DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY v. CAREL JORGE FABRICIO (2025)

OPINION

¶1 The Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) petitions for special action relief from the juvenile court's order requiring DCS to disclose its case notes to the parents in this dependency action in a format that omits what the parents argue is burdensome, unacceptable metadata. To resolve DCS's petition, we consider whether the court erred by (1) interpreting the juvenile procedural rules as requiring the disclosing party to provide disclosure in the “least burdensome and most cost-effective” manner to the receiving party, and (2) concluding that inclusion of metadata with the case notes violates the parents’ right to due process. See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. (“Rule”) 315(a)(2). Because Rule 315 does not permit the receiving party to dictate how disclosed documents are formatted, and the parents have not shown they were denied due process, we accept jurisdiction and grant relief.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Carel G. (“Mother”) is the biological mother of A.V. (age six) and L.O. (age two). Fabricio V. is the biological father of A.V. but has not seen his child for about five years. Jorge O. is the alleged biological father of L.O. but paternity has not been established. DCS took both children into temporary physical custody in January 2025 after receiving reports that Mother abused A.V. DCS petitioned for dependency because “not one of the children's parents was able to safely and effectively care for them.” The parties then encountered the disclosure issues leading to this special action, which flow from much larger disclosure problems affecting dependency cases throughout the state.

¶3 DCS implemented Guardian, a case management system, in 2021. Among other things, the Guardian system houses case notes from child safety specialists involved in “dependency, termination, guardianship, and adoption cases.” See Ariz. Ct. App., Div. 1, Admin. Order No. 2024-08 at 1. In August 2023, DCS disclosed that Guardian had “systemic issues with its disclosure practices” that resulted in DCS's failure to disclose at least 200,000 documents. Id. DCS admitted “these disclosure problems occurred because its Guardian system was not well-suited for litigation use.” Id.

¶4 Given the unprecedented disclosure complications, this court issued an administrative order in March 2024. See Ariz. Ct. App., Div. 1, Admin. Order No. 2024-04. The order established tasks—with deadlines—for DCS to accomplish to address the undisclosed documents, warned that failure to timely comply with the order may result in sanctions, and directed the clerk of this court to create an administrative juvenile case for filings related to the order. See id. at 4–5. After reviewing DCS's response to the order “and discovering numerous errors and inconsistencies,” this court held a status conference and issued orders imposing additional requirements on DCS. See Admin. Ord. 2024-08 at 2. Subsequent discussions resulted in DCS being given a “list of priorities for disclosure [including] a means for promptly disclosing case notes.”

¶5 In late 2024, DCS implemented a software coding change to address Guardian's “design flaws” and to “facilitate disclosing case notes entered into the system” by child safety specialists. The coding change was intended to help DCS meet the disclosure deadline set by this court. Before the change, parties received case notes in an electronic format like a printed email message, with the date and time, the title of the note, the person who created the note along with their title, and the subject of the note displayed at the top, followed by the contents of the note itself. After the coding change, parties received case notes combined with many lines of software code known as metadata.

¶6 The record in this special action contains a sample of the disclosure in the case at issue, consisting of 371 pages. Case notes appear every few pages, interspersed throughout the metadata. Some case notes are only one line and can be difficult to distinguish from the lines of code. Other case notes are formatted roughly like paragraphs and run ten lines or more. The record also contains redacted samples from other cases pending before the juvenile court. Sometimes, the metadata runs for many pages without an identifiable case note. The following shows what the metadata typically looks like:

534: mcshhs_notetype: Collateral

535: mcshhs_personaddressidname: null

536: mcshhs_personemailidname: null

537: mcshhs_personlist: C6DA2EF9-B050-EB11-A812-001DD8309076

538: mcshhs_personname: null

539: mcshhs_personphoneidname: null

540: mcshhs _personrelationshipidname: null

541: mcshhs_personsubstanceidname: null

542: mcshhs_phoneidname: null

543: mcshhs_portalnotename: null

544: mcshhs_powfield: mcshhs_caseid

545: mcshhs_providerinvestigationname: null

546: mcshhs_providername: null

547: mcshhs_provideryominame: null

548: mcshhs_psrtidname: null

In essence, the coding change now produces both the raw data entered by a child safety specialist along with Guardian's software code that creates its interface. This form of case note disclosure and its accompanying metadata—described by DCS as “unfamiliar,” “unpopular,” “awful,” “burdensome,” “incredibly frustrating,” “ugly,” and “a bunch of gobbledygook”—prompted the parents to challenge DCS's newly implemented disclosure practice.

