JANKAUSKAS v. SANDBERG

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Jennifer JANKAUSKAS, appellant, v. Abraham SANDBERG, et al., respondents.

Decided: March 30, 2010

REINALDO E. RIVERA, J.P., FRED T. SANTUCCI, RANDALL T. ENG, and CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, JJ. Law Offices of Sanford F. Young, P.C., New York, N.Y., for appellant. MacKay, Wrynn & Brady, LLP, Douglaston, N.Y. (Christine Brennan and James Gilroy of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Partnow, J.), dated August 26, 2008, which, upon a jury verdict on the issue of liability, is in favor of the defendants and against her dismissing the complaint.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

A jury verdict should not be set aside as contrary to the weight of the evidence unless the jury could not have reached the verdict by any fair interpretation of the evidence (see Lolik v. Big v. Supermarkets, 86 N.Y.2d 744, 631 N.Y.S.2d 122, 655 N.E.2d 163; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 495 N.Y.S.2d 184). A jury finding that a party was negligent, but that the negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident, is inconsistent and contrary to the weight of the evidence only when the issues are “so inextricably interwoven as to make it logically impossible to find negligence without also finding proximate cause” (Rubin v. Pecoraro, 141 A.D.2d 525, 527, 529 N.Y.S.2d 142; see Zhagui v. Gilbo, 63 A.D.3d 919, 883 N.Y.S.2d 222; Jaffier v. Wilson, 54 A.D.3d 725, 864 N.Y.S.2d 458). “Where the verdict can be reconciled with a reasonable view of the evidence, the successful party is entitled to the presumption that the jury adopted that view” (Koopersmith v. General Motors Corp., 63 A.D.2d 1013, 1014, 406 N.Y.S.2d 358; see Zhagui v. Gilbo, 63 A.D.3d 919, 883 N.Y.S.2d 222; Jaffier v. Wilson, 54 A.D.3d at 726, 864 N.Y.S.2d 458; Rubin v. Pecoraro, 141 A.D.2d at 526, 529 N.Y.S.2d 142). Here, the issues of negligence and proximate cause were not inextricably interwoven, and the jury's determination that the defendant was negligent but that the negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident, was not contrary to the weight of the evidence (see Rubin v. Pecoraro, 141 A.D.2d 525, 529 N.Y.S.2d 142).

The plaintiff's contention that she was prejudiced by defense counsel's summation is unpreserved for appellate review because she raised no objection to the comments now alleged to have been improper (see Wilson v. City of New York, 65 A.D.3d 906, 908, 885 N.Y.S.2d 279; Lucian v. Schwartz, 55 A.D.3d 687, 689, 865 N.Y.S.2d 643).

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