “only the most extraordinary circumstances” justify a superior court's refusal to allow a plaintiff to dismiss without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2). Cheney, 144 Ariz. at 448 (quoting Goodman v. Gordan, 103 Ariz. 538, 541 (1968)). Neither “the mere prospect of a second suit” nor a plaintiff's intention to seek dismissal “to gain a tactical advantage” rise to the level of an extraordinary circumstance meriting the denial of a motion for voluntary dismissal. Id. Rather, a court must conclude that a defendant may be deprived of a substantial legal right, such as the loss of a defense, in order to find that an extraordinary circumstance exists to justify the denial of a plaintiff's request for dismissal without prejudice. See id. at 447-48 (circumstances extraordinary when plaintiff's dismissal with goal of refiling new claim under recently enacted statutes would deprive defendant of legal defense); see also Schoolhouse Educ. Aids, 145 Ariz. at 89-91 (circumstances extraordinary when plaintiffs seized property through writ of replevin, then sought and obtained voluntary dismissal, depriving defendant of trial to seek restoration of property rights and damages for taking and withholding of seized property).

¶9 Here, the Town has not identified a qualifying extraordinary circumstance involving an impact to a substantial legal right due to the superior court's dismissal, without prejudice, of the Minor Plaintiffs’ claims. The Town's motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted solely on the ground of the insufficiency of the collective plaintiffs’ notice of claim. Thus, the ultimate question of the Town's liability, if any, to the Minor Plaintiffs has not been litigated on the merits. We recognize that, because § 12-821.01(D) allows the Minor Plaintiffs to file a new notice of claim within 180 days of their eighteenth birthdays, the dismissal without prejudice may expose the Town to a future action upon the Minor Plaintiffs reaching the age of majority. But this possibility subjects the Town to no prejudice beyond the mere prospect of a second lawsuit, which, as discussed, is an insufficient showing of prejudice to warrant a denial of a Rule 41(a)(2) dismissal. See Cheney, 144 Ariz. at 448.

¶10 We are also unpersuaded by the Town's argument that the superior court's prior judgment on the pleadings entitles it to protection from a future action on this issue by the Minor Plaintiffs. A motion for a new trial necessarily occurs after a dispositive judgment. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(b)(1). A superior court has wide discretion when deciding whether to grant a new trial, see McBride v. Kieckhefer Assocs., Inc., 228 Ariz. 262, ¶ 16 (App. 2011), and it is appropriate for a court to grant such a motion when, as here, it identifies an error that resulted in an improper judgment. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in the court's partial grant of the motion for a new trial in Minor Plaintiffs’ favor in the form of its grant of their motion for dismissal, without prejudice, of their claims against the Town.¹

Disposition

¶11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In so ruling, we express no opinion as to whether those claims are substantively meritorious. Our supreme court's recent opinion in this matter addresses only whether the State had a duty, through the Department of Liquor Licenses and Control, to protect the Adult Plaintiffs from the harm caused by an establishment overserving its patrons. See Sanchez-Ravuelta, 2025 WL 1427953, ¶¶ 49, 62. And, the superior court's original dismissal with prejudice rested purely on notice-of-claim grounds. Thus, the ultimate issue of whether the County or Town may be held liable to the Minor Plaintiffs has not been decided on the merits.

ECKERSTROM, Judge: