Reset A A Font size: Print

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

IN RE: TUCKER J., Alleged to be a Juvenile Delinquent. Jonathan J. Miller, as Franklin County Attorney, Respondent; Tucker J., Appellant.

Decided: July 19, 2007

Before:  MERCURE, J.P., CARPINELLO, ROSE, LAHTINEN and KANE, JJ. Pamela A. Ladd, Fonda, for appellant. Jonathan J. Miller, County Attorney, Malone (Jonathan C. Wool of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal from an order of the Family Court of Franklin County (Main Jr., J.), entered August 1, 2006, which granted petitioner's application, in a proceeding pursuant to Family Ct. Act article 3, to adjudicate respondent a juvenile delinquent.

Petitioner commenced proceedings in two separate petitions, alleging that respondent engaged in acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crimes of assault in the second degree and obstructing governmental administration in the second degree (petition 1), and the crimes of obstructing governmental administration in the second degree and resisting arrest (petition 2).   The allegations stem from respondent's involvement in an incident on March 17, 2006, in the Village of Tupper Lake, Franklin County, involving a number of youths who interfered with the attempted arrest of an individual by a police officer, precipitating a clash with law enforcement officials.   In satisfaction of both petitions, respondent admitted to the allegations contained within petition 2-namely, that he obstructed the Tupper Lake Police Chief's arrest of another person by grabbing the Police Chief and shouting obscenity-laced challenges, and that he fought with the Police Chief and a State Trooper when they, in turn, endeavored to arrest him.   As a result, respondent was adjudicated a juvenile delinquent and placed in the custody of the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of one year.   Respondent now appeals.

Respondent asserts that Family Court failed to ascertain a sufficient factual basis during his allocution and, as a result, reversal is required.   We disagree.   Upon review of the record we are satisfied that Family Court adequately apprised respondent of the specific allegations contained in petition 2 and respondent unequivocally admitted to the commission of the acts alleged in that petition (see Matter of Mark J., 259 A.D.2d 40, 43, 696 N.Y.S.2d 583 [1999];  cf. Matter of Tiffany MM., 298 A.D.2d 728, 728-729 [2002] ).   Furthermore, although respondent did not explicitly admit his intent to obstruct the administration of law or resist arrest, it can be sufficiently inferred from his admission (see Matter of Justin ZZ., 214 A.D.2d 816, 816, 624 N.Y.S.2d 674 [1995];  see generally Matter of Davan L., 91 N.Y.2d 88, 90-92, 666 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 689 N.E.2d 909 [1997];  People v. Stevenson, 31 N.Y.2d 108, 113, 335 N.Y.S.2d 52, 286 N.E.2d 445 [1972];  People v. Clark, 241 A.D.2d 710, 710, 660 N.Y.S.2d 200 [1997], lv. denied 90 N.Y.2d 1010, 666 N.Y.S.2d 105, 688 N.E.2d 1388 [1997] ).

 Also unavailing are the arguments that there was not adequate evidence adduced at the dispositional hearing upon which Family Court could legally base its order and that respondent was effectively deprived of his right to a dispositional hearing.   At that hearing, a predispositional investigation report prepared by the Probation Department and a dispositional report prepared by the local Department of Social Services were entered upon consent of the parties.   Based upon these reports, along with respondent's previous admission to the allegations in petition 2 and the statements of the parties at the hearing, we find that there was adequate material and relevant evidence submitted at the hearing upon which Family Court could base its disposition (see Family Ct. Act § 350.3[1];  Matter of Hasan R., 177 A.D.2d 817, 817, 576 N.Y.S.2d 431 [1991];  cf. Matter of Ashley MM., 271 A.D.2d 796, 797, 705 N.Y.S.2d 447 [2000];  Matter of Tanya U., 243 A.D.2d 785, 786, 662 N.Y.S.2d 625 [1997] ).   Moreover, inasmuch as respondent was given the opportunity to review the dispositional reports-and, in fact, successfully contested portions of them-to offer other material to be considered in his disposition and, along with his mother, to be heard on the appropriate disposition, it cannot be said that respondent was effectively deprived of his right to a dispositional hearing (see Matter of Sharon D., 274 A.D.2d 702, 702-703, 710 N.Y.S.2d 205 [2000];  cf. Matter of Stephany OO., 22 A.D.3d 909, 909-910, 802 N.Y.S.2d 289 [2005] ).

 Finally, upon reviewing the record and considering both respondent's admitted failure to abide by the terms of his probation during the pendency of his dispositional hearing and the seriousness of the crimes to which he admitted, we find that a preponderance of the evidence supports Family Court's conclusion that placement of respondent with the Office of Children and Family Services for a period of one year was the least restrictive dispositional alternative (see Family Ct. Act § 350.3[2];  § 352.2[2];  Matter of Manuel W., 279 A.D.2d 662, 663, 717 N.Y.S.2d 812 [2001];  see also Matter of Todd Z., 295 A.D.2d 652, 654, 743 N.Y.S.2d 190 [2002] ).

We have considered respondent's remaining contentions and find them to be either unpreserved or without merit.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs.



Copied to clipboard