State of Alabama v. Jeri Bonar (2025)

ORDER

The State of Alabama appeals Judge Kandice Pickett's order granting Jeri Bonar's motion to dismiss the cases against her, in which Bonar asserted that the State had denied her a speedy trial.

Bonar moved to dismiss the cases in December 2021. That motion was denied. On August 17, 2023, Bonar again moved to dismiss the cases on speedy-trial grounds. Judge Pickett held a hearing on the motion, and, in a judgment issued the next day, Judge Pickett granted the motion. The State timely appealed the judgment. See Rule 15.7, Ala. R. Crim. P.

This Court notes that Judge Pickett, who sits on the circuit bench, signed the order as a “Circuit Judge,” and the transcript of the hearing indicates that it was held in the circuit court. But the judgment dismissing the cases and the trial court's digital stamp indicate that the judgment was filed in the district court. And, although Bonar's motion purported to be filed in the circuit court, the trial court's digital stamp indicates that the motion was filed in the district court.

Before this Court can reach the merits of this appeal, this Court needs clarification about whether Judge Pickett was sitting as a circuit judge or acting as a district judge when she granted Bonar's motion to dismiss on August 18, 2023. See State v. MacGrady, [Ms. CR-2023-0867, May 3, 2024] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ n.1 (Ala. Crim. App. 2024) (“[T]his Court remanded the case ․ for Judge Owens to clarify whether she was sitting as a circuit judge or acting as a district judge at the time she granted MacGrady's motion to dismiss.”).

This Court thus remands the cases to the trial court for it to clarify the record in accordance with this order. On remand, the trial court shall take all necessary action to see that the circuit clerk makes due return to this Court within 21 days from the date of this order.

This Court further orders that the submission of this appeal is set aside pending further order of this Court.

REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

The cases from which this appeal arises originated in the Jefferson District Court, as noted in the style of the cases, and they will be remanded to the Jefferson District Court by virtue of the Court's order. Because this Court's action overlooks our primary responsibility to resolve issues involving subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, and because Judge Kandice Pickett's subjective thoughts about her status in the proceedings below are not determinative of the issue whether jurisdiction exists in this case, I respectfully dissent.¹

“Lack of subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived by the parties and it is the duty of an appellate court to consider lack of subject matter jurisdiction ex mero motu,” because if “a court is without subject matter jurisdiction, any judgment rendered [by it] is void.” Ex parte Smith, 438 So. 2d 766, 768 (Ala. 1983) (citing City of Huntsville v. Miller, 271, Ala. 687, 127 So. 2d 606 (1958); Payne v. Department of Indus. Rels., 423 So. 2d 231 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982); Nigg v. Smith, 415 So. 2d 1082 (Ala. 1982); and Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P.); see also Riley v. Hughes, 17 So. 3d 643, 648 (Ala. 2009) (quoting Baldwin Cnty. v. Bay Minette, 854 So. 2d 42, 45 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn, Stamps v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 642 So. 2d 941, 945 n.2 (Ala. 1994)) (stating that appellate courts are “ ‘ “duty bound to notice ex mero motu the absence of subject-matter jurisdiction.” ’ ”). In this appeal, however, the Court does not have to address the jurisdictional issues ex mero motu, because the State explicitly challenges the district court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (State's brief at 7-13.) While this Court's order states that clarification of the intentions of the trial judge when she issued the challenged order are required to reach “the merits” of this appeal, the complete absence of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be affected by any response that Judge Pickett might provide in complying with the Court's order. See Ex parte Smith, 438 So. 2d at 768 (citing In re Ingram, 356 So. 2d 618 (Ala. 1978)) (“We are in agreement with the Court of Civil Appeals to the extent that [it held that] a circuit court is without authority to transfer a cause from an inferior court under the auspices of its general supervisory powers.”).

In April 2015, Jeri Bonar was arrested on charges of possession of a forged instrument in the second degree and theft of property in the first degree. See §§ 13A-8-3 and 13A-9-6, Ala. Code 1975. Bonar applied for admission to the mental-health-court program, and, over the State's objection, the district court released her to a residential substance-abuse program. (C. 9.) Bonar's cases were transferred to “Judge Stephen Wallace for Mental Health Court,” and she was ordered to appear in court on December 17, 2015. (C. 10-13.) Bonar failed to appear before the court as ordered, and she has not been in touch with her attorneys since 2015. The district court, noting Bonar's failure to appear and to cooperate with the mental-health court's staff, issued a writ for her arrest. (C. 14-15.) On May 25, 2017, the district court ordered that Bonar's cases be bound over to await action by the grand jury. (C. 4, 15.)

