BILLY EARL WILLIAMS v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

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Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

BILLY EARL WILLIAMS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 05–10–00609–CR

Decided: March 30, 2011

Before Justices Moseley, Richter, and Lang–Miers

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice Moseley

Billy Earl Williams appeals from the adjudication of his guilt for aggravated assault.   In two points of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating his guilt and the written judgment should be modified to reflect the correct name of appellant's counsel.   We modify the judgment adjudicating guilt and affirm as modified.   The background of the case and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts.   We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.

Appellant waived a jury and pleaded guilty to aggravated assault involving family violence.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a) (West Supp.2010);  Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 71.004(1) (West 2008).   Pursuant to a plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt and placed appellant on ten years' community supervision.   The State later moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging appellant violated five conditions of his community supervision.   Appellant pleaded not true to the allegations in a hearing on the motion.   After hearing evidence, the trial court found three of the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and assessed punishment at five years' imprisonment.

In his first point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by adjudicating his guilt because it specifically found two of the alleged violations not true and the remaining allegations were unsupported by the evidence.   Appellant asserts the evidence shows the complainant made contact with him and he acted in self-defense when he hit her, and the trial court should have continued his community supervision and ordered alcohol treatment rather than impose a prison term.   The State responds that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by revoking appellant's community supervision and adjudicating his guilt.

Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion.   See Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex.Crim.App.2006).   An order revoking community supervision must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning the greater weight of the credible evidence that would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has violated a condition of probation.   Id. at 763–64.   A finding of a single violation of community supervision is sufficient to support revocation.   See Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980).   Thus, in order to prevail, appellant must successfully challenge all the findings that support the revocation order.   See Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191, 193–94 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978).

During the hearing on the motion to adjudicate, the trial court heard testimony from two Rowlett police officers who were dispatched to an industrial area on a call about an intoxicated man trying to fix a flat tire.   Officer Jimmie Garrison testified that as he arrived in the area, several people waved him down, including appellant's girlfriend, the complainant.   The complainant was very upset and crying, had dust on her face, and had blood running down both sides of her face.   Her clothing was in disarray.   The complainant said her boyfriend had beat her up, and she gave Garrison appellant's name.   Paramedics arrived at the scene and treated the complainant.   Photographs taken of the complainant's injuries were admitted into evidence.

Officer Reed Smith said he arrived on the scene as a backup officer.   Garrison told Smith about the assault and said the suspect drove away in a black pickup truck with a flat tire.   Smith testified he drove down the street a short distance and saw the suspect vehicle parked next to a trailer on the property of a concrete company.   Appellant was fumbling with keys trying at the trailer's door.   When Smith approached appellant, he smelled a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage.   Smith detained appellant.

Appellant testified he worked for the concrete company and lived in the trailer on the company's property.   The complainant lived in the trailer with appellant at one time, but he made her leave after he was arrested for the first assault in April 2008.   Appellant told the trial court that a few weeks before the assault in April 2008, the complainant attacked him with a club and he went to the hospital.   On January 25, 2009, the complainant came to his trailer and got mad because he had another woman with him.   During their argument, the complainant stabbed him in the shoulder with a knife.   Appellant pushed her away, but he did not hit her.   The complainant then cut his truck tire with the knife.   Appellant got in the truck and drove to a nearby fast food restaurant.   He drove back to the trailer and was detained by the police.   During cross-examination, appellant admitted he had been drinking that evening, and said he used cocaine “right before all this happened.”

The trial court found that appellant violated three conditions of his community supervision, including committing a new assault involving family violence, having contact with the complainant, and consuming an alcoholic beverage.   Although appellant denied that he made contact with the complainant, and said he only pushed the complainant in self-defense, it was the trial court's role, as the fact finder in this case, to reconcile any conflicts in the evidence and judge the witnesses' credibility.   See Swearingen v. State, 101 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.Crim.App.2003);  Lee v. State, 952 S.W.2d 894, 897 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc).

Because the evidence is sufficient to prove appellant violated these conditions of his community supervision, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant's community supervision and adjudicating his guilt.   See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763–64;  Sanchez, 603 S.W.2d at 871.   We overrule appellant's first point of error.

In his second point of error, appellant contends the judgment adjudicating guilt should be modified to reflect the correct name of the attorney representing appellant at the hearing on the motion to adjudicate.   The record shows appellant was represented by Neil Pask during the hearing.   The written judgment recites that John Carlough appeared as the attorney for appellant.   Thus, the written judgment is incorrect.   We sustain appellant's second point of error.

We modify the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt to show Neil Pask was the attorney for the defendant.   See Tex.R.App. P. 43.2(b);  Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex.Crim.App.1993);  Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, pet. ref'd).

As modified, we affirm the trial court's judgment adjudicating guilt.

JIM MOSELEY JUSTICE

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