[248 U.S. 1, 2] Messrs. Samuel McClay and David A. Reed, both of Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
[248 U.S. 1, 3] Mr. Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Mr. Justice DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Pittsburgh Melting Company filed a bill in the District Court of the United States for the Western District of Pennsylvania against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company and G. E. Totten, Inspector of the Bureau of Animal Industry of the Department of Agriculture, seeking a mandatory injunction requiring the Railroad Company to receive and carry in interstate and foreign commerce shipments of oil, the manufacture of the Melting Company, and to restrain the government inspector from interfering with the shipments.
A decree in favor of the complainant was rendered in the District Court. 229 Fed. 214. Upon appeal this decree was reversed by the Court of Appeals, and the cause remanded to the District Court, with directions to dismiss the bill. 232 Fed. 694, 146 C. C. A. 620.
The case arises under the Meat Inspection Acts. Act June 30, 1906, c. 3913, 34 Stat. 674, and Act March 4, 1907, c. 2907, 34 Stat. 1260, 1265. The act provides an elaborate system of inspection of animals before slaughter, and of carcasses after slaughter and of meat-food products, with a view to prevent the shipment of impure, unwholesome, and [248 U.S. 1, 5] unfit meat and meat-food products in interstate and foreign commerce. The act in part provides:
And the act further provides:
The facts appearing of record so far as we deem them necessary to the decision of the case are:
The Melting Company has long been engaged in rendering or converting animal fats into various products, including the oil which is the subject- matter of this controversy. At one time the company made oleomargarine, but owing to adverse legislation of the state of Pennsylvania desisted from doing so. Government inspectors were in the works of the Melting Company and inspected and marked the products until 1909 when a controversy arose between the company and the government officers as to the purchase of the fats used by the company. Upon refusal to comply with the orders of such officers, inspection was withdrawn. Whether this action was right or not we do not stop to enquire, since the claim for relief is based upon the allegation that complainant's oil is not a meat-food product within the meaning of the statute.
After inspection was withdrawn the company continued to ship its oil, but did so under the then regulations of the Department of Agriculture concerning the shipment of fat for industrial use, as 'inedible,' and so marking the receptacle containing the same and making the certificate then required by the Department of Agriculture that it was inedible and not intended for food purposes. On November 1, 1914, the Department adopted a new regulation requiring a certificate to accompany the shipment of such fats claimed not to be food products, stating that the same 'is not capable of being used as food by man, is suitable only for industrial purposes, is not for food purposes, and is of such character or for [248 U.S. 1, 7] such a use that denaturing is impracticable.' The regulation permits the shipment of oil for industrial uses after it is 'denatured'; that is, treated with a substance which renders it unfit for food, while still fit for use in industrial purposes. The Melting Company refused to make this certificate, which resulted in the notice to the Railroad Company to refuse to carry the oil, and brought about this suit to compel the carrier to receive and transport it.
The District Court found that the oil manufactured and shipped by the Melting Company was not within the terms of the act, as it was not a meat- food product, which is prohibited from shipment without inspection. The reasons for reaching that conclusion are set forth in the opinion of the District Judge. 229 Fed. 214, supra. The Circuit Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion upon the testimony adduced. 232 Fed. 694, 146 C. C. A. 620, supra.
An examination of the record satisfies us that the Circuit Court of Appeals reached the right conclusion. The oil here in controversy, the testimony shows, is generally known as 'oleo' oil, and is not 'tallow' oil as that term is generally understood by the trade. Both oils are made from the fat of slaughtered beeves. Oleo oil by itself is seldom used as a food. It is, however, largely used in the manufacture of oleomargarine. In fact it constitutes a large percentage of that product. It is used in cooking for shortening purposes. Made as it is by the Melting Company it has no quality which prevents its use for such food purposes. It is not a tallow oil, distasteful and unfit to use in the making of food products. Without elaborating the discussion, we reach the conclusion that this product was clearly a 'meat-food product,' within the meaning of the statute. It is true that the Melting Company does not sell it as such, and now marks it as 'inedible.' But that does not change the fact that a main use of such oil is in making edible products. The company has no control over the use of the oil after it is shipped, and the record [248 U.S. 1, 8] does not disclose what use is made of a large percentage of its product which was shipped abroad at the time this action was begun.
The enactment of the statute was within the power of Congress in order to prevent interstate and foreign shipment of impure or adulterated meat-food products. The statute does not specifically define a meat-food product. In our view the product of the Melting Company is a meat-food product in the sense of the use of those terms in the statute and as such subject to the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture. It being such meat-food product the Melting Company could not truthfully claim that it was not capable of being used as food by man, and hence could not make the certificate required.
The theory of the bill is that the product in question was not within the terms of the act; the District Court reached the conclusion that this theory was the correct one, and so rendered a decree which required the Railroad Company to receive the oil for transportation in interstate and foreign commerce, without inspection, when labelled 'inedible,' and accompanied by the certificate of the Melting Company that such oil is inedible and not intended for food purposes and is of such a character that denaturing is impossible or will render the oil unavailable for the desired industrial use. This decree is consistent only with the finding of the District Court that the product was not a meat-food product within the meaning of the statute.
As we have said, we think the record shows, as found by the Circuit Court of Appeals, that the oil made and offered for shipment by the Melting Company was a meat-food product, and hence subject to the regulation of the statute requiring inspection before shipment. The decree requiring such oil to be shipped without inspection was properly reversed.