AUTOMATED WASTE DISPOSAL INC v. MID HUDSON WASTE INC

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Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

AUTOMATED WASTE DISPOSAL, INC., et al., appellants, v. MID-HUDSON WASTE, INC., et al., respondents.

Decided: April 29, 2008

DAVID S. RITTER, J.P., JOSEPH COVELLO, DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, and WILLIAM E. McCARTHY, JJ. Keane & Beane, P.C., White Plains, N.Y. (Edward F. Beane of counsel), for appellants. Law Office of Thomas M. Gambino & Associates, P.C., Poughkeepsie, N.Y., for respondents.

In an action, inter alia, to permanently enjoin the defendants from improperly soliciting the plaintiffs' customers and inducing them to breach unexpired contracts with the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Putnam County (O'Rourke, J.), dated October 19, 2006, which denied their motion for a preliminary injunction.

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.

 “In order to obtain a preliminary injunction (see CPLR 6301), the moving party must demonstrate (1) a likelihood of success on the merits, (2) an irreparable injury absent the granting of injunctive relief, and (3) a balancing of the equities in its favor” (Wiener v. Life Style Futon, 48 A.D.3d 458, 851 N.Y.S.2d 355;  see Aetna Ins. Co. v. Capasso, 75 N.Y.2d 860, 862, 552 N.Y.S.2d 918, 552 N.E.2d 166;  Iron Mtn. Info. Mgt., Inc. v. Pullman, 41 A.D.3d 656, 657, 836 N.Y.S.2d 891).  “ ‘The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to maintain the status quo pending determination of the action’ ” (City of Long Beach v. Sterling Am. Capital, LLC, 40 A.D.3d 902, 903, 837 N.Y.S.2d 572, quoting Kelley v. Garuda, 36 A.D.3d 593, 596, 827 N.Y.S.2d 293).  “The decision to grant or deny a preliminary injunction rests in the sound discretion of the Supreme Court” (Ruiz v. Meloney, 26 A.D.3d 485, 486, 810 N.Y.S.2d 216;  see Doe v. Axelrod, 73 N.Y.2d 748, 750, 536 N.Y.S.2d 44, 532 N.E.2d 1272;  Ying Fung Moy v. Hohi Umeki, 10 A.D.3d 604, 604, 781 N.Y.S.2d 684).   Here, the plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that they would suffer irreparable harm if the preliminary injunction were not granted (see EdCia Corp. v. McCormack, 44 A.D.3d 991, 994, 845 N.Y.S.2d 104;  Matos v. City of New York, 21 A.D.3d 936, 937, 801 N.Y.S.2d 610;  1659 Ralph Ave. Laundromat Corp. v. Ben David Enters., 307 A.D.2d 288, 289, 762 N.Y.S.2d 288;  Marders the Landscape Store v. Barylski, 303 A.D.2d 465, 465, 756 N.Y.S.2d 429;  Neos v. Lacey, 291 A.D.2d 434, 435, 737 N.Y.S.2d 394).   The plaintiffs' contention that the Supreme Court was required to hold a hearing on its motion is without merit (see CPLR 6312[c];   Marders the Landscape Store v. Barylski, 303 A.D.2d at 466, 756 N.Y.S.2d 429).   Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.

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