In February 2018, the State asked the district court to recall the warrant for Bonar's arrest for failing to appear, based on the return of an indictment by a Jefferson County grand jury. (C. 16; see also R. 8.) On February 14, 2018, the district court recalled the arrest warrant issued after Bonar failed to appear in court. (C. 16.)

Later, in December 2021, Bonar's counsel filed a motion to dismiss in the district court, claiming her right to a speedy trial had been violated. (C. 76-77.)² That motion was denied on December 17, 2021. (C. 17.) Bonar's counsel renewed their motion in August 2023.³ (C. 80-83.) On August 18, 2023, Judge Pickett held a hearing on the renewed motion to dismiss, although Bonar was not in the State's custody, was not under any court-imposed restrictions on her liberty, and did not appear before the district court. At the conclusion of that hearing, Judge Pickett entered an order, in the district court cases, granting Bonar's motion to dismiss for want of speedy trial.⁴ (C. 18-20.)

Ten days after Judge Pickett entered her order in Bonar's district-court cases, Judge Stephen Wallace electronically filed an order “In The District Court of Jefferson County,” purporting to transfer those cases to Judge Pickett. (C. 26.) That order, however, was entered four days after the State had filed its notice of pretrial appeal. (C. 21.)

A court derives its subject-matter jurisdiction from the Alabama Constitution and the Alabama Code of 1975, not from a judge's subjective perspective as to which court he or she intended to act in. See Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536, 538 (Ala. 2006) (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630-31 (2002)); see also Ex parte Scroggins, 354 So. 3d 429, 454 (Ala. 2021); Ex parte Smith, 438 So. 2d 766. Those sources vest exclusive original jurisdiction of all felony prosecutions in the circuit courts. § 12-11-30(2), Ala. Code 1975; see also Art. VI, § 142, Ala. Const. 2022. The district courts of the State, on the other hand, possess only limited jurisdiction in felony matters. § 12-12-32(b), Ala. Code 1975; see also Art. VI, § 143, Ala. Const. 2022 (“The district court shall be a court of limited jurisdiction ․”). In felony cases, a district court's jurisdiction extends to conducting preliminary hearings and receiving pleas of guilty in noncapital felony cases, see §§ 12-12-32 and 15-11-2, Ala. Code 1975, and to conducting proceedings addressing the conditions of a defendant's pretrial release, see Rule 7.5, Ala. R. Crim. P. A district court, however, “does not retain authority over a case once the case has been bound over to the grand jury.” State v. Brown, 259 So. 3d 655, 659 (Ala. 2018).

In this pretrial appeal, the State correctly argues that “there is no provision in law, rule, or constitution for a circuit court to cobble together jurisdiction in this manner.” (State's brief at 13.) While this Court's order states that, before it “can reach the merits of this case, this Court needs clarification about whether Judge Pickett was sitting as a circuit judge or acting as a district judge when she granted Bonar's motion to dismiss on August 18, 2023,” it cites no authority to support this notion, and I am aware of none. If the State is incorrect in its argument that no constitutional provision, statute, or rule permits the action undertaken in these cases, this Court should provide the State some legal basis illustrating why Judge Pickett's intention to act in one court versus the other would make a difference in this Court's resolution of the merits.

For example, if Judge Pickett intended to act as a circuit court judge when she entered the order, does that change the fact that all the orders in this case were entered in the Jefferson District Court under district-criminal case numbers? If Judge Pickett intended to act as a circuit judge, did her intention create an entirely new cause of action -- one that neither party undertook to file or perfect? If Judge Pickett thought she was sitting as a circuit judge, why does the majority of this Court not want to know whether she treated this cause as a habeas petition, a mandamus proceeding, or whatever other legal vehicle might countenance the jump from pre-indictment, district-court criminal cases (in which all the filings were made and all the orders were entered) to a completely different circuit-court proceeding?

I am aware of no legal authority supporting the action undertaken by the majority of the Court today. As noted above, these cases are returning to the Jefferson District Court, because that is the court that entered the order appealed by the State. The Alabama Supreme Court, through Rule 2.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., has recognized the limited powers of the district court in felony cases. That rule provides:

“Felonies. All felony charges and misdemeanor or ordinance violations which are lesser-included offenses within a felony charge or which arise from the same incident as a felony charge shall be prosecuted in circuit court, except that the district court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to receive guilty pleas and to impose sentences in felony cases not punishable by sentence of death, including related and lesser included misdemeanor charges, and may hold preliminary hearings with respect to felony charges.”

