TIMOTHY CRAWFORD v. STATE OF ALASKA (2010)

NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this court do not create legal precedent.  See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3).  Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding precedent for any proposition of law.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND JUDGMENT

Timothy Crawford took trolling poles from a floating dock.   Those poles belonged to Michael Jewett.   Crawford's defense was that he believed that those poles were abandoned.   He was convicted of second-degree theft.

Crawford appeals, arguing that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that he intended to steal the poles.   In particular, he argues that the State failed to prove that he did not believe that the poles were abandoned.   For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that his conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.

To establish whether sufficient evidence was presented to support a conviction, we view the evidence and the reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to upholding the conviction and inquire whether reasonable jurors could conclude that the accused's guilt was established beyond a reasonable doubt.¹  We do not weigh the credibility of the witnesses.²  Therefore, we set out the facts of this case in the light most favorable to upholding the conviction.

Factual and procedural background

In January 2007, Michael Jewett began major repairs on his fishing boat.   To accommodate the repairs, he needed to remove four custom made trolling poles.   These were large poles which would cost about $10,000 to $12,000 to replace.   The poles were in excellent condition.   Jewett stored these poles on a public floating dock in Bar Harbor.   Although the dock was not intended for storage, Jewett obtained permission from the Harbor Master's office to store the poles on the dock.   Jewett stacked the poles, out of the way, on the dock-there were no complaints to the Harbor Master about the poles.   Jewett checked on the poles about once every three days.

Appellant Timothy Crawford lived on his boat in Bar Harbor.   That spring, Crawford began negotiations with Phillip Nehl to purchase or trade for Nehl's boat, the F/V ANNETTE.   Nehl mentioned that he needed trolling poles.   Crawford offered to trade the trolling poles as part of the purchase price of the boat.   The boat that Nehl needed the poles for was in Bar Harbor.   Crawford picked up the poles on June 6, at night, and transported them two miles south to another dock.

Jewett discovered that the poles were missing, and notified the police.   The poles were seen in Nehl's truck.   The police contacted Nehl and seized the poles.   Nehl showed the police some receipts which he had received from Crawford which indicated that the poles were part of the purchase price for the F/V ANNETTE.

A jury found Crawford guilty of second-degree theft.

Sufficient evidence supported Crawford's conviction

A person commits second-degree theft if, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate property of another to oneself or a third person, the person obtains the property of another, valued between $500 and $25,000.³  A person acts “intentionally” with respect to a result described by a provision of law defining an offense when the person's conscious objective is to cause that result.⁴

Thus, to convict Crawford, the State needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he took the poles with intent to deprive Jewett of his poles or to appropriate Jewett's poles to himself or a third person.

Crawford's defense was that he believed the poles were abandoned, and thus he lacked the requisite intent to steal the poles.   Crawford claimed that he believed that the poles had been abandoned, because he had been previously told by the Harbor Master's office that everything left on the dock would be discarded, and because the poles sat on the dock for about six months.   He pointed out that the poles were not labeled with any identifying information, and he claimed that he talked to other harbor users about the poles, and nobody indicated that they belonged to Jewett.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the conviction, we believe that the jury could reasonably have rejected Crawford's explanation that he believed that the poles were abandoned.   The jury could have concluded that Crawford was aware of the value of the poles, because he offered them as part of the trade price of the F/V ANNETTE.   The jury could have concluded that based on the value of the poles and the way that the poles were stacked neatly, Crawford did not believe that the poles were abandoned.   The jury could have concluded that Crawford did not believe that the poles were abandoned based on his failure to seek information regarding the owner of the poles from the Harbor Master.   Further, when Crawford took the poles from the floating dock in Bar Harbor, he transported them two miles south, rather than delivering them directly to Nehl's boat, which was docked nearby in Bar Harbor.   In addition, Crawford took the poles at night.   Based on this, the jury could reasonably have concluded that Crawford was attempting to avoid being observed while taking the poles, and thus he was aware that the poles were not abandoned.

There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that Crawford was guilty of second-degree theft.

Conclusion

Crawford's conviction is AFFIRMED.

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981);  Simpson v. State, 877 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Alaska App.1994)..  FN1. Dorman v. State, 622 P.2d 448, 453 (Alaska 1981);  Simpson v. State, 877 P.2d 1319, 1320 (Alaska App.1994).

FN2. Brown v. Anchorage, 680 P.2d 100, 104 (Alaska App.1984)..  FN2. Brown v. Anchorage, 680 P.2d 100, 104 (Alaska App.1984).

FN3. AS 11.46.100(1), AS 11.46.130(a)(1)..  FN3. AS 11.46.100(1), AS 11.46.130(a)(1).

FN4. AS 11.81.900(a)(1)..  FN4. AS 11.81.900(a)(1).

COATS, Chief Judge.