United States Second Circuit

Because of the broad definition of "employ" given in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. section 203(g), an entity's exercise of an employer's formal prerogatives is not necessary to establish joint employment under that Act. District court erred when it concluded, as a matter of law, that defendant and its principals were not joint employers within the meaning of the FLSA.

Appellate Information

• Decided 12/30/2003
• Published 12/30/2003

Judges

• JOSÉ A. CABRANES, Circuit Judge., Before:  WINTER, LEVAL, and CABRANES, Circuit Judges.

Court

• United States Second Circuit

Counsel

• For Appellant:
  
• James Reif (Margaret A. Malloy, of counsel), Gladstein, Reif & Meginniss, LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs-Appellants., Jennifer S. Brand, Assistant Attorney General (M. Patricia Smith, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Chepaitis, Assistant Solicitor General, of counsel, Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York, on the brief), Office of the Attorney General of the State of New York, New York, NY, for amicus curiae Eliot Spitzer, Attorney General of the State of New York., Catherine K. Ruckelshaus (Laurence E. Norton, II, Amy Sugimori, of counsel), National Employment Law Project, Inc., New York, NY, for amici curiae Asian-American Legal Defense and Education Fund and National Employment Lawyers' Association.


• For Appellees:
  
• Michael H. Klein, Kestenbaum, Dannenberg & Klein, LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants-Appellees.