Joseph JACKSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Christopher MONIN, Correction Officer Eric Wagner, Correction Officer, Defendants-Appellees, James T. Conway, Superintendent, Mark Bradt, Superintendent, D. O'Connell, Sergeant, Kaczmarek, Lieutenant, D. Sekuterski, Correction Officer, J. Kozakiewiez, Correction Officer, Pam Korozko, Civilian, M. Janes, Inmate Grievance Program Supervisor, K. Bellamy, Inmate Grievance Program Director, A. Prack, Special Housing Unit Director W. Murray, Lieutenant, W. M. Gonzalez, Deputy Counsel, Defendants.*
SUMMARY ORDER
Plaintiff-appellant Joseph Jackson, proceeding pro se, sued correction officers and prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging injuries sustained while he was incarcerated at Attica Correctional Facility. Most of Jackson's claims were dismissed on motion, and a single retaliation claim against two correction officers proceeded to trial, at which Jackson was represented by counsel. Jackson alleged that the two officers, Christopher Monin and Eric Wagner, violated his civil rights by threatening and assaulting him in retaliation for having filed grievances against Sergeant Daniel O'Connell. Following a two-day bench trial, the district court credited the defendants' version of the facts and found in their favor. On appeal, Jackson argues that the district court erred by crediting the defendants' testimony over his own. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
We review a district court's findings of fact after a bench trial for clear error. See Principal Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Coassin, 884 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2018). To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim under § 1983, a prisoner must show that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, the defendant took adverse action against him, and there existed a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action. See Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2009). Here, it is undisputed that Jackson engaged in protected conduct. See Dkt. No. 107, at 107-08; see also Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865, 872 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that retaliation by prison officials against prisoners who redress grievances is prohibited). The parties sharply disputed, however, whether defendants took adverse action against Jackson and whether there was a causal connection between the protected activity and any adverse action. While Jackson asserted that the defendants slapped him, threatened him, and ripped his paperwork in retaliation for his complaints against O'Connell, defendants denied doing so. In addition, defendants denied any knowledge of Jackson's complaints against O'Connell, and they testified that therefore they could not have retaliated against Jackson based on his protected activity. The district court considered the parties' evidence and credited defendants' testimony. It did not clearly err in doing so.
On appeal, we may not second guess the trial court's credibility assessments. See Principal Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 884 F.3d at 138. Given the conflicting narratives presented at trial, Jackson's retaliation claim turned largely on the relative credibility of the parties. The record contains more than adequate evidence to support the district court's determinations. See Krist v. Kolombos Rest. Inc., 688 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2012) (“It is within the province of the district court as the trier of fact to decide whose testimony should be credited.”). Thus, the district court did not err in finding that Jackson had failed to meet his burden of proving retaliation by a preponderance of the evidence.
We have considered all of Jackson's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.