¶7 At the preliminary protective hearing, Mother asked the juvenile court to order case note disclosure in the “prior ․ readable format.” Jorge's attorney agreed, asserting it was “impossible to forward disclosure to a client when there's 100 pages of irrelevant ․ metadata.” She explained that the disclosure with metadata was “destroying” her, that she had just received disclosure of more than 1,000 pages in another case that she could not forward to her client, and as a contracted defense attorney, she lacked the resources, including computer memory, to handle the disclosures with metadata. After Jorge's attorney raised a similar concern in an earlier case, the juvenile court accepted the caseworker's offer to take screenshots of the case notes, notwithstanding DCS's objection. In the present case, DCS again objected to any order requiring disclosure in an alternative format. Explaining that its new disclosure practice allowed trackable disclosure so the agency could confirm compliance with this court's orders, DCS argued that providing screenshots of case notes would be “unrealistic and unworkable” as a statewide practice.

¶8 The juvenile court found DCS's current disclosure of case notes was unacceptable, reasoning that disclosure with metadata violates the parents’ due process rights and imposes an undue burden on their attorneys, especially when DCS case specialists have “access to a clean version of the case notes” that they can view “on their computer screen in the old user friendly format.” Over DCS's objection, the court ordered the production of case notes in a more user-friendly format. Specifically, the court ordered DCS to disclose “every case note ․ by screenshot or in some other manner that is not a violation of the due process rights of the parents” as a supplement to the trackable, metadata format. DCS then filed this special action challenging the court's order.

DISCUSSION

¶9 Generally, acceptance of special action jurisdiction is discretionary, and depends on whether a “remedy by appeal is equally plain, speedy, and adequate.” Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 12(a). Because this special action involves legal questions of first impression and of statewide importance that are likely to recur, we accept jurisdiction. See Ariz. R. P. Spec. Act. 12(b) (listing factors supporting acceptance of jurisdiction); State ex rel. Adel v. Covil ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 252 Ariz. 40, 41, ¶ 2 (App. 2021).

A. Interpretation of Rule 315

¶10 “Juvenile proceedings are governed by the Rules of Procedure for Juvenile Court.” Yavapai Cnty. Juv. Action No. 7707, 25 Ariz. App. 397, 399 (1975). We apply statutory construction principles when interpreting court rules. Spring v. Bradford, 243 Ariz. 167, 170, ¶ 12 (2017). If the rule's language, read in context, “is subject to only one reasonable meaning, we apply that meaning” unless doing so would result in “an absurdity or constitutional violation.” Brenda D. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 437, 442, ¶ 15 (2018); Stambaugh v. Killian, 242 Ariz. 508, 509, ¶ 7 (2017). “When the language can reasonably be read more than one way,” we may consider the spirit and purpose of the rule, as well as the effects and consequences of different interpretations, to derive its meaning. Brenda D., 243 Ariz. at 442, ¶ 15.

¶11 Part III of the juvenile rules addresses, inter alia, dependency proceedings. Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 301(a). In interpreting the provisions under Part III, courts should do so “in a manner that protects the rights of the parties and the child's best interests and gives paramount consideration to the child's health and safety.” Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 301(b). Rule 315(a)(1) provides that “[a] party must disclose to other parties all relevant information that is not privileged. A party must allow other parties to inspect materials, with or without copying regardless of whether those materials are in physical, paper, or electronic form.” Rule 315(a)(2) states that “[a] party should disclose information in the least burdensome and most cost-effective manner.” Under Rule 315(c), parties have an ongoing obligation to disclose “any relevant document” within “10 days after its receipt or preparation.”

