Roger Williams, Appellant v. Amalgamated Transit Union Local 689 and Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, Appellees
Upon consideration of the motions for summary affirmance, the opposition thereto, and the replies, it is
ORDERED that the motions for summary affirmance be granted. The merits of the parties' positions are so clear as to warrant summary action. See Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (per curiam). The district court correctly held that appellant's hybrid § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act/duty of fair representation claim was untimely because the complaint was not filed until March 16, 2015. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) (six-month statute of limitations in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act applicable to hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claims). Even if there were some possibility the employer and the union might take further action to resolve the matter after appellant attempted to return the settlement proceeds on July 28, 2014, that does not mean the employer had not already breached the collective bargaining agreement and the union had not already breached its duty of fair representation. See Simmons v. Howard Univ., 157 F.3d 914, 917 (D.C. Cir. 1998). The court also correctly determined that appellant's remaining claims were preempted by the hybrid claim. See Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220 (1985) ( “[W]hen resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that claim must be either treated as a § 301 claim, ․ or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.”); May v. Shuttle, Inc., 129 F.3d 165, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (state law claim preempted by duty of fair representation where “state law claim is the same as the federal claim”).
Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed to withhold issuance of the mandate herein until seven days after resolution of any timely petition for rehearing or petition for rehearing en banc. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. Rule 41.