FREDRICK BOYD v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE (2012)

NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent.  See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3).  Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding precedent for any proposition of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Fredrick Boyd was convicted of refusal to submit to a breath test in violation of the Anchorage Municipal Code. On appeal, he claims that the district court erred when it found that police had probable cause to stop him for a traffic offense.   For reasons explained here, we disagree with Boyd and affirm the district court's ruling.

Background

On August 15, 2008, Anchorage Police Officer Ken Evans was talking to two women who, after attracting his attention, had just gotten out of a truck.   As Evans spoke to the women, he saw the truck returning to the area.   He saw the driver, Boyd, stop the truck in the street, and then back it into a driveway in order to turn the truck around.   The driveway went into a heavily wooded lot that had been fenced off and had a gate.   As Boyd backed into the driveway, Evans heard a crash as the truck ran into something.   From where he was, Evans was unable to see what Boyd had backed into.

Evans then saw Boyd drive off, heading away from Evans and the women.   Evans noticed that Boyd did not stop to determine whether he had caused any damage to the object he had backed into, nor did he leave any of the information required when a driver of a vehicle is involved in an accident.   Because Boyd had apparently just left the scene of an accident without leaving the required information, Evans pursued him and conducted a traffic stop.

Ultimately Boyd was arrested for operating while under the influence and for refusal to submit to a breath test.   He was not charged with leaving the scene of an accident.

Boyd moved to suppress all evidence and then, later, to dismiss the case, both times claiming that Evans had made an illegal traffic stop.   A hearing was held at which Evans and one of the women testified.   Afterwards, District Court Judge Brian K. Clark found that Evans had probable cause to stop Boyd for leaving the scene of an accident,¹ and for failing as a driver to exercise due care.²

Later, Judge Clark tried the case at a bench trial.   The judge found Boyd guilty of breath test refusal,³ but acquitted him of the operating under the influence.⁴

Discussion

Why we conclude that Evans had probable cause to stop Boyd for a traffic violation

Boyd claims that Judge Clark erred in finding that Evans had probable cause to make a traffic stop.   Boyd argues that Evans only had a hunch that Boyd caused any damage when Evans heard the truck hit an object.   He argues that the officer had no proof that anything had been damaged until after the stop had been conducted and the officer went back to look.   Boyd concludes that because Evans had nothing but a hunch, he did not have probable cause to stop Boyd for leaving the scene of an accident.

But Judge Clark found two reasons for upholding the stop.   The first reason was that Evans had probable cause to believe that Boyd had left the scene of an accident without providing the required information.   The second reason was that Evans had watched Boyd as Boyd failed to exercise due care to avoid colliding with an animal, other traffic, or fixed or moveable objects.

We have ruled a number of times that normally, when a police officer directly observes a violation of the motor vehicle laws, the officer has probable cause to conduct a traffic stop.⁵  Here, Judge Clark found that Evans witnessed Boyd's failure to exercise due care when backing his truck.

The existence of probable cause is a mixed question of law and fact.⁶  Absent clear error, we accept the facts as the lower court finds them.⁷  We then determine whether probable cause arises from these facts.⁸

Judge Clark found that “[i]t is clear that when Officer Evans was directly observing Boyd, and Boyd backed up [his vehicle], that Boyd, in fact, collided with something.”   Judge Clark then ruled that Boyd, by colliding with something, violated AMC 9.16.140.B. Under this section of the municipal code, “[e]very driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with an animal, other traffic or fixed or moveable objects.”   Based on the testimony from the hearing, Judge Clark ruled that Evans had probable cause to stop Boyd because he had witnessed Boyd collide with some object.

The record supports Judge Clark's factual findings.   Evans testified that he watched Boyd back his truck into the driveway of a fenced, gated, and heavily wooded lot and heard the truck collide with something.   Accordingly, we conclude that Evans had probable cause to believe that Boyd had not exercised due care to avoid hitting a fixed or moveable object when backing his truck.   And because the traffic stop was lawful, Boyd was not entitled to have evidence suppressed or to have the charges dismissed.

Conclusion

We AFFIRM the district court's judgment.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 9.10.020..  FN1. Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 9.10.020.

FN2. AMC 9.16.140.B (“Every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with an animal, other traffic or fixed or moveable objects.”)..  FN2. AMC 9.16.140.B (“Every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due care to avoid colliding with an animal, other traffic or fixed or moveable objects.”).

FN3. AMC 9.28.022..  FN3. AMC 9.28.022.

FN4. AMC 9.28.020..  FN4. AMC 9.28.020.

FN5. E.g., Bessette v. State, 145 P.3d 592, 594 (Alaska App.2006);  Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1148 (Alaska App.2005)..  FN5. E.g., Bessette v. State, 145 P.3d 592, 594 (Alaska App.2006);  Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1148 (Alaska App.2005).

FN6. See Saucier v. State, 869 P.2d 483, 484 (Alaska App.1994)..  FN6. See Saucier v. State, 869 P.2d 483, 484 (Alaska App.1994).

FN7. Id..  FN7. Id.

FN8. Chandler v. State, 830 P.2d 789, 792 (Alaska App.1992)..  FN8. Chandler v. State, 830 P.2d 789, 792 (Alaska App.1992).

COATS, Chief Judge.