United States Third Circuit

The exhaustion requirement in section 1997e(a) of the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 is an affirmative defense, to be pleaded by the defendant; the District Court erred in dismissing complaint sua sponte for failure to meet heightened pleading requirement it imposed, because failure to exhaust is not one of the four bases for sua sponte dismissal under section 1997e(c).

Appellate Information

• Decided 04/03/2002
• Published 04/03/2002

Judges

• Before SLOVITER, NYGAARD and McKEE, Circuit Judges.

Court

• United States Third Circuit

Counsel

• For Appellant:
  
• Jon Romberg, Craig T. Moran (Argued), John P. Campbell (Argued), Seton Hall Law School, Newark, NJ, Attorneys for Appellant., D. Michael Fisher, Attorney General, J. Bart DeLone (Argued), Deputy Attorney General, Calvin R. Koons, Senior Deputy Attorney General, John G. Knorr, III, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Appellate Litigation Section, Office of Attorney General, Appellate Litigation Section, Harrisburg, PA, Attorneys for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as Amicus Curiae.