The district court's limited jurisdiction to dispose of felony matters, therefore, is illustrated by its inability to act except in cases in which a defendant wishes to plead guilty. While the district court may also hold preliminary hearings, it is well settled that a district court cannot use its power to conduct preliminary hearings as a means of barring, quashing, or dismissing a later indictment. See § 15-11-2, Ala. Code 1975; Coral v. State, 551 So. 2d 1181, 1182 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989); see also Ex parte Stewart, 853 So. 2d 901, 904 (Ala. 2002) (“The [district] court's determination of the conditions of release at the initial appearance is not accusatory or adversarial; it is a shield by the judicial branch to ensure that a defendant's rights are being protected.”). Thus, in these cases, the district court exceeded its authority when it purported to bar the State from proceeding with a felony prosecution of Bonar.

While I recognize that Judge Pickett is a circuit judge in Jefferson County and that a “presiding circuit court judge, by order, may assign a judge who is within the circuit to serve within the circuit courts or within the district courts of the circuit,” Rule 13, Ala. R. Jud. Admin., that rule does not increase a district court's jurisdiction when a circuit judge, such as Judge Pickett, sits as district judge.⁵ What is certain from the record is that the lower court's order was entered in district-court cases, bore district-court case numbers, but was signed by a judge using a “Circuit Judge” signature line. (C. 18-20.) While there are good reasons why a circuit judge may need to sit as a district judge and might sign orders using a circuit-judge signature line, there is nothing in Alabama law to suggest that a circuit judge's signature block can act as a mechanism to expand the jurisdiction or power of the district court within the framework of our Unified Judicial System.

A circuit judge's authority is established by statute. Under § 12-17-26, Ala. Code 1975, circuit judges have the following authority:

“(1) To grant stays of proceedings and writs of certiorari, quo warranto, mandamus and all other remedial and original writs which are grantable by judges at common law.

“(2) To grant writs of injunction and ne exeat, returnable into the circuit court.

“(3) To administer oaths and take acknowledgements and affidavits in all cases in which oaths and affidavits are required by law.

“(4) To exercise such other powers as are or may be granted them by law.”

While such authority is not granted to district judges, circuit judges are not granted the authority to take the action Judge Pickett took in the district court. The dismissal of a felony prosecution, before it formally commences, does not fit within the authority granted by the first three subsections of this statue, and such authority has not been otherwise granted “by law.”

The fundamental problem, as Judge Pickett recognized on the record, was that there is no circuit-court case in which she could act. And the blame for this lies squarely with Bonar, who successfully avoided appearing in court or being arrested in the years since she was indicted. (R. 20.) See Rule 3.1(d), Ala. R. Crim. P. (“A case shall be docketed upon service of a summons or upon the defendant's arrest.”); see also § 15-8-70, Ala. Code 1975. In Alabama, the initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings in a felony prosecution begins with the issuance of an indictment by a grand jury. Ex parte Stewart, 853 So. 2d at 903 (citing Ala. Const. 1901, Art. 1, § 8). We have previously observed that while the grand jury “is an independent body in its deliberations,” it is nonetheless “a constituent part of the circuit court.” Mayberry v. State, 48 Ala. App. 276, 283, 264 So. 2d 198, 204 (Crim. App. 1971); see also Brown, 259 So. 3d at 659. Once a felony prosecution is initiated by way of an indictment, a defendant who, unlike Bonar, is not fleeing prosecution may then challenge the denial of a speedy trial by way of a pretrial motion in the circuit court. See Committee Comments to Rule 15.2, Ala. R. Crim. P. (“If a defendant wishes to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the denial of a speedy trial, or any similar defense, the defense should be raised by a motion under this rule.”).

Further, these are not cases in which the defendant is either in custody or under some other form of pretrial restraint, because Bonar fled Alabama years ago and her whereabouts are unknown. Cf. State v. MacGrady, [Ms. CR-2023-0867, May 3, 2024] __ So. 3d __, __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2024) (noting that “MacGrady was released on bond” but remained in the area). Under Alabama law, indictments must be returned to the circuit court, “but no entry of an indictment found must be made on the minutes, nor must any indictment be inspected by any other person than the district attorney, the presiding judge and the clerk of the court until the defendant has been arrested or has given bail for his appearance.” § 15-8-70, Ala. Code 1975. It is undisputed that Bonar has never been arrested on her indictment, nor was she on bail at the time the grand jury returned the indictment against her.

