PAPASMIRIS v. KATSOS

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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Mary Yialouris PAPASMIRIS, respondent, v. John KATSOS, appellant.

Decided: June 28, 1999

FRED T. SANTUCCI, J.P., DANIEL F. LUCIANO, ROBERT W. SCHMIDT and NANCY E. SMITH, JJ. Barbara H. Katsos, New York, N.Y., for appellant. Mulholland & Knapp, L.L.P., New York, N.Y. (Robert P. Knapp of counsel), for respondent.

In an action, inter alia, to enjoin the defendant from blocking access to a purported driveway easement owned by the plaintiff, the defendant appeals from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Vaughan, J.), entered May 12, 1998, as granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment enjoining him from closing, obstructing, or otherwise restricting the plaintiff's use of the driveway.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

 The extent of an easement that is claimed under a grant is generally limited by the language of the grant, as a grantor may create an extensive or a limited easement (see, Ledley v. D.J. & N.A. Mgt., 228 A.D.2d 482, 643 N.Y.S.2d 675;  Ciano v. Smolan, 225 A.D.2d 727, 640 N.Y.S.2d 195;  Mandia v. King Lbr. & Plywood Co., 179 A.D.2d 150, 583 N.Y.S.2d 5).   The terms of the grant are to be construed most strongly against the grantor in ascertaining the extent of the easement (see, Ledley v. D.J. & N.A. Mgt., supra;  Circuit City Stores v. Muss, 151 A.D.2d 714, 715, 543 N.Y.S.2d 147).   The facts of this case support the Supreme Court's determination that the grant gives the plaintiff an easement to use a driveway located on the defendant's property.   Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment enjoining the defendant.

The defendant's remaining contentions are without merit.

MEMORANDUM BY THE COURT.

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