KARL RIGMAIDEN v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

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Court of Appeals of Texas, Waco.

KARL RIGMAIDEN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 10-16-00151-CR

Decided: September 20, 2017

Before Chief Justice Gray, Justice Davis, and Justice Scoggins

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Karl Rigmaiden, was charged by information with driving while intoxicated-3rd or more. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.09(b) (West Supp. 2016). Pursuant to a plea bargain with the State, appellant pleaded guilty to the charged offense. The trial court accepted appellant's guilty plea, found appellant guilty of the charged offense, sentenced appellant to ten years' incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice with a $5,000 fine, suspended the sentence, and placed appellant on community supervision for five years. In its certification of appellant's right of appeal, the trial court noted that appellant did not have the right to appeal the underlying offense because the underlying case was a plea-bargain case, and because appellant waived his right of appeal.

Thereafter, the State filed a motion to revoke appellant's community supervision, alleging that appellant violated numerous conditions of his community supervision. Without the benefit of a plea agreement, appellant pleaded “true” to all of the allegations contained in the State's motion to revoke, except for one that was abandoned by the State.1 The trial court accepted appellant's pleas of “true” to the State's remaining allegations, revoked appellant's community supervision, and sentenced appellant to four years' incarceration in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice with no fine. The trial court also certified appellant's right to appeal the revocation of his community supervision. This appeal followed.

I. ANDERS BRIEF

Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), appellant's court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that his review of the record yielded no grounds of error upon which an appeal can be predicated. Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 407 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance ‘arguable’ points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities.”) (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.)); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc).

In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978), appellant's counsel has carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there are no reversible errors in the trial court's judgment. Counsel has informed this Court that he has: (1) examined the record and found no arguable grounds to advance on appeal; (2) served a copy of the brief and counsel's motion to withdraw on appellant; and (3) provided appellant with a copy of the record and informed him of his right to file a pro se response.2 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 510 n.3; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.23. More than an adequate period of time has passed, and appellant has not filed a pro se response.3 See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409.

II. INDEPENDENT REVIEW

Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S. Ct. 346, 349-50, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988). We have reviewed the entire record and counsel's brief and have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (“Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirement of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1.”); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 509. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW

In accordance with Anders, appellant's attorney has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel in this case. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744, 87 S. Ct. at 1400; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17 (citing Jeffery v. State, 903 S.W.2d 776, 779-80 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no pet.) (“If an attorney believes the appeal is frivolous, he must withdraw from representing the appellant. To withdraw from representation, the appointed attorney must file a motion to withdraw accompanied by a brief showing the appellate court that the appeal is frivolous.”) (citations omitted)). We grant counsel's motion to withdraw. Within five days of the date of this Court's opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court's judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review.4 See TEX. R. APP. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Affirmed

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record reflects that appellant testified during the punishment phase in hopes of mitigating his punishment.

2.   The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that “ ‘the pro se response need not comply with the rules of appellate procedure in order to be considered. Rather, the response should identify for the court those issues which the indigent appellant believes the court should consider in deciding whether the case presents any meritorious issues.’ ” In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 409 n.23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Wilson v. State, 955 S.W.2d 693, 696-97 (Tex. App.—Waco 1997, no pet.)).

3.   In his “Notice to Client,” appellate counsel noted that: “I have informed you of your right to review the record, and provided a copy of the same ․” Accordingly, based on counsel's statement, we have fair assurance that appellant has had sufficient access to the record to assist in filing a pro se response, though no response has been filed. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 321-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

4.   No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or must file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration was overruled by this Court. See TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2. Any petition and all copies of the petition for discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. at R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of rule 68.4 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See id. at R. 68.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 409 n.22.

AL SCOGGINS Justice