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United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Yuridia GARCIA LORENZO, Petitioner, v. Robert M. WILKINSON, Acting Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 19-71491

Decided: January 27, 2021

Before: McKEOWN, CALLAHAN, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. Paula Helena Gonzalez, Law Office of Paula Gonzalez, Chula Vista, CA, for Petitioner Kristen A. Giuffreda, Trial Attorney, DOJ - U.S. Department of Justice, Civil Division/Office of Immigration Litigation, Washington, DC, for Respondent


Yuridia Garcia Lorenzo, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of an immigration judge's (“IJ”) determination under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(a) that she did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture in Mexico and thus is not entitled to relief from her reinstated removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review an IJ's negative reasonable fear determination for substantial evidence. Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 833 (9th Cir. 2016). We deny the petition for review.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ's determination that Garcia Lorenzo failed to establish a reasonable possibility of persecution in Mexico on account of a protected ground. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992) (an applicant “must provide some evidence of [motive], direct or circumstantial”); Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010) (an applicant's “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”); Nagoulko v. INS, 333 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding future fear not objectively reasonable under circumstances of the case).

Substantial evidence also supports the IJ's determination that Garcia Lorenzo failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility of torture by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See Andrade-Garcia, 828 F.3d at 836-37 (no government acquiescence demonstrated).

As stated in the court's August 6, 2019 order, the temporary stay of removal remains in place until issuance of the mandate.


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