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United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Amber HEILMAN-BLANTON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 19-30064

Decided: October 23, 2019

Before: FARRIS, LEAVY, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges. Nicholas A. Manheim, Attorney, Helen J. Brunner, Esquire, Assistant U.S. Attorney, DOJ-Office of the U.S. Attorney, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiff - Appellee Catherine Chaney, Attorney, Camiel & Chaney, P.S., Seattle, WA, for Defendant - Appellant


Amber Heilman-Blanton appeals from the district court’s judgment and challenges the 14-month sentence imposed upon her second revocation of supervised release. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Heilman-Blanton contends that the district court erred by failing to explain the sentence adequately. We review for plain error, see United States v. Valencia-Barragan, 608 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 2010), and conclude that there is none. The record reflects that the district court sufficiently explained its reasons for imposing a sentence one month above the Guidelines range, including Heilman-Blanton’s history of noncompliance and her unsuitability for supervised release. See United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Moreover, contrary to Heilman-Blanton’s contention, the district court did not rely on impermissible sentencing factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); United States v. Miqbel, 444 F.3d 1173, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006).

Heilman-Blanton also contends that the sentence is substantively unreasonable in light of the alleged procedural errors and her struggles with substance abuse. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The sentence is substantively reasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors and the totality of the circumstances. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.


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