LINDSEY CARL MCADAMS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Opinion By Justice FitzGerald
A jury convicted Lindsey Carl McAdams of assault-family violence with a prior conviction for assault-family violence. The trial court assessed punishment at two years' imprisonment. In two issues, appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conviction. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
In reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidence to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Vodochodsky v. State, 158 S.W.3d 502, 509 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). We review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, and assume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in the testimony, weighed the evidence, and drew reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict. See Rollerson v. State, 227 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex.Crim.App.2007).
In a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court views all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the fact-finder's verdict of guilt was rationally justified. See Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 920 (2007); see also Marshall v. State, 210 S.W.3d 618, 625 (Tex.Crim.App.2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S.842 (2007). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, we must defer to the fact-finder's determination concerning what weight to give to contradictory testimony. Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex.Crim.App.2008).
The State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily injury to Kathy Isringhouse, a person with whom he had a dating relationship and was a member of her family or household, and that prior to the commission of the assault, appellant had been previously convicted of assault-family violence. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01(a) (Vernon Supp.2009). “Bodily injury” means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. Id. § 1.07(a)(8).
The jury was instructed it could find appellant guilty of assault-family violence causing bodily injury, a lesser-included offense of assault by contact, or not guilty. The jury heard testimony from four witnesses. Kathy Isringhouse testified that on January 19, 2008, appellant assaulted her by grabbing her and pushing her into a concrete wall at a gas station. Isringhouse and appellant had lived together “off and on” for about a year and a half. The evening of the assault, appellant had driven Isringhouse around the city for three hours, refusing to take her home. At some point, the car began overheating, so they stopped at a gas station. When appellant got out of the car to look under the hood, Isringhouse grabbed the keys and ran to the attendant, who was behind a bullet-proof glass window. She threw the keys into the night drop drawer and told the attendant to call the police. Appellant ran behind Isringhouse, grabbed her arms, and snatched the keys from the drawer. Appellant told the attendant that Isringhouse was his wife and she was drunk. Isringhouse again told the attendant to call 911. Appellant shoved Isringhouse “face first against a concrete wall” of the station. Several security guards who had seen the assault from the other end of the parking lot arrived and got appellant away from her. Isringhouse refused any medical treatment, telling the guards she wanted to go home. Isringhouse testified that when appellant slammed her against the concrete wall, it “hurt” and she sustained bruises on her arms, a cut on her lip that was bleeding, and injury to her knee that she treated the next day with an ice pack and an ACE bandage.
Richard Jones, a private security company supervisor, testified he and all of the people who work for the company are licensed peace officers. On January 19, 2008, he was parked at the end of a parking lot located between the gas station and a restaurant having a conversation with one of the guards he supervised, Angela Rose. He was facing the station, while Rose's vehicle was parked next to his but facing the restaurant. They had their windows down as they talked. He heard a woman screaming. He looked out the front windshield and saw appellant chasing Isringhouse between the pumps. Jones started his car and drove the short distance from the end of the parking lot to the side of the station. Jones saw appellant “tackle” Isringhouse, then appellant “drove her into the side of the station.” Appellant threw the woman on the ground, then “[he] got her in a bear hug from behind and was slinging her around.” Jones yelled for appellant to let Isringhouse go. When appellant did not comply, Jones grabbed appellant and pulled him back. Jones testified he did not talk to Isringhouse, and had only minimal contact with her, because he was focused on detaining appellant and Dallas police officers arrived on the scene. He did not see any visible injuries on Isringhouse. Jones testified he saw appellant slam Isringhouse against the security window where the attendant sat and not the wall, and that appellant used force when he tackled Isringhouse and threw her against the window.
Angela Rose testified that when she heard a woman screaming, she looked in her rearview mirror and saw Isringhouse running away from appellant. Rose drove her vehicle behind Jones and pulled up to the station. Rose saw appellant grab Isringhouse and slam her into the security plate on the window. Appellant had his arms around Isringhouse and shook her back and forth. Rose said appellant forcefully pushed Isringhouse against the window, and Isringhouse would certainly have been in pain. Rose and Jones got out of their vehicles and ordered appellant to let go of Isringhouse. After repeating the command a few times, appellant let Isringhouse go. Jones took appellant to the front of Jones's truck, and Rose walked Isringhouse to her car. Isringhouse said she was okay, and Rose did not see any visible injuries on Isringhouse. Rose testified she only spoke briefly with Isringhouse because she was on the telephone with 911 and another officer arrived and took Isringhouse to a patrol car.
Dallas police officer Christopher Nicholson testified he was flagged down at the gas station by a female security officer who said they had detained a man in regard to a disturbance with his wife. Nicholson talked with Isringhouse, who was crying and shaking. Nicholson saw several injuries on Isringhouse, including scrapes and bruises on her knees and wrists and a “busted lip” that was red and swollen “like something or someone had struck her.” Appellant did not testify or present any evidence during the trial.
Appellant contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to show bodily injury to Isringhouse. Appellant asserts that because Isringhouse said she felt nothing and Jones did not see any visible injury to her, the evidence relied upon by the jury was so weak as to undermine confidence in the jury's determination. The State responds that the evidence is sufficient to support the conviction because it shows appellant pushed Isringhouse into a concrete wall, causing her physical pain.
The jury heard Isringhouse's testimony that she had bruises on her arms, a cut on her lip, and an injury to her knee after appellant slammed her into a concrete wall at the gas station. While neither Jones nor Rose saw any visible injuries on Isringhouse, both testified they had very limited contact with her and were focused on either calling 911 or detaining appellant. Nicholson testified he saw visible injuries to Isringhouse, including scrapes, bruises, and a “busted lip.” The jury was free to accept or reject any and all of a witness's testimony and to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1979); Rollerson, 227 S.W.3d at 724 (the trier of fact draws reasonable inferences in a manner that supports the verdict).
Viewing all of the evidence under the proper standards, we conclude it is legally and factually sufficient to show appellant caused bodily injury to Isringhouse and it supports appellant's conviction. See Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 524; Vodochodsky, 158 S.W.3d at 509.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
KERRY P. FITZGERALD JUSTICE