C.H. v. STATE (2019)

C.H. was convicted in the Talladega Juvenile Court of two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a child, see § 12-15-111, Ala. Code 1975. On October 4, 2018, C.H. was sentenced to 2 concurrent terms of 90 days in the county jail, and the juvenile court purported to split those sentences “[p]ursuant to the Split Sentence Act,” with C.H. to serve 10 days in the county jail followed by 2 years' probation for each conviction. (C. 44, 70.) In each case, the juvenile court also ordered C.H. to pay court costs, a fine of $100, attorney fees, and a $25 Alabama Crime Victims Compensation Assessment. C.H. appealed.

On appeal, C.H.'s counsel filed a “no-merit” brief in substantial compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), in which counsel stated that, “[a]fter thorough examination of the record, counsel is of the opinion that there was no harmful error in the circuit [sic] court case.” C.H.'s brief, at 6. C.H. was thereafter given an opportunity to present issues to this Court pro se. On April 15, 2019, C.H. responded by filing a 125-page document with this Court. That document contains, among other things, copies of certain pages from the record with C.H.'s handwritten notes on them attempting to identify issues or points to be considered by this Court.

Concerning C.H.'s convictions, this Court has reviewed the record and can find no basis for reversing the judgment of the juvenile court. Thus, C.H.'s convictions are affirmed.

Concerning C.H.'s sentences, we must reverse the juvenile court's judgment as to those. A violation of § 12-15-111 is a Class A misdemeanor. See § 12-15-111(c), Ala. Code 1975. Recently, in Collier v. State, 293 So.3d 961 (Ala. Crim. App. 2019), this Court held that the Split Sentence Act, § 15-18-8, Ala. Code 1975, “now expressly limits the trial court's authority to split a sentence to felony cases only” and that “the Split Sentence Act no longer grants the trial court the authority to split a sentence for a misdemeanor offense.” 293 So.3d at 974-75. Thus, C.H.'s split sentences are illegal.

“The proper remedy for cases in which the trial court had no authority to apply the Split Sentence Act has been to remand the case to the trial court for that court to remove the split portion of the sentence.” Collier, 293 So.3d at 975. Here, the 90–day sentences were valid and cannot be increased; however, the juvenile court must set aside the split portion of C.H.'s sentences.¹ See Wood v. State, 602 So. 2d 1195, 1196 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992) (“Although the manner in which the trial court 'split' the appellant's original sentence was improper, the sentence itself was valid. Therefore, the trial court did not have the power to increase the appellant's sentence from eight to ten years' imprisonment.”).

Based on the foregoing, C.H.'s convictions for contributing to the delinquency of a child are affirmed. However, as to C.H.'s sentences, the judgment is reversed, and this case is remanded to the juvenile court for proper sentencing. Due return shall be filed with this Court no later than 42 days from the date of this opinion.

AFFIRMED AS TO CONVICTIONS; REVERSED AS TO SENTENCES; AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.  ^*

FOOTNOTES

1.   Although a trial court cannot split a sentence for a misdemeanor offense under the Split Sentence Act, § 12-15-111(d), Ala. Code 1975, provides that a juvenile court may suspend the entire sentence and place a person on probation upon a conviction under that statute.

FOOTNOTE.   Note from the reporter of decisions: On January 28, 2020, on return to remand, the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, by order.

McCOOL, Judge.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.