¶12 DCS argues the juvenile court erred by interpreting Rule 315(a)(2) to require disclosure in the manner least burdensome and most cost-effective to the receiving party. According to DCS, the plain language of Rule 315(a)(2) “indicates that it is the disclosure of the materials itself—not the inspection of them—that should be accomplished in the least burdensome and most cost-effective manner.”

¶13 Mother counters that the rule's plain language “indicates the least burdensome and most cost-effective manner applies to both the discloser and the recipient,” asserting that because the rule does not expressly mention “one over the other, the only reasonable interpretation is that it applies to both.” Fabricio contends “[R]ule 315 is ambiguous and unclear” and “DCS has failed to show any substantial burden or economic hardship it would suffer” by following “the court's orders to disclose the case notes in a readable format.” Given the “Constitutional rights of parents and children in this matter,” Fabricio argues “[t]he court's order was reasonable.” He also urges us to refer to the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure for instruction because the juvenile rules are silent on “how electronically stored information should be disclosed.” Counsel for the children likewise argues that the civil rules provide “more mechanics” for how electronic disclosure should occur and that because DCS created the disclosure problem, the burden of solving it should fall on DCS “instead of the attorneys on the receiving end of the disclosures.”

¶14 We disagree with DCS's suggestion that Rule 315(a)(2) is unambiguous. The rule's inclusion of the word “should” creates some uncertainty about the disclosing party's obligation. Compare Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 315(a)(2), with Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 315 (a)(1) (party “must” disclose) and (party “must” allow inspection). Reasonably construed, “should” means the disclosing party is advised or recommended to use disclosure practices that are the least burdensome and most cost-effective, but the disclosing party is not obligated to do so.

¶15 For example, if DCS discloses thousands of documents in a particularly complex dependency case, the agency is advised, but not required, to use (at least for purposes of compliance with this rule) the least burdensome and most cost-effective disclosure method. The same principle applies to parents, children, and guardians and coincides with the overall purpose and policy behind the juvenile court rules—that the judicial process will not be unnecessarily complicated but must still protect fundamental liberty interests in a reasonably efficient manner. See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 101(b) (“Parties should use these rules, and courts should construe and enforce them, in a manner that ensures a simple and fair resolution of juvenile proceedings, reduces unnecessary delay and expense, protects individual rights, and preserves the public welfare.”). Yet nothing in Rule 315(a)(2) gives the receiving party the right to control the specific format of disclosure, and it is not our role to add such a requirement. See Antonio P. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 218 Ariz. 402, 405, ¶ 13 (App. 2008) (recognizing that courts “will not enlarge, stretch, expand, or extend” the language of a statute) (citation modified).

¶16 A comparison to the civil court rules supports our analysis. Our supreme court amended the civil rules governing disclosure and discovery of electronically stored information in 2017. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26.1(c). The pertinent civil rule states:

Unless the parties agree or the court orders otherwise, a party must produce electronically stored information in the form requested by the receiving party. If the receiving party does not specify a form, the producing party may produce the electronically stored information in native form or in another reasonably usable form that will enable the receiving party to have the same ability to access, search, and display the information as the producing party.

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26.1(c)(3) (emphasis added). The family law rules include an identical provision. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 49(k)(2) (effective Jan. 1, 2019).

¶17 Our supreme court updated the current juvenile court rules on disclosure and discovery in 2022. See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 313, 315 (effective July 1, 2022). The juvenile rules are not nearly as comprehensive as the civil rules, but more importantly, unlike the civil and family rules, Rule 315(a)(2) does not give the receiving party the right to control the format in which electronically stored information is received. Compare Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 315(a)(2), with Ariz. R. Civ. P. 26.1(c)(3), and Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 49(k)(2).

¶18 When rules or statutes “set forth a requirement in one provision but not in another, a court should assume the absence of the provision was intentional.” Ariz. State Univ. ex rel. Ariz. Bd. of Regents v. Ariz. State Ret. Sys., 237 Ariz. 246, 252, ¶ 26 (App. 2015) (applying the canon of construction known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius); see also Welch v. Cochise Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 251 Ariz. 519, 529, ¶ 36 (2021) (explaining that the expressio unius est exclusio alterius canon “counsels us to construe the legislature's exclusion ․ as intentional”). Thus, we presume the supreme court's inclusion of specific language in the civil rules and the family rules that allows the recipient of electronically stored information to dictate how the information is received, and the omission of any similar language from the juvenile rules, was intentional.

