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IN RE: Cleopatra CREIGHTON, respondent, v. Taveres Tramine WHITMORE, appellant.

Decided: March 30, 2010

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., HOWARD MILLER, LEONARD B. AUSTIN, and SHERI S. ROMAN, JJ. Tennille M. Tatum-Evans, New York, N.Y., for appellant. Anna Stern, New York, N.Y., for respondent.

In a family offense proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 8, Taveres Tramine Whitmore appeals from an order of protection of the Family Court, Kings County (Feldman, J.H.O.), dated April 14, 2009, which, after a hearing, directed him, inter alia, to refrain from assaulting, harassing, and menacing the petitioner.

ORDERED that the order of protection is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

The determination of whether a family offense was committed is a factual issue to be resolved by the hearing court (see Family Ct. Act §§ 812, 832; Matter of Halper v. Halper, 61 A.D.3d 687, 875 N.Y.S.2d 916; Matter of Lallmohamed v. Lallmohamed, 23 A.D.3d 562, 806 N.Y.S.2d 622), and that court's determination regarding the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great weight on appeal unless clearly unsupported by the record (see Matter of Gray v. Gray, 55 A.D.3d 909, 867 N.Y.S.2d 110; Matter of Wallace v. Wallace, 45 A.D.3d 599, 844 N.Y.S.2d 711). Contrary to the appellant's contention, it is not incumbent upon the Family Court to specify in the protective order the particular family offense he committed where it is clear from the allegations in the petition and the evidence adduced at the hearing (see Matter of Abbott v. Burnes, 27 A.D.3d 555, 813 N.Y.S.2d 133; Matter of Topper v. Topper, 271 A.D.2d 613, 613-614, 706 N.Y.S.2d 147). Here, the petitioner stated to the police and in her family offense petition that, inter alia, on January 12, 2009, the appellant committed acts of physical and verbal abuse which constituted the family offense of harassment, and a fair preponderance of the credible evidence adduced at the fact-finding hearing supports a finding that the appellant committed that offense, warranting the issuance of an order of protection (see Penal Law § 240.26[1]; Matter of Robbins v. Robbins, 48 A.D.3d 822, 822-823, 851 N.Y.S.2d 877; Matter of Topper v. Topper, 271 A.D.2d at 613-614, 706 N.Y.S.2d 147).

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