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United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

YING ZHENG, Petitioner, v. William P. BARR, Attorney General, Respondent.

No. 19-3782

Decided: April 10, 2020

BEFORE: COLE, Chief Judge; CLAY and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges Margaret W. Wong, Margaret Wong & Associates, Cleveland, OH, for Petitioner Anthony Cardozo Payne, Raya Jarawan, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent


This is another of many cases our court has recently considered in which a noncitizen of the United States seeks, based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 201 L.Ed.2d 433 (2018), to vacate an order of the Board of Immigration of Appeals denying her relief from removal. See, e.g., Calzadilla-Sanchez v. Barr, 796 Fed.Appx. 891, 894–95 (6th Cir. 2020); Garcia-Romo v. Barr, 940 F.3d 192, 196–97 (6th Cir. 2019); Gomez-Chavez v. Barr, 791 F. App'x 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2019).

Petitioner Ying Zheng’s argument is as follows: Under our immigration statutes, a nonpermanent resident must have “been physically present in the United States for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediately preceding” an application for cancellation of removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (b)(1)(A). That period, per a statutory provision referred to as the “stop-time rule,” concludes when the resident “is served a notice to appear under section 1229(a).” 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (d)(1). Under Pereira, “[a] putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a),’ and so does not trigger the stop-time rule.” Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113–14. Zheng’s notice to appear did not specify the time or place of her removal proceedings; instead, that information was conveyed in a subsequent notice of hearing. So, the argument goes, the notice to appear was defective under the statute such that the stop-time rule was never triggered.

As the government correctly notes, and Zheng herself concedes, a published opinion of this court that was issued while her petition was pending, Garcia-Romo v. Barr, disposes of her argument. In Garcia-Romo, we held that the stop-time rule is triggered when the government sends a noncitizen “all the required categories of information under § 1229(a)(1)(A)-(G) through one or multiple written communications.” 940 F.3d at 201. Thus, upon receiving her notice of hearing, Zheng received all of the information required by statute, and the stop-time rule was triggered. Because we are bound to follow Garcia-Romo, we cannot afford Zheng the relief she seeks.

For these reasons, we deny Zheng’s petition for review.

COLE, Chief Judge.

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