In such cases, an indictment is essentially in limbo, whether or not it is actually locked up in the clerk's “iron vault.” See § 15-8-72, Ala. Code 1975 (“The clerk of the court in which indictments are returned shall, forthwith and without allowing them to be taken out of his custody or control, record the same, with the endorsement thereon, in a well-bound book which shall be properly indexed and kept secret, as indictments are required to be kept secret, before the arrest of the defendant; and, if the office of the clerk is furnished with an iron safe or vault, it shall be kept therein.”). As a result, there is no circuit-court proceeding against Bonar presently pending in the courts, and Judge Pickett could not create one by intending to act as a circuit judge.⁶ Ex parte Smith, 438 So. 2d at 768.

And the absence of any such case matters, because a circuit judge may permit an indictment to be quashed or dismissed, § 15-8-130, Ala. Code, but such an action must “be entered of record.” Where the law prohibits the creation of such a record until a defendant is arrested or has given bail for his or her appearance, a circuit judge cannot act in a felony prosecution “of record.” That is not to say that a defendant who has not fled the jurisdiction of Alabama's courts would be left with no remedy. Defendants seeking to challenge pretrial, preindictment restraints on their liberty on speedy-trial grounds may do so by way of the writ of habeas corpus. See Moreno v. State, 367 So. 3d 462, 464-65 (Ala. Crim. App. 2021) (remanding habeas petition alleging violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial); see also Williams v. State, 511 So. 2d 265, 267 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) (noting that the writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for one whose constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated when no other remedy is available).⁷

I do not dispute that, outside the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus sought by an eligible petitioner, circuit judges possess some limited powers and authority over grand-jury proceedings and certain aspects of felony prosecutions before the service of an indictment on an accused. But while those powers are varied, they are also well defined. For example, Alabama law permits a district attorney or circuit judge to disclose certain information about secret grand-jury proceedings, even though that authority is not given to district judges. See § 12-16-221, Ala. Code 1975.⁸ Circuit judges have the authority to grant recesses of the grand jury or to call recessed grand jurors back into attendance. See § 12-16-190, Ala. Code 1975. Circuit judges are responsible for providing proper legal charges to the grand jury. See § 12-16-202, Ala. Code 1975. Further, circuit judges have statutory authority to conduct contempt proceedings for grand-jury witnesses who refuse to appear or otherwise refuse to answer proper questions posed by the grand jurors. See §§ 12-16-190 and 12-16-226, Ala. Code 1975. A circuit judge, under appropriate circumstances, can replace the foreperson of the grand jury. See § 12-16-208, Ala. Code 1975. Circuit judges are required to expunge from any grand-jury report criticisms of a citizen that are not accompanied by an indictment or a bill of impeachment. See § 12-16-223, Ala. Code 1975. In cases involving grand-jury secrecy, circuit judges have been explicitly empowered to “issue whatever other reasonable orders as may be necessary to accomplish the purposes” of the Grand Jury Secrecy Act. § 12-16-226, Ala. Code 1975. But I am aware of no part of Alabama law that provides circuit judges the authority to dismiss or quash an indictment extrajudicially (by their intent to act as a circuit judge outside the confines of any circuit-court matter), or within the confines of a district-court proceeding.

In the ordinary case, challenges to a felony prosecution on speedy-trial grounds must be made by means of a pretrial motion filed in accordance with Rule 15.2, Ala. R. Crim. P. As noted in the Committee Comments to that rule, “[i]f a defendant wishes to raise the defense of double jeopardy, the denial of a speedy trial, or any similar defense, the defense should be raised by a motion under this rule.” Such speedy-trial motions are linked to the indictment served on a defendant, as noted in Dozier v. State, 706 So. 2d 1287 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997). In Dozier, this Court found that a defendant's failure to reassert his speedy-trial claim by means of a pretrial motion upon being reindicted after a former indictment had been dismissed resulted in a failure to preserve the issue for appellate review. Id. at 1288. Though this Court considers speedy-trial claims that were not presented by means of a pretrial motion, we do require that such claims be presented to the trial court. See Archie v. State, 875 So. 2d 336 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003). It follows that, if a speedy-trial claim must be presented to the circuit court to preserve the issue for appellate review, a criminal prosecution in the circuit court must be formally commenced before such a claim can be asserted as a defense to prosecution.⁹

Another limitation on the ability of the district court to act in these cases is its lack of personal jurisdiction over Bonar. It is undisputed that the district court's arrest warrant for her failure to appear in court was recalled in 2018. It is further undisputed that she has not been arrested since then. During the hearing held before the district court, the following exchange occurred:

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So the delay -- the delay would be on the State for not finding her and serving her with the warrant.

