Patrina HALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO; et al., Defendants-Appellees, Emily Cohen, Defendant.
Patrina Hall appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in her action alleging federal discrimination claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Smith v. Almada, 640 F.3d 931, 936 (9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hall's claims regarding contracting and grant funding because Hall failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she was able and ready to compete for the contracts and grants at issue. See Barnes-Wallace v. City of San Diego, 704 F.3d 1067, 1085 (9th Cir. 2012) (to establish standing, a plaintiff seeking to challenge a discriminatory barrier making it more difficult for members of a group to obtain a benefit, such as a government contract, must demonstrate that they were able and ready to bid on the contract at issue).
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Hall's claims regarding participation in committee meetings because Hall failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether discriminatory intent existed. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (setting forth burden-shifting framework under which plaintiff bears the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of discrimination); Rashdan v. Geissberger, 764 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to disparate treatment claims under Title VI); Navarro v. Block, 72 F.3d 712, 716 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires proof of discriminatory intent or motive.”).
We do not consider Hall's employment discrimination claim against defendant Cohen because Hall failed to replead it in her operative complaint. See Lacey v. Maricopa County, 693 F.3d 896, 911 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (claims dismissed with leave to amend are waived if not repled).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).