KATHY TODD v. MR STEVE PAWN SHOP (2011)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

Kathy Todd, in propria persona, appeals from a judgment entered after a court trial found in favor of Mr. Steve's Pawn Shop (Pawn Shop) in Todd's breach of contract action against Pawn Shop for selling her pawned diamond ring.   Todd contends that Pawn Shop had not complied with the statutory notice requirements contained in Financial Code section 21201 before it sold the diamond ring.¹  We disagree and affirm the judgment.

BACKGROUND

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, as we must (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 58), the evidence shows the following.

On June 16, 2007, Todd pawned a diamond ring to Pawn Shop in return for a loan of $300.   She had pawned and redeemed the ring three times previously to Pawn Shop. On October 25, 2007, Pawn Shop mailed a notice to Todd of the termination of the loan period and right of redemption, informing her that she had until November 10, 2007, to redeem the ring.   The notice was returned to Pawn Shop by the post office.

Pawn Shop sold the ring after the loan due date and “much after” the grace period.   On October 26, 2007, Todd called Pawn Shop to pick up the ring and was told she had to speak to Steve Jacobson, the proprietor of Pawn Shop. Todd came to talk to him about a month after the loan due date and after the ring had been sold.   Jacobson gave Todd the notice that had been mailed to her and returned by the post office.   Todd admitted that the notice had been sent to her correct address.   A photocopy of that notice was admitted at trial.   Jacobson testified that when Todd met with him at Pawn Shop he showed her verification of mailing by the post office contained in Pawn Shop's ledger.

The trial court determined that Pawn Shop had complied with the required notification and verification of mailing requirements of section 21201 and found in favor of Pawn Shop. This appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Substantial evidence supports the trial court's judgment

Todd contends that Pawn Shop had not complied with the statutory notice requirements contained in section 21201 before it sold the diamond ring.   Specifically, she contends that the court erred in its interpretation of section 21201, the court erred in failing to require Pawn Shop to show verification that it had mailed notice of termination and redemption through the post office, and the evidence did not support the judgment.   We disagree with her contentions.

Statutory interpretation is a question of law which we decide de novo.   (California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 699.)  “In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we are bound by the substantial evidence rule.   All factual matters must be viewed in favor of the prevailing party and in support of the judgment.   All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the judgment.”  (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc., supra, 191 Cal.App.4th at p. 58.)

Section 21201 provides, in pertinent part:  “Every loan made by a pawnbroker for which goods are received in pledge as security shall be evidenced by a written contract, a copy of which shall be furnished to the borrower.   The loan contract shall provide a four-month loan period, shall set forth the loan period and the date on which the loan is due and payable, and shall clearly inform the borrower of his or her right to redeem the pledge during the loan period.  [¶] ․ [¶] If any pledged article is not redeemed during the four-month loan period as provided herein, and the borrower and pawnbroker do not mutually agree in writing to extend the loan period, the pawnbroker shall notify the borrower within 30 days after expiration of the loan period․  The pawnbroker shall notify the borrower at his or her last known address of the termination of the loan period, by a means for which verification of mailing or delivery of the notification can be provided by the pawnbroker, and extending the right of redemption, during posted business hours, for a period of 10 days from date of mailing of that notice.   The 10–day notice shall include a statement that:  ‘If the tenth day falls on a day when the pawnshop is closed, the time period is extended to the next day that the pawnshop is open.’ ”

The trial court did not err in its interpretation of section 21201 and its determination that Pawn Shop had complied with the statutory notice requirements.   As required by section 21201, Pawn Shop notified Todd at her last known address of the termination of the loan period.   The notice extended her the right of redemption for more than the required 10 days from the date of mailing of the notice.   Jacobson gave Todd the original notice that had been returned by the post office.   At trial, Jacobson produced a copy of the original notice mailed to Todd and testified that when Todd met with him at Pawn Shop he showed her the ledger book containing verification of mailing by the post office.   Thus, Todd's further argument that the court misinterpreted the statute by permitting hand delivery of the notice is unsupported by the record.

Todd selects an excerpt from the trial transcript, in which Jacobson testified that he did not have a “certificate” of mailing with him at trial, to argue that the judgment was not supported by substantial evidence.   But Jacobson produced at trial a copy of the original notice mailed to Todd and testified that he had shown Todd the ledger book containing verification of mailing by the post office.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

We concur:

FOOTNOTES

FN1. Undesignated statutory references are to the Financial Code..  FN1. Undesignated statutory references are to the Financial Code.

CHANEY, J. JOHNSON, J.