“THE COURT: Just for curiosity, where is Ms. Bonar today?

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I -- I don't know.

“[THE STATE]: Judge, if I may, our notes from mental health court from back in 2015 is defense has not -- defendant had not been in contact with her defense attorney or anyone with mental health court. And that is December of 2015.

“․.

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. Judge, no. We have not had any contact with Ms. Bonar. I think it's Bonar, I believe. But we haven't had any contact.

“THE COURT: And I think I said her last name - -

“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yeah. But no, we have not had contact.”

(R. 13-14, 20.) A court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by means of an arrest or his or her voluntary appearance. See, e.g., Sherrod v. State, 197 Ala. 286, 72 So. 540 (1916). In City of Dothan v. Holloway, 501 So. 2d 1136, 1137 (Ala. 1986), for example, our Supreme Court noted that a trial court can acquire personal jurisdiction over a defendant only by service of its process or through a voluntary appearance. Neither of those things occurred in these cases.

Bonar fled the jurisdiction of the district court, which never reattained jurisdiction over her person. To the contrary, that court withdrew its warrant for her arrest, which removed any restraints on Bonar's liberty relating to the proceedings in the district court. Bonar has not been arrested, has not had the indictment served on her, and has not voluntarily appeared to accept service of the indictment, and one of those events would be necessary to commence criminal proceedings in a circuit court. Rule 2.1, Ala. R. Crim. P. Thus, the circuit court has never acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of Bonar's prosecution or her person.¹⁰ Whether one views the actions of Judge Pickett as being those of a district judge, or of a circuit judge, there was no personal jurisdiction over Bonar permitting entry of the order under review.

Although neither party cited to Brown, supra, in their briefs, it illustrates why the district court's order in these cases is, in fact, void. In Brown, the district court granted the felony defendant's motion for discovery after a preliminary hearing had been held. The State unsuccessfully petitioned for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court and this Court. Brown, 259 So. 3d 657; see also State v. Brown, 259 So. 3d 683 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017). The State then sought a writ of mandamus in the Alabama Supreme Court, which granted the State's petition and issued the writ directing the presiding judge of the Montgomery Circuit Court to vacate his order denying the State's petition for a writ of mandamus and, further, to vacate the district court's order granting discovery. This outcome was required because “an indictment is required to initiate a felony prosecution,” Brown's case had been bound over to the grand jury, and the district court had “completed its function of holding a preliminary hearing.” Brown, 259 So. 3d at 659-60.

If a district court lacks authority to grant discovery in a felony prosecution after it has performed its limited functions in that felony proceeding, it follows that a district court cannot dismiss or otherwise interfere with the service and prosecution of an indictment -- regardless of whether the district-court bench is being occupied at the time by a circuit judge. And because the powers of a circuit judge are those powers that “are or may be granted them by law,” § 12-17-26(4), Ala. Code 1975, the absence of any statutory authority providing for the dismissal of an indictment before the arrest of the accused or the entry of the matter on the minutes of the circuit court, § 15-8-70, Ala. Code 1975, means that, in these cases, the fact that the order was entered by a circuit judge sitting as a district judge did not otherwise confer jurisdiction upon the district court or the judge.

Whatever Judge Pickett's response to this Court's order might be, it will not change the fact that she was sitting as a district judge in the proceedings below. Rather than remand these cases for irrelevant factual development, this Court should resolve the jurisdictional issue that has been presented. Consequently, because I am unaware of any legal authority to support either this Court's remand order or the district court's actions, I must respectfully dissent.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Judge Pickett is a circuit judge in Jefferson County.

