JOSEPH ANDRE DAVIS v. FLOYD DANIEL LOPEZ AND IRMA JIMENEZ

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Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

JOSEPH ANDRE DAVIS, Appellant v. FLOYD DANIEL LOPEZ AND IRMA JIMENEZ, Appellees

NO. 01-17-00052-CV

Decided: March 28, 2017

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Huddle.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Joseph Andre Davis, has filed a notice of appeal attempting to appeal from the trial court's January 6, 2017 temporary order in a suit affecting the parent-child relationship. We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

This Court has jurisdiction only over appeals from final judgments and those interlocutory orders specifically authorized by statute. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 109.002(b) (“An appeal may be taken by any party to a suit from a final order rendered under this title.”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014 (authorizing appeals from certain interlocutory orders); CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 447-48 (Tex. 2011) (“Unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal, appellate courts generally only have jurisdiction over appeals from final judgments.”).

In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, a trial court “may make a temporary order, including the modification of a prior temporary order, for the safety and welfare of the child, including an order: (1) for the temporary conservatorship of the child;” but any such “[t]emporary orders rendered under this section are not subject to interlocutory appeal.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 105.001(a)(1), (e); see also W.F.S. v. Texas Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., No. 01–15–00689–CV, No. 01–15–01028–CV, 2016 WL 828171, at *1–2 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 3, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Accordingly, the temporary order Davis seeks to appeal is neither a final judgment nor is an interlocutory appeal of the order authorized by statute. On February 14, 2017, the Clerk of this Court notified Davis that this Court might dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction unless Davis timely filed a response demonstrating this Court's jurisdiction over the appeal. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). Davis did not file a response addressing our Court's jurisdiction over the appeal, but instead filed a motion requesting that we treat his appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus.

We dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction because Davis seeks to appeal an interlocutory order not authorized by statute. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a), 43.2(f). Davis's alternative request for a writ of mandamus is denied. We dismiss all other pending motions as moot.

PER CURIAM