PEOPLE v. DICKERSON

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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Kyle DICKERSON, Appellant.

2013–08525

Decided: January 23, 2019

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., BETSY BARROS, ANGELA G. IANNACCI, LINDA CHRISTOPHER, JJ. Janet E. Sabel, New York, N.Y. (Andrea Yacka–Bible of counsel), for appellant. Eric Gonzalez, District Attorney, Brooklyn, N.Y. (Leonard Joblove, Anthea H. Bruffee, and Andrew N.T. Churchill of counsel), for respondent.

DECISION & ORDER

ORDERED that the judgment and the amended judgment are affirmed.

At trial, the People presented the testimony of the manager of an electronics store, who testified that the defendant came into the store on April 20, 2012, and stole four iPads and two iPhones.  The manager, who had been managing the store since 2009, testified that the stolen iPads were new 16–gigabyte iPad 3s, which the store purchased for $600 each from wholesalers and planned to sell for $650 each.  He testified that the stolen iPhones were new iPhone 4s, which the store purchased from wholesalers for $700 each and planned to sell for $750 each.

The jury convicted the defendant of grand larceny in the third degree.  On August 9, 2013, the Supreme Court imposed sentence on that conviction and, upon finding that the conviction constituted a violation of probation, revoked a sentence of probation imposed on a previous conviction of robbery in the third degree and imposed a sentence of imprisonment on the previous conviction.  The defendant appeals.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish that the value of the property stolen by the defendant exceeded $3,000 and, therefore, that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of grand larceny in the third degree beyond reasonable doubt (see Penal Law §§ 155.20[1];  155.35[1];  People v. Tyler, 140 A.D.3d 1617, 1619, 32 N.Y.S.3d 764;  People v. Helms, 119 A.D.3d 1153, 1155, 990 N.Y.S.2d 314;  cf. People v. Sutherland, 102 A.D.3d 897, 898, 961 N.Y.S.2d 198).  Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5];  People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053;  People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672).  Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

With respect to the appeal from the amended judgment rendered upon the violation of probation finding, we are satisfied with the sufficiency of the supplemental brief filed by the defendant's assigned counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493, and, upon an independent review of the record, we conclude that there are no nonfrivolous issues which could be raised on the appeal from the amended judgment.  Counsel's application for leave to withdraw as counsel on the appeal from the amended judgment is, therefore, granted (see id.; Matter of Giovanni S. [Jasmin A.], 89 A.D.3d 252, 931 N.Y.S.2d 676;  People v. Paige, 54 A.D.2d 631, 387 N.Y.S.2d 399;  cf. People v. Gonzalez, 47 N.Y.2d 606, 419 N.Y.S.2d 913, 393 N.E.2d 987;  People v. Sedita, 113 A.D.3d 638, 978 N.Y.S.2d 318).

DILLON, J.P., BARROS, IANNACCI and CHRISTOPHER, JJ., concur.

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