VINCENT BARROW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DR. LAWRENCE FARAGO, PSYCHIATRIST, BRYAN HILTON, SUPERINTENDENT OF PROGRAMS, MICHAEL HOAGAN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ANTHONY DEVITTO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF SPECIAL PROGRAMING, DIANE VANBUREN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BOB LEWIS, OMH THERAPIST, LISA KALIES, UNIT CHIEF, OMH, RESIDENTIAL MENTAL HEALTH UNIT, JOSEPH BELLNIER, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF PROGRAM SERVICE, KENNETH S. PERLMAN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF PROGRAM SERVICE, LUCIEN LECLAIRE, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, MAUREEN E. BOLL, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND COUNSEL, E. LINDQUIST, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, KAREN BELLAMY, DIRECTOR, INMATE GRIEVANCE PROGRAM, JEFF MCKOY, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, MAUREEN BOSCO, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CENTRAL NEW YORK PSYCHIATRIC CENTER, OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, B. MCARDLE, DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF MARCY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, DONALD SELSKEY, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, LIEUTENANT CORY, HOLANCHUCK, BRIAN FISCHER, COMMISSIONER, CAPTAIN HARPER, CHARLES KELLY, JR., SUPERINTENDENT, MARCY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, Defendants-Appellees, ADOLF, CORRECTIONS COUNSELOR, NEW YORK STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, MARCY, NEW YORK, ONEIDA COUNTY, NEW YORK STATE, KINDERMAN, DEPUTY SUPT. OF PROGRAMS, Defendants.
Appellant Vincent Barrow, a prison inmate appearing pro se, brought the instant suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against prison officials, claiming violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. Barrow's claims are based primarily on allegations that the defendants required him to wear an exposure jumpsuit (a jumpsuit designed to prevent the wearer from removing it) when he left his cell; placed a sign reading “exposer” outside his cell; afforded him inadequate process before taking the foregoing measures; disproportionately required minority inmates to wear exposure jumpsuits; provided inadequate medical care for his foot pain, exhibitionism, and depression; and denied him access to certain programming. The district court dismissed on motion all of Barrow's claims, except for an Eighth Amendment claim that his psychiatrist denied treatment for his depression. The court later resolved that claim adversely to Barrow on summary judgment. Barrow appeals both the dismissal and the grant of summary judgment. We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues presented for review.
1. We review the district court's decision to dismiss virtually all of Barrow's claims de novo. Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). An independent review of the record and relevant case law reveals that the district court properly dismissed Barrow's claims for substantially the reasons stated in the magistrate judge's thorough September 25, 2014 report and recommendation, which the district court adopted in its entirety. See Barrow v. Buren, No. 9:12-CV-01268, 2015 WL 417084, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2015).
2. We review the district court's grant of summary judgment on Barrow's claim of inadequate medical care de novo. Sousa v. Marquez, 702 F.3d 124, 127 (2d Cir. 2012). To establish an Eighth Amendment violation based on inadequate medical care, Barrow would need to prove that “the alleged deprivation of adequate medical care [was] sufficiently serious,” and that the defendant-- Barrow's psychiatrist--acted with deliberate indifference to Barrow's health. Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279-80 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
As the district court concluded, Barrow failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his psychiatrist acted with deliberate indifference in discontinuing his prescription for a particular depression medication. The record on summary judgment showed that the psychiatrist offered Barrow other treatment for his depression, including cognitive behavioral therapy. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (“So long as the treatment given is adequate, the fact that a prisoner might prefer a different treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment violation.”). Furthermore, the evidence demonstrated that Barrow refused visits with his psychiatrist and only partially complied with his treatment.
We have considered Barrow's remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court