¶19 Although most of the information disclosed under Rule 315 will likely come from DCS, the rule applies to all parties in dependency proceedings. See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 301(a). It would be odd to conclude that when a party other than DCS discloses information under Rule 315, DCS could then demand that the information be provided in a more suitable format. As noted, Rule 315 contemplates that the party disclosing such information should do so in the least burdensome and most cost-effective manner.

¶20 Jorge asserts that Rule 315’s “provisions regarding disclosing in ‘the least burdensome and most cost-effective manner’ is only applicable to ‘relevant’ information.” Jorge contends that allowing the discloser to “disclose reams of irrelevant documents at the least cost to them leads to an absurd result.” We agree the metadata is seemingly irrelevant to this case, but that alone did not give the juvenile court the legal authority to order DCS to provide supplemental disclosure without the metadata. However, a receiving party who objects to the format of disclosed information may seek a court order requiring compliance with the civil discovery rules and may exercise the right of inspection as outlined below, infra ¶¶ 21–22.

¶21 We hold that Rule 315(a)(2) does not permit a receiving party to direct how the disclosing party will format the information it discloses. Nonetheless, we recognize DCS's acknowledgement that its current method of disclosing case notes (and the accompanying voluminous metadata) is burdensome to the other parties (and their attorneys) in dependency cases. DCS avows it is working on a better solution. Still, until that occurs, the attorneys and their clients are not without legal recourse, given that they have the right to receive all information from DCS relating to their pending cases. See A.R.S. § 8-807(C) (stating DCS shall disclose its “information to a court, a party in a dependency or termination of parental rights proceeding or the party's attorney ․ for the purposes of and as prescribed in this title”). And the parents’ right to receive such information is critical, given the constitutional rights at stake. See Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, ¶ 24 (2005) (“Parents possess a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children.”).

¶22 The juvenile court rules provide options for addressing disclosure and discovery issues. For example, Rule 315 provides that the “parties may agree to utilize the discovery methods in Civil Rules 26 through 37.” Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 315(e). If the parties do not make such an agreement, a party may seek the application of the civil rules through a motion “stating why [those] methods are necessary.” Id. Amici indigent defense agencies from Maricopa, Pima, Pinal, and Coconino counties argue that DCS tacitly acknowledged the applicability of the civil rules by quoting selective language from Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 34 on the coversheet to its disclosures containing metadata. DCS's inclusion of this language adds confusion but does not constitute an agreement between the parties as required by Rule 315. According to the record before us, the parties did not agree to utilize the civil rules, and none of the parties filed a motion with the court showing why application of the civil rules was necessary. But no party is precluded from making that request going forward.

¶23 Moreover, Rule 313 authorizes parents and their attorneys of record to “inspect and copy case records” without a court order. Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 313(a)(1). Because DCS does not dispute that its specialists can view the case notes without metadata, we cannot discern any reason why a parent or their counsel cannot “inspect and copy” the case note in that same format, subject to confidentiality requirements of Rule 315(a)(3) and A.R.S. § 8-807(U) (“A person who receives DCS information shall maintain the confidentiality of the information.”). Rule 315(a)(1) also provides a similar avenue for a party to request to “inspect materials, with or without copying regardless of whether those materials are in physical, paper, or electronic form.”

¶24 We recognize that no order from the juvenile court or this court will solve the serious technological problems in Guardian that will undoubtedly continue to plague dependency cases until appropriate changes are implemented. And it is no secret that DCS has not yet resolved its obligations to disclose additional information relevant to the statutory grounds alleged in such cases. Even so, all cases must be handled in a manner that ensures each party is afforded due process. See Ariz. R. P. Juv. Ct. 301(b). Thus, to ensure that all parties have reasonable access to electronically stored information in each pending case, the juvenile court must address issues relating to disclosure or discovery on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., S.S. v. Superior Court, 178 Ariz. 423, 425 (App. 1994) (explaining that “the juvenile court has the inherent power, on a case-by-case basis, to order such discovery as it deems necessary”).

