United States Ninth Circuit

In a dispute over the interpretation of two federal statutes that define the type of school eligible to receive specific federal funds, the district court's construction of the word "including" to mean, essentially, "such as," is affirmed since that construction was consistent with the plain meaning of the language employed by Congress, the legislative history surrounding the provisions, and the reasonable interpretation given the language by the agency Congress directed to supervise the distribution of the funds at issue.

Appellate Information

• Argued 08/18/2006
• Decided 09/25/2006
• Published 09/25/2006

Judges

• MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS, Circuit Judge., Before: MICHAEL DALY HAWKINS and THOMAS, Circuit Judges, and MILLER, District Judge.

Court

• United States Ninth Circuit

Counsel

• For Appellant:
  
• William A. Richards, Arizona Office of the Attorney General, Phoenix, AZ, for plaintiff-appellant Arizona State Board for Charter Schools., David D. Garner, Phoenix, AZ, for plaintiffs-appellants Charter Schools Excel Education Centers, Inc., Phoenix Education Management LLC, Intelli-School, Inc., PAS Charter, Inc., SC Jensen Corporation, Inc., and RSD Charter School, Inc.


• For Appellees:
  
• Isaac J. Lidsky, Department of Justice, Civil Division, for the defendants-appellees.