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United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

David MEYERS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold CLARKE, Director; W. Swiney; A. Robinson; Paul Haymes; Director of Federal Bureau of Investigations; J. Bentley, Defendant-Appellees.

David Meyers, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold Clarke, Director; A. Robinson, Deputy Director; Paul Haymes, Chief of DOC-S14; Walter Swiney; Henry Ponton; Marcus Elam, Regional Administrator; A. Galihar; J. Fannin, Investigator; J. D. Bentley, Investigator; J. King; J. Kiser; J. Artrip; Keith Dawkins, Defendants-Appellees.

David Meyers, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Director Harold Clarke; United States District Court Abingdon Division; United States District Court Big Stone Gap Division; Judicial Council of Fourth Circuit; Circuit Executive James N. Ishida, Respondents-Appellees.

David Meyers, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harold Clarke, Director; F.B.I.; D.O.J.; U.S. District Court; Conrad, U.S. Judge; R. Ballou; C. Dudley; Dr. Laurence Wang; R. Stoots; B. Alvis; B. Dye; R. Bishop; S. Simons; J. D. Bentley; J. Fannin; C. R. Stanely; Walter Swiney; Ofc. Gwen; D. Tate; F. Stanely; A. Clevinger; D. C. Stallard; Paul Haymes; A. Robinson; M. L. Counts; Western Regional Prea Analyst; J. King, Defendants-Appellees.

David Meyers, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Director Harold Clarke, Respondent-Appellee.

No. 19-6912, No. 19-6916, No. 19-6925, No. 19-6926, No. 19-6928

Decided: August 26, 2019

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges. David Meyers, Appellant Pro Se.

In these consolidated appeals, David Meyers, a Virginia inmate and three-striker, has filed a consolidated notice of appeal, but did not designate the orders he seeks to appeal. We dismiss these appeals for lack of jurisdiction.

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B), a notice of appeal must specify the judgment or order being appealed. We construe this rule liberally “asking whether the putative appellant has manifested the intent to appeal a specific judgment or order and whether the affected party had notice and an opportunity fully to brief the issue.” Jackson v. Lightsey, 775 F.3d 170, 176 (4th Cir. 2014). “This principle of liberal construction does not, however, excuse noncompliance with the Rule.” Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248, 112 S.Ct. 678, 116 L.Ed.2d 678 (1992). Because the dictates of Rule 3 are jurisdictional, each requirement must be satisfied as a prerequisite to appellate review. Id. In his one-page consolidated notice of appeal, Meyers failed to indicate the orders being appealed. Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction.

Moreover, parties are accorded 30 days after the entry of the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal, or 60 days if the United States or an officer or agency is a party. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), (B). The district court may extend the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopen the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007). Meyers’ “Notice of Appeals” is not timely as to any order.

Because Meyers failed to specify the orders being appealed, we dismiss the appeals for lack of jurisdiction. We also deny as moot Meyers’ motions for leave to proceed on appeal without prepayment of fees under the Prison Litigation Reform Act. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.



Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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