B. Due Process Protections

¶25 DCS argues the juvenile court erred in finding that “the current disclosure of case notes, with all of the metadata, is a violation of the due process rights of the parents.” The parents counter that the disclosures containing metadata are too large to print, and many parents are indigent and lack the technological resources to receive the large files electronically. The parents also assert that the metadata increases the “risk of parties missing pertinent information about their case” and because DCS case workers can “easily reference their notes through their mobile Guardian portal, [but] counsel for the remaining parties are stuck going line by line over hundreds of pages of metadata,” the parents are at a “significant disadvantage” in preparing for a trial where they may lose the fundamental right to parent their children. Amicus Fort Yuma Quechan Indian Tribe contends the metadata risks denying tribes and Indian Child Welfare Act caseworkers “the ability to participate fully and meaningfully in dependency actions.”

¶26 We review de novo whether due process has been satisfied. State ex rel. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Torres, 245 Ariz. 554, 560, ¶ 23 (App. 2018). “The touchstone of due process under both the Arizona and federal constitutions is fundamental fairness,” State v. Melendez, 172 Ariz. 68, 71 (1992), manifested by notice and “the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,’ ” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (citation omitted). “Due process is not a static concept [and] must account for ‘the practicalities and peculiarities of the case,’ ” meaning that the procedural protections required “can vary, based on the interests at stake in a particular case.” Comeau v. Ariz. State Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 196 Ariz. 102, 107, ¶ 20 (App. 1999) (citation omitted); Torres, 245 Ariz. at 560, ¶ 22. “[D]ue process requires that parties have an adequate opportunity to present factual and legal claims fully.” Matter of Guardianship of A.K., 258 Ariz. 336, 344, ¶ 18 (App. 2024). In resolving a due process challenge, courts must consider: (1) “the private interest ․ affected”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

¶27 DCS recognizes that the private interests affected are not only the parents’ fundamental interest in parenting their children but also the children's “interest in a ‘normal family home.‘” Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 34 (citation omitted). Because these principles are fundamental and essential to family relationships, the procedures used in dependency proceedings should minimize any risk of erroneously depriving a parent or child of these interests. But the importance of these interests must also be weighed against the safeguarding of Arizona's children while avoiding fiscal and administrative burdens. DCS's current process of disclosing case notes interspersed with metadata, though undoubtedly frustrating, limits the risks of erroneous deprivation of information going forward.

¶28 It is undisputed that the attorneys for the parents and the children are receiving the case notes. Notwithstanding the significant problems created by the metadata, counsel for the parents have not shown that they or their clients have been precluded from reviewing the pertinent information. Given that we review allegations of due process violations on a case-by-case basis, see Comeau, 196 Ariz. at 107, ¶ 20, we cannot say the metadata in this case has prevented the receiving parties or their counsel from having notice of adverse facts or limited their ability to defend themselves. Thus, at this stage of the proceedings, the parents have not shown a denial of due process.

¶29 Finally, nothing in the record shows that the metadata has prevented counsel from preparing factual or legal arguments or providing competent representation to their clients. See Guardianship of A.K., 258 Ariz. at 344, ¶ 18. All parties recognize that disclosure of the case notes with metadata is burdensome; however, we cannot agree with the juvenile court's ruling that the parents have been denied due process under the facts presented.

C. Attorneys’ Fees

¶30 Fabricio requests an award of attorneys’ fees under A.R.S. § 12-348(A), which mandates a fee award in favor of “any party other than this state or a city, town or county that prevails by an adjudication on the merits” under one of several circumstances set forth in the statute. Because Fabricio is not a prevailing party and the merits have not been adjudicated, we deny his request and do not address whether he would be eligible for fees under § 12-348(A).

CONCLUSION

¶31 We vacate the juvenile court's order requiring DCS to supplement its original disclosures by removing the metadata from the case notes.

BROWN, Judge: