LESLIE AMY BROWN v. STATE OF ALASKA (2010)

NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent.  See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3).  Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding precedent for any proposition of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Leslie Amy D. Brown was convicted of fourth-degree assault for pushing Ruth Prentice, taking a swing at her, and chasing her up the street.   Brown argues that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to convict her.   As explained below, we find no merit to this claim.   We therefore affirm Brown's conviction.

On June 8, 2009, Ruth Prentice was buying lunch at a store in White Mountain when she ran into Norma Douglas and her daughter, Brown.   There was apparently some enmity between Douglas and Prentice, because before leaving the store with her daughter, Douglas told Prentice she “better watch it.”

When Prentice finished buying her lunch and walked outside, the daughter, Brown, was waiting for her.   Brown called Prentice names, including “whore” and “village slut,” and pushed her around.   She told Prentice “you better watch it.”   Brown then took a swing at Prentice and grabbed a hold of Prentice's coat.   Prentice was afraid Brown was going to beat her up, so she slipped out of the coat and ran up the street.   She doubted she would make it home before Brown caught up with her, so she ran to a friend's house.   Once there, she called Dan Harrelson, the Village Public Safety Officer.   Harrelson arrived at the friend's house within two or three minutes.   Brown was still standing outside, upset and “very angry.”   Harrelson told Brown to leave the area.   Then he took Prentice home.

Brown was convicted of fourth-degree assault for placing Prentice in fear of imminent physical injury.¹  On appeal from that conviction, Brown argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove that the threat of physical injury was “imminent.”   Brown claims that her statement to Prentice that she had “better watch it” was a warning of future consequences, not a threat of immediate harm.

In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, and decide whether a fair-minded juror exercising reasonable judgment could conclude that the State met its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.²

Viewing the evidence in this light, Brown's conduct was not limited to threatening Prentice with future harm.   As just recounted, Prentice testified that Brown called her insulting names, shoved her, and chased her up the street, forcing her to take refuge in a friend's house.   Prentice said that while this was happening, she was afraid Brown was going to beat her up.   This testimony was corroborated by Officer Harrelson, who said Prentice was agitated and “sobbing heavily” when she called him for help.   When Harrelson arrived at Prentice's friend's house, Brown was still standing outside, and she was upset and “very angry.”   Harrelson told Brown to leave the area.   The next day, Brown admitted to Harrelson that she had “lost it,” and that she should not have shoved Prentice.

In her testimony at trial, Brown denied that she chased Prentice up the street.   But a fair-minded jury could reject this testimony and find that Prentice and Harrelson were more credible witnesses.³  We conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a fair-minded juror to find that Brown placed Prentice in fear of imminent physical injury, and that Brown was therefore guilty of fourth-degree assault.

We AFFIRM Brown's conviction.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. A person commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree if “by words or other conduct that person recklessly places another person in fear of imminent physical injury.”  AS 11.41.230(a)(3)..  FN1. A person commits the crime of assault in the fourth degree if “by words or other conduct that person recklessly places another person in fear of imminent physical injury.”  AS 11.41.230(a)(3).

FN2. Silvernail v. State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Alaska App.1989);  Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981)..  FN2. Silvernail v. State, 777 P.2d 1169, 1172 (Alaska App.1989);  Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981).

FN3. Anthony v. State, 521 P.2d 486, 492 (Alaska 1974) (“The assessment of witness credibility is exclusively within the province of the jury.”)..  FN3. Anthony v. State, 521 P.2d 486, 492 (Alaska 1974) (“The assessment of witness credibility is exclusively within the province of the jury.”).

BOLGER, Judge.