ANTHONY MOORE v. STATE OF ALASKA (2011)

NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent.  See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3).  Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding precedent for any proposition of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Anthony Moore was convicted of rape and robbery in 1978, and he was sentenced to a composite term of twenty-five years to serve.¹  In February 1993, Moore filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that the Department of Corrections was not calculating his good time credit in the proper manner.

Under Alaska law, prisoners receive credit against their sentence if they maintain good behavior during their term of imprisonment.²  Moore took the position that this statutory good time credit should be awarded to him under the “block” method—that is, awarded all at once, at the beginning of his sentence, with the possibility that he might forfeit some or all of this credit if he misbehaved while serving his sentence.   The Department of Corrections took the position that statutory good time credit should be awarded under the “accrual” method—that is, awarded monthly, in small portions, at the end of each month in which a prisoner maintained good behavior.

The superior court ruled in Moore's favor on this issue, and this Court affirmed the superior court's ruling in State v. McCallion.³

In 1978, when Moore was sentenced, Alaska law also offered prisoners the opportunity to earn additional good time credit—“meritorious” good time credit—if the prisoners worked while they were in prison or in a corrections camp.⁴  Although the Alaska Legislature abolished meritorious good time credit in 1980, the Department of Corrections agreed that if statutory good time credit should be awarded under the block method (as Moore argued it should), then, for prisoners whose crimes were committed before 1980, the legislature's abolition of meritorious good time credit violated the ex post facto clause (because, in effect, it constituted an increase in these prisoners' punishment).

Based on the Department's position concerning this ex post facto issue, Moore and the Department reached a stipulation concerning Moore's projected release date from prison.   Moore and the Department agreed that if the superior court accepted the Department's position that statutory good time credit should be awarded under the accrual method, then the legislature's abolition of meritorious good time credit did not violate the ex post facto clause, and Moore's projected release date would be July 30, 1995.   On the other hand, Moore and the Department agreed that if the superior court accepted Moore's position that statutory good time credit should be awarded under the block method, then the abolition of meritorious good time credit did violate the ex post facto clause, and Moore's projected release date would be considerably earlier—May 2, 1993.

As we have already explained, the superior court adopted Moore's position, and this Court affirmed that ruling in McCallion.⁵  Thus, Moore was released from prison in May 1993.

Fifteen years later, in May 2008, Moore was in prison again, stemming from a parole violation.   He filed a motion in the superior court, asking the court for “enforcement” of the judgment that was entered in the 1993 post-conviction relief action.   Specifically, Moore claimed that the 1993 judgment specified that he should receive meritorious good time credit as well as statutory good time credit, and that this meritorious good time credit should be awarded under the same method as the statutory good time credit—that is, awarded under the block method rather than the accrual method.

Superior Court Judge Michael Spaan concluded that Moore had misconstrued the 1993 judgment.   Even though the 1993 judgment clearly specified that a prisoner's statutory good time credit should be awarded under the block method, Judge Spaan found that the 1993 judgment was silent regarding the method by which meritorious good time credit should be awarded.

In particular, the record reflects that the superior court was not required to resolve this issue in 1993 because Moore and the Department reached a stipulation concerning Moore's release date.   This stipulation was presumably based, in part, on the parties' agreement as to how much meritorious good time credit Moore was entitled to.   But the parties did not explain their method of calculating Moore's meritorious good time credit, and the superior court was not asked to rule on this issue.   Instead, the parties simply informed the superior court that if statutory good time credit should be awarded under the block method, then Moore was also entitled to meritorious good time credit—in an unspecified amount—and Moore's projected release date was May 2, 1993.

Based on our examination of the record of the 1993 post-conviction relief proceedings, we agree with Judge Spaan that the superior court's 1993 judgment does not specify the method by which meritorious good time credit is to be awarded to prisoners (i.e., prisoners whose offense pre-dates the legislature's 1980 abolition of meritorious good time).

We express no opinion as to whether Moore might be entitled to file a new lawsuit to litigate this issue now that he has been returned to custody and the Department of Corrections has calculated a new projected release date for him.   But this issue was not resolved in 1993.

For these reasons, the superior court's ruling is AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Moore v. State, 597 P.2d 975, 975 (Alaska 1979)..  FN1. Moore v. State, 597 P.2d 975, 975 (Alaska 1979).

FN2. See AS 33.20.010 and its predecessor statutes..  FN2. See AS 33.20.010 and its predecessor statutes.

FN3. 875 P.2d 93, 99 (Alaska App.1994)..  FN3. 875 P.2d 93, 99 (Alaska App.1994).

FN4. See former AS 33.20.020 (1979)..  FN4. See former AS 33.20.020 (1979).

FN5. 875 P.2d at 93, 99..  FN5. 875 P.2d at 93, 99.

COATS, Chief Judge.