Carlos RADCLIFFE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA; Alexander Chyorny, Defendants-Appellees.
California state prisoner Carlos Radcliffe appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging federal and state law claims arising from his pretrial detention at the Santa Clara County Jail. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Radcliffe's federal claims because Radcliffe failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted his available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable. See Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 402, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015) (Prison Litigation Reform Act applies to both pretrial detainees and convicted prisoners); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[P]roper exhaustion of administrative remedies ․ means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (a prisoner who does not exhaust administrative remedies must show that “there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him”).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Radcliffe's state law claims because Radcliffe failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he complied with, or was excused from, the claim-presentment requirements of California's Government Claims Act (“GCA”). See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 905, 911.2, 945.4; Baines Pickwick Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 72 Cal.App.4th 298, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 74, 79 (1999) (GCA applies to all actions seeking monetary relief).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).