Theodore A. TOSTERUD, Appellant, v. Robert L. ELLIS, Multnomah County Assessor, or his successor in office, Respondent, Portland Adventist Medical Center and Department of Revenue, State of Oregon, Intervenors/ Respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from an order of the Oregon Tax Court that dismissed his appeal of an order of defendant Ellis, the Assessor of Multnomah County. Intervenor Portland Adventist Medical Center, whose charitable property tax exemptions lie at the heart of the dispute between the parties, filed the motion to dismiss, along with defendant Ellis and intervenor the Department of Revenue. The Tax Court granted the dismissal under ORS 305.560(3), which provides, in part:
“In any case in which the taxpayer is not the appealing party, a copy of the complaint shall be served upon the taxpayer by the appealing party by certified mail within the period for filing an appeal * * *.”
The parties agree that plaintiff did not serve the contemplated notice on intervenor Portland Adventist Medical Center-the party which, if plaintiff's arguments on the merits were successful, would have to pay increased property taxes-within the ninety-day period for appeal provided by ORS 305.280(1) ( “[A]n appeal [from an order of a county assessor] shall be filed within 90 days after the [order.]”).
Plaintiff argues on various grounds that he is not subject to the service requirement of ORS 305.560(3) or, if he is, that his failure to make timely service did not justify dismissal of his appeal. We address the latter issue briefly. Plaintiff acknowledges that this court previously has held that the failure to make the service required by ORS 305.560(3) requires dismissal of the appeal. See Multnomah County v. Dept. of Rev., 325 Or. 230, 236, 935 P.2d 426 (1997) (so holding). He argues, however, that a recent amendment to that statute establishes that the legislature no longer intends for the failure to make timely service to carry the same consequence that we identified in Multnomah County. A full explanation of the issue under the statutory analysis paradigm set out by this court in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993), would not benefit the parties, bench, or bar. The change of wording on which plaintiff relies plainly speaks to other considerations, not to the one that he identifies.
We have considered all of plaintiff's other arguments and conclude that they are not well taken. Again, fuller explication of our reasoning in this fact-bound case would not benefit the parties, bench, or bar.
The order of the Oregon Tax Court is affirmed.