2.   Bonar's motion was styled “In the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama,” but was electronically filed using the AlaFile system, under case numbers DC-2015-3187 and DC-2015-3188. Accordingly, the electronic-filing stamp reflects that the motion was filed in the District Court of Jefferson County in those two district-court matters. Pursuant to the Administrative Policies and Procedures for Electronic Filing in the Criminal Divisions of the Alabama Unified Judicial System (April 2011), an “ ‘[e]lectronic filing’ means uploading a document directly from a judge's or user's computer, using the Unified Judicial System's Internet-based system to file that document in the court's case file.” Id. at p. 3 (emphasis added). Additionally, the electronic-filing stamp generated by the AlaFile system is controlling for purposes of determining the “filing” of a document. Id. at p. 6. Accordingly, Bonar's motion was filed in the Jefferson District Court.

3.   See note 2, supra.

4.   Judge Pickett electronically entered her order, which was styled as being “In the District Court of Jefferson County, Alabama.” (C. 18.) Pursuant to the Administrative Policies and Procedures for Electronic Filing in the Criminal Divisions of the Alabama Unified Judicial System (April 2011), a “document” includes orders of a court, and the electronic filing of an order means “uploading [the order] ․ from [the] judge's ․ computer, using the Unified Judicial System's Internet-based system to file that document in the court's case file. Id. at p. 3 (emphasis added). The use of the AlaFile system in this case indicates that Judge Pickett was acting as a district judge in these cases.

5.   I note also that the record indicates that Judge Pickett did not appear to have relied upon her status as a circuit judge to justify her actions in the district court, because she conceded in the proceedings below that she knew “the case can't get started in circuit court until she's served with the writ.” (R. 15.) Later, Judge Pickett noted: “I can't even serve her with a court date because she hasn't been served.” (R. 20.)

6.   As noted above, the facts of these cases are factually distinguishable from those in State v. MacGrady, [Ms. CR-2023-0867, May 3, 2024], __ So. 3d __ (Ala. Crim. App. 2024), in which this Court reached the merits of a speedy trial ruling made by a circuit judge in a district court case after the case had been bound over to the grand jury, but before any indictment was returned. MacGrady, __ So. 3d at __ n.1. Moreover, though the Court reached the merits, it did not consider the issue of the lower court's probable lack of jurisdiction, which the State challenges here. Consequently, MacGrady is not controlling on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Ex parte Town of Lowndesboro, 950 So. 2d 1203, 1210 (Ala. 2006) (noting that, even if raised by the parties, a jurisdictional issue “not decided by the courts and made part of the opinion of the case” has no precedential effect); see also United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952) (“Even as to our own judicial power or jurisdiction, this Court has followed the lead of Chief Justice Marshall who held that this Court is not bound by a prior exercise of jurisdiction in a case where it was not questioned and it was passed sub silentio.”).

7.   Because Bonar fled the jurisdiction of the district court to parts unknown, there is no basis for her to seek a writ of habeas corpus. See § 15-21-1, Ala. Code 1975 (“Any person who is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty in the State of Alabama on any criminal charge or accusation or under any other pretense whatever ․ may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus ․.”). Bonar, however, has not been in the custody of the State of Alabama since fleeing the jurisdiction of the district court in 2015.

8.   Thus, in the present case, the district attorney's disclosure of that Bonar had been indicted in a motion to recall an outstanding writ of arrest did not violate grand jury secrecy rules. (C. 74, R, 8.)

9.   In the habeas context, the purpose of a speedy-trial claim is to obtain the defendant's release from pretrial detention or the removal of pretrial restraints on the defendant's liberty. A successful habeas petitioner obtains his or her freedom, but not a judgment barring further criminal proceedings. While a habeas petition is an appropriate mechanism for attacking illegal pretrial confinement or restraints on a defendant's liberty on speedy-trial grounds, it “cannot be made to answer the purposes of an appeal.” Blake v. State, 448 So. 2d 968, 970 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (citing Price v. Hamilton, 279 Ala. 324, 184 So. 2d 835 (1966)).

10.   While a defective indictment does not defeat a circuit court's jurisdiction, see Ex parte Seymour, 946 So. 2d 536, 538-39 (Ala. 2006), an indictment (defective or not) is required for the commencement of criminal proceedings. See Rule 2.1, Ala. R. Crim. App. Ex parte Seymour does not change Alabama's constitutional requirement that felony proceedings be commenced by means of an indictment returned by a grand jury, except where a defendant consents to guilty-plea proceedings on information. Art. I, § 8, Ala. Const. 2022.

Windom, P.J., and Kellum and Minor, JJ., concur. Cole, J., concurs in the result. Anderson, J., dissents, with opinion.