Lester Blount, Appellant v. Elaine C. Duke, Appellee
Upon consideration of the motion for summary affirmance, the opposition thereto, and the reply, it is
ORDERED that the motion for summary affirmance be granted. The merits of the parties' positions are so clear as to warrant summary action. See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Appellant incorporated into his complaint a settlement agreement between himself and his employer by referring to it in the complaint, Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798 F.3d 1119, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and he conceded in district court that the agreement could properly be considered in the context of a motion to dismiss. Because the claims asserted in the appellant's complaint are barred by the “plain meaning” of a waiver provision in this settlement agreement, Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Local 2924 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 470 F.3d 375, 381 (D.C. Cir. 2006), and the appellant has not shown that this waiver provision resulted in a “prospective waiver,” Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974), the district court properly determined that he failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because the court did not have to consider anything other than the properly incorporated settlement agreement in reaching this conclusion, it did not have to convert the motion to a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), see Colbert v. Potter, 471 F.3d 158, 165 (D.C. Cir. 2006), or permit discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.