ADAMS EXP CO. v. COM. OF KENTUCKY(1909)
[214 U.S. 218, 219] Section 1307, Kentucky Statutes 1903, provides:
The Adams Express Company was proscuted in the circuit court of Hart county for a violation of that statute. The facts were agreed upon. It was a company engaged in the express business. W. G. Tharp was a resident of Hart county, Kentucky, who bought and paid for liquor in Nashville, Tennessee, and New Albany, Indiana. The sellers were licensed dealers in those places, and shipped the liquors to him, by the defendant, prepaying the express charges. Tharp was in the habit of becoming intoxicafed, and the defendant's agent in [214 U.S. 218, 220] Hart county knew of this fact when he delivered the liquors. On the trial the court ruled 'that the said transportation and delivery of said liquor to said Tharp by defendant did not constitute interstate commerce within the meaning of the clause of the Federal Constitution which gives to the Congress of the United States power to regulate commerce between the states, and that the defendant is guilty of knowingly furnishing liquor to an inebriate, as charged in the information herein.'
The defendant prayed an appeal to the court of appeals of Kentucky, which was and thereupon the case was brought here directly from the circuit court of Hart county, the highest court of the state in which a decision could be had. Ky. Stat. 1903, 950
Messrs. Lawerence Maxwell and Joseph S. Graydon for plaintiff in error. [214 U.S. 218, 221] No brief was filed for defendant in error.
Statement by Mr. Justice Brewer:
Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court:
The jurisdiction of this court is not open to dispute. Defendant contended that the Kentucky statute, as applied to [214 U.S. 218, 222] the transportation of liquor from state to state, was in conflict with the section of the Federal Constitution vesting jurisdiction in Congress over interstate commerce. This contention was denied by the state court, and thus a question arose under the Federal Constitution, decided adversely to the plaintiff in error. Western Turf Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359 , 51 L. ed. 520, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 384.
Liquor, however obnoxious and hurtful it may be in the judgment of many, is a recognized article of commerce. License Cases, 5 How. 504, 577, 12 L. ed. 256, 289; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 -110, 34 L. ed. 128-132, 132, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 36, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 681.
In Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co. 170 U.S. 438, 444 , 42 S. L. ed. 1100, 1103, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 674, 676, Mr. Justice White, delivering the opinion of the court, said:
That the transportation is not complete until delivery to the consignee is also settled.
In Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412, 426 , 42 S. L. ed. 1088, 1096, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 664, 669, it was held that the Wilson act [26 Stat. at L. 313, chap. 728, U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3177] 'was not intended to and did not cause the power of the state to attach to an interstate commerce shipment, whilst the merchandise was in transit under such shipment, and until its arrival at the point of destination, and delivery there to the consignee.'
This legislation is in the exercise of the police power,-a power which, generally speaking, belongs to the state,-and is an attempt, in virtue of that power, to directly regulate commerce; but, in case of conflict between the powers claimed by the state and those which belong exclusively to Congress, the former must yield, for the Constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance thereof are 'the supreme law of the land.' [214 U.S. 218, 223] Section 5258 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1901, p. 3564) provides:
In Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Wharton, 207 U.S. 328, 334 , 52 S. L. ed. 230, 234, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 121, 123, it was declared 'that any exercise of state authority, in whatever form manifested, which directly regulates interstate commerce, is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution.'
In Adams Exp. Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U.S. 129, 135 , 51 S. L. ed. 987, 991, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 606, 607, it was said:
Clearly, within the cases above cited, the statute before us, as applied to transportation from state to state, cannot be sustained.
The judgment of the Circuit Court of Hart County, Kentucky, is reversed, and the case remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with the views expressed in this opinion.
Mr. Justice Harlan dissents.