ANSELMO DOMINGUEZ v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

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Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

ANSELMO DOMINGUEZ, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 05–10–00518–CR

Decided: March 29, 2011

Before Justices Murphy, Fillmore, and Myers

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Opinion By Justice Murphy

Anselmo Dominguez waived a jury and pleaded guilty to indecency with a child younger than seventeen years.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 21.11(a) (West Supp.2010).   After finding appellant guilty, the trial court assessed punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment.   In a single point of error, appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion by sentencing him to imprisonment.   We affirm the trial court's judgment.   The background of the case and the evidence admitted at trial are well known to the parties, and we therefore limit recitation of the facts.   We issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4 because the law to be applied in the case is well settled.

Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated the objectives of the Texas Penal Code by sentencing him to imprisonment because the sentence is merely punitive and not necessary to prevent the recurrence of his criminal behavior.   Appellant asserts that because he immediately apologized and begged forgiveness for the offense, he should have received treatment and counseling.   The State responds that appellant has failed to preserve his complaint for review and, alternatively, the record does not show the sentence violates the objectives of the penal code.

Appellant did not complain about the sentence either at the time it was imposed or in his motion for new trial.   See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1);  Castaneda v. State, 135 S.W.3d 719, 723 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.) (for error to be preserved for appeal, the record must show appellant made a timely request, objection, or motion).   After sentencing, appellant did not object to the sentence, and his motion for new trial complained that the “verdict” was “contrary to the law and the evidence.”   Thus, appellant has not preserved his issue for our review.

In addition, we note that the trial court imposed punishment within the statutory range for the offense.   See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.33, 22.11(d);  Kirk v. State, 949 S.W.2d 769, 772 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1997, pet. ref'd).   We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the fifteen-year sentence.   See Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (as long as a sentence is within the proper range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal).   We overrule appellant's sole point of error.

We affirm the trial court's judgment.

MARY MURPHY JUSTICE

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