NORTON v. PARK PLAZA OWNERS CORPORATION

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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Paul NORTON, appellant, v. PARK PLAZA OWNERS CORPORATION, et al., respondents.

Decided: July 26, 1999

SONDRA MILLER, J.P., FRED T. SANTUCCI, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT and NANCY E. SMITH, JJ. Pomerance & Collins, LLP, Hicksville, N.Y. (Daniel Collins of counsel), for appellant. McKenna, Siracusano, Fehringer & Chianese, East Rockaway, N.Y. (William H. Hendrick of counsel), for respondents.

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Winslow, J.), dated March 31, 1998, as denied those branches of his motion which were for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability on his causes of action to recover damages under Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6), and dismissed those causes of action asserted under Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

The plaintiff, an elevator repairman, reported to a building owned by the defendants, Park Plaza Owners Corporation and Park Plaza Associates (hereinafter collectively Park Plaza), to repair a defect in one of the elevators.   The elevator machine room was located on the roof of the building and the entrance thereto was accessible only by traversing a fixed, permanent staircase.   After completing the repairs, the plaintiff walked down this staircase and fell when the fourth step from the top partially collapsed.   He commenced the instant action against Park Plaza to recover damages for violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240(1), and 241(6), as well as for common-law negligence, and moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability as to all causes of action.   The Supreme Court denied the motion and dismissed the causes of action to recover damages based on Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6).   We affirm.

 The cause of action to recover damages under Labor Law § 240(1) was properly dismissed in view of the fact that the staircase upon which the plaintiff fell was a normal appurtenance to the building and was not designed as a safety device to protect him from an elevation-related risk (see, Brennan v. RCP Associates, 257 A.D.2d 389, 683 N.Y.S.2d 69;  Williams v. City of Albany, 245 A.D.2d 916, 666 N.Y.S.2d 800;  Dombrowski v. Schwartz,217 A.D.2d 914, 629 N.Y.S.2d 924;  Pennacchio v. Tednick Corp., 200 A.D.2d 809, 606 N.Y.S.2d 448;  Monroe v. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 186 A.D.2d 1019, 588 N.Y.S.2d 483).

 The cause of action to recover damages under Labor Law § 241(6) was also properly dismissed.   In order to prevail under that statute, a plaintiff is required to plead and prove that the defendant violated a specific provision or provisions of the Industrial Code (see, Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co., 81 N.Y.2d 494, 601 N.Y.S.2d 49, 618 N.E.2d 82;  Phillips v. City of New York, 228 A.D.2d 570, 644 N.Y.S.2d 764).   Here, the only such provision upon which plaintiff relies is one which relates to “ladders and ladderways” (12 NYCRR 23-1.21) and thus is inapplicable to the facts of this accident (see also, Mosher v. State of New York, 80 N.Y.2d 286, 590 N.Y.S.2d 53, 604 N.E.2d 115;  Spiteri v. Chatwal Hotels, 247 A.D.2d 297, 669 N.Y.S.2d 282;  Bermel v. Board of Educ. of City of N.Y., 231 A.D.2d 663, 647 N.Y.S.2d 548).

Finally, the Supreme Court properly found that issues of fact exist precluding summary judgment on the Labor Law § 200 claim.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

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