PRICE FIRE & WATER PROOFING CO. v. U S(1923)
Mr. S. S. Ashbaugh, of Washington, D. C., for appellant. [261 U.S. 179, 180] Mr. Alfred A. Wheat, of New York City, for the United States.
Mr. Justice BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
By the Dent Act (Act March 2, 1919, c. 94, 40 Stat. 1272 [Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, 3115 14/15 a-3115 14/15 e]), the Secretary of War was authorized to adjust and discharge, upon a fair and equitable basis, agreements, express or implied, made prior to November 12, 1918, in connection with the prosecution of the war, 'when such agreement has been performed in whole or in part, or expenditures have been made or obligations incurred upon the faith of the same by any such person, firm, or corporation prior to November twelfth, nineteen hundred and eighteen, and such agreement has not been executed in the manner prescribed by law.' If an adjustment offered by the Secretary was refused by the claimant, the Court of Claims was given jurisdiction to award fair and just compensation. But it was expressly provided that neither the Secretary nor the court should include in the award 'prospective or possible profits on any part of the contract [261 U.S. 179, 181] beyond the goods and supplies delivered to and accepted by the United States and a reasonable remuneration for expenditures and obligations or liabilities necessarily incurred in performing or preparing to perform' the contract.
The claimant herein owned an establishment for fireproofing and waterproofing cloth. In 1917, an arrangement was made by which, after January 1, 1918, the plant, with increased facilities, was to be operated. by the claimant, wholly on cloth to be delivered to it from time to time by the government. Payment was to be made at an agreed rate per yard. No agreement was executed in the manner pr vided by law. Thereafter many orders for finishing goods were given. There were serious delays and irregularities on the part of the government, both in delivering the goods for finishing and in removing them from the premises after the work had been done, and upon the signing of the Armistice all unfinished orders were canceled. For all goods finished the claimant was paid at the agreed price. But by the action of the government prior to November 12, 1918, and by its cancellation of the orders, it was subjected to large and unanticipated expenses. A claim for these expenses and the losses incurred was duly presented to the Secretary of War. An adjustment offered by him was rejected, and thereupon claimant brought this suit in the Court of Claims for $641,313.64. The petition set forth ten distinct causes of action. On nine of these the court made the allowances set forth in the margin,1 which aggregate $47,700.08, and judgment was entered below for this [261 U.S. 179, 182] amount. The tenth cause of action, on which $590,000 was claimed, was for loss to commercial business. On this no allowance was made. A motion for a new trial was asked for by claimant (on which ground does not appear) was overruled. Whether the court erred in disallowing the claim on the tenth cause of action is the sole question for decision on this appeal.
The facts found by the court bearing especially on this cause of action were these:
Claimant contends here that it should be allowed to recover this $125, 000, as expenses incurred in efforts to keep alive its business and organization to February, 1921, when the testimony was taken. The Dent Act does not permit any recovery on this ground. These were not 'expenditures or obligations or liabilities incurred in performing or preparing to perform the contract.' Nor were they made or incurred prior to November 12, 1918. There was no breach of contract or wrongful act on the part of the United States in this connection. Nor was there a taking of property for which compensation can be made. It is urged here that the full [261 U.S. 179, 184] amount should be allowed to reimburse claimant for expenditures incurred at the plant in the early months of 1918, when it was idle because of the government's delay in supplying goods for finishing. Some allowance for expenses incurred during that period was allowed under the fifth cause of action and is included in the $47,700.08 for which judgment was entered. For awarding more there is no basis in the findings. No request for additional findings appears to have been made below. Nor was leave sought there, or here, to reopen the case, so that additional evidence could be introduced. The findings made are conclusive. 2
[ Footnote 1 ] (1) Storage and hauling charges on untreated gray goods: On this cause of action the Court of Claims awarded the plaintiff the sum of $ 2,147 05
(2) Storage charges on treated goods after notice of completion: On this cause of action the Court of Claims awarded the plaintiff the sum of 544 60
(3) Alterations and additions to the plant for storage purposes, including restoration: On this cause of action the Court of Claims awarded the plaintiff the sum of 11,249 16
(4) Extra protection demanded by the defendants: On this cause of action the Court of Claims awarded the plaintiff the sum of 2, 953 11
(5) Wages paid unemployed labor from December 29, 1917, to March 23, 1918: On this cause of action the Court of Claims awarded the plaintiff the sum of 3,013 52
(6) Allowance on chemicals and materials left over after suspension of work: On this cause of action the Court of Claims awarded the plaintiff the sum of 3,877 87
(7) Increased plant facilities: On this cause of action the Court of Claims awarded the plaintiff the sum of 20,000 00
(8) Deductions made by defendants because of increased yardage resulting from treatment and for alleged loss in shipment: On this cause of action the Court of Claims awarded the plaintiff the sum of 964 09
(9) Insurance premiums paid by plaintiff in excess of that provided for: On this cause of action the Court of Claims awarded the plaintiff the sum of 2,960 68
Total amount awarded by Court of Claims $47,700 08
[ Footnote 2 ] There is nothing in Roxford Knitting Co. v. Moore & Tierney (C. C. A.) 265 Fed. 177, 11 A. L. R. 1415, or in United States v. Russell, 13 Wall. 623, which were relied upon by claimant, that lends support to its contention.