Skip to main content


Reset A A Font size: Print

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Cesar MERCADO-CASTANEDA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-50152

Decided: October 23, 2019

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges. Zachary Howe, Stephen Hing Wong, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Daniel Earl Zipp, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Office of the US Attorney, San Diego, CA, for Plaintiff - Appellee Eric Fish, Federal Public Defender, Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., San Diego, CA, for Defendant - Appellant


Cesar Mercado-Castaneda appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the district court’s revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Mercado-Castaneda contends that the approximately three-month delay between his violation of supervised release and the district court’s signing of a petition for warrant was not “reasonably necessary” for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i). He argues that, therefore, the district court lacked jurisdiction over his revocation proceedings and violated his right to due process. Reviewing de novo, see United States v. Morales-Isabarras, 745 F.3d 398, 401 (9th Cir. 2014), we conclude that it was reasonably necessary for the district court to delay issuance of the warrant until after the resolution of the criminal proceedings that formed the basis of Mercado-Castaneda’s supervised release violation. See id. at 402 (“[W]hen the outcome of an ongoing criminal proceeding is directly related to the issue of whether the defendant violated a condition of supervised release, it is ‘reasonably necessary’ to delay proceedings on the supervised release violation pending resolution of the underlying criminal charge.”). Mercado-Castaneda has not shown that this delay should be treated differently because it occurred before issuance of the warrant. See id. at 401 (“Courts have generally taken a practical approach to the determination of what delays are ‘reasonably necessary’ for purposes of § 3583(i).”). Accordingly, the district court retained jurisdiction to revoke Mercado-Castaneda’s supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i), and did not violate Mercado-Castaneda’s due process rights.

The parties’ joint motion to expedite this appeal is denied as moot.


Copied to clipboard