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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Kathleen ONORATO, Appellant, v. CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent, et al., Defendants.

Decided: February 22, 1999

GUY JAMES MANGANO, P.J., FRED T. SANTUCCI, GABRIEL M. KRAUSMAN and ANITA R. FLORIO, JJ. Louis M. Reale, Brooklyn, N.Y., for appellant. Michael D. Hess, Corporation Counsel, New York, N.Y. (Stephen J. McGrath and Ellen Ravitch of counsel), for respondent.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by her brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Mastro, J.), dated January 20, 1998, as granted that branch of the motion of the defendant City of New York for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

 The plaintiff, a pedestrian, was injured when she was struck by an automobile in an intersection which was not controlled by a traffic control device.   At the time of the accident, a traffic signal had been approved for the intersection but had not yet been installed.   The decision to install a traffic control device is a discretionary governmental function which will not expose a municipality to liability.   However, if a municipality determines that a traffic control device is necessary to remedy a dangerous condition, it must act with reasonable speed to correct the condition and it may be held liable when there is an unjustified delay in implementing its remedial plan (see generally, Friedman v. State of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 271, 502 N.Y.S.2d 669, 493 N.E.2d 893;  O'Brien v. City of New York, 231 A.D.2d 698, 647 N.Y.S.2d 561).   We agree with the Supreme Court that there was no evidence of unjustifiable delay in the installation of the subject traffic signal.   Thus